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Abstract 
In 2013, in the aftermath of the military coup d'état, many ‘Islamized’ articles have been banned from the 2012 
Egyptian constitution and almost one hundred firmly inclined towards the respect of human rights and the 
absolutim on freedom of belief have been added. This latter issue did cause pragmatisms on the freedom of worship 
and on the nature of the new leadership, which remains intrinsically unstated in the 2014 text. Essential questions 
concerning the conceptualization of citizenship and its extension (al-wataniyya,) as well as the pluralism of the 
concept of ‘madaniyya’ (as right to the city) still remain unanswered. Based on the critical discourse analysis and in 
person observations dating back to 2012, this article will attempt to address and understand to what extent by 
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I. Introduction  
The relationship between the state and society in Egypt has long been a controversial issue. 
The prevailing literature tends either to overestimate the strength of the Egyptian authorities or 
underestimate that of society, in a country which leaders have often been compared to the 
Leviathan.1 The moment when the Arab uprisings broke out in the streets and squares, they 
attempted to overthrow this philosophical mythization, offering a social vision closer to the 
Lockian answer, in other words, the limitation of authorities in exercising the absolutism of 
their powers.
2
 Two years later, in 2013, the counter revolution has sabotaged the socio-political 
expectations coming from the Egyptian middle and lower-class people, and for this reason, the 
2014 constitutional provisions can be translated as a sort of paradigm shift, while reevaluating 
the Egyptian definition of government and the future of the urban relationships between the 
ruler and citizens.3 The failure of the Islamist parties in running the country has often been 
blamed on their inability to be distanziated from irksome intepretations of the doctrinal 
sources. That has impacted on and hampered the possibility of putting in place more flexible 
policies.4 
As a fundamental document regulating the aspects of governance published in 2014 attested, 
the Egyptian constitution raises many questions concerning the future of law, politics and the 
relationship of the ruler to the country and its social fabric. With regards to the content, in the 
body of the 2014 text, there are aspects engendering substantive weaknesses which structurally 
do not really differ from the 1971 or the formerly ‘Islamized’ 2012 amended texts. The 2014 
document, as occurred with the 2012 text, approved under al-Horria wa al-‘Adala, contains 
articles which could in the near future contribute to altering the shape of authoritarism, as the 
SCAF seeked to impose in the process of writing it. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has 
injected new zeal and energy into the military establishment, imposing his rule using 
unprecedented amounts of force, including mass arrests and death sentences, criminalising 
freedom of dissent, protest and speech. Nevertheless, Al-Sisi has gained considerable 
popularity leading Egypt’s revolutionaries, including the 6 April Youth Movement, in 
order to seek new routes and tactics in light of the political failure in the 2012 elections. 
In 2011, Egypt attempted to establish a moment of socio-political reformulation, which 
eventually came to a collapse one year later. The failure of the 2011-2012 turmoil in achieving 
social dignity and good governance, as part of civil expectations, could be considered as 
symptomatic for both the society’s political weakness and the economic degradation which, 
since Morsi’s ouster, has kept citizens from trusting the political counterpart, namely: the 
unstructured workers’ movement. Social forces, with strong reference to those active in the 
settlement of Mahalla El-Kubra in the Gharbiyya governorate (next to Shubra and Helwan in 
Greater Cairo), in spite of having represented the driving force in the 2011 uprising, revealed 
an inability to foster a form of structured organization to officially enter the political realm in 
 
1  THOMAS HOBBES, Leviathan, London 2010. 
2  JOHN LOCKE, The second treatise on civil government, New York 1986, at 186. 
3  MICHAEL FOUCAULT, The Subject and Power, in: The Essential Foucault: selections from essential works of Foucault, 1954-
1984, ed. Paul Rabinow & Nikolas S. Rose, New York 2003, 126-144. 
4  GILBERT ACHCAR, The Arab world: Absence of democracy, Le monde diplomatique, June 1997, available at 
<http://mondediplo.com/1997/06/arabdem>, last accessed 14 January 2015. 
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2012. This inability reinforced the heterogenity of the Islamist parties, which benefitted from 
the scarcity of political consciousness in civil and revolutionary actors to further pursue their 
campaign of mobilization. In addition, history confirms the Islamist existence as inscribed into 
the destiny of the enduring military state. Compromises between the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the military can be dated back to the 1990s and traced to the banking system. For example, 
Faisal bank and the Central Bank of Egypt have so far been involved as representatives of these 
financial dealings, and to a limited extent, could be accused of corruption, as these dealings are 
geared towards gaining more space within the economic and political arena. Now, the collapse 
of workers’ movements in the 2012 elections could be explained through the ‘myopic 
polarization’ of the system that, historically, since the mid 1990s-2000s, has been impacting 
directly on the resurgence of the Islamists, as the only existing and structured political 
counterpart in the history of the country. In saying this, I agree with CIHAN TUĞAL, when he 
claims that in all predominantly Muslim countries, the states (along with the global hegemon, 
the United States) have participated in the constitution of Islamist social actors as ‘those 
fighting for the sake of the poor’ in the 20sand 30s. However, they turned into radical political 
players regionally at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s when authoritarisms, 
or the military coup, shifted into a civil war, for instance with the case of Algeria, which 
foreclosed routes for a legal and pluralist representative government and inclusion in decision 
making.5   
The main challenge for Al-Sisi today remains the maximization of the economic and financial 
efficiency as Egypt is running low on foreign currency. This implies that he is expected to 
intervene not only structurally in the state’s apparatus; but also applicatively, despite that fact 
that economic and social pragmatisms govern the intra-society politics. The latter issue still 
today constitutes the main challenge of attempting to establish a procedural and pluralist form 
of madaniyya, here conceived as an extension of the right to the city.   
Egypt has so far been called to introduce socio-economic reforms that have to perfectly match 
with people’s demands; otherwise according to the thesis supported also by EL-MAHDI, the risk 
of fuelling another mass protest in the long-term is likely to increase.6 The change is expected 
to take place from the reintroduction of ‘the politically excluded’ into the state discourse. If the 
latter scenario is revealed, it would counter the statement by SADOWSKY concerning the 
weakness of Arab societies to counter vis a vis the strongness of the state.7 As a consequence, 
that would also require a re-analysis of Egyptian society illustrated by its historical inability to 
rebel against a post-modern totalitarian system, or nizam al-kamil. Arguably, a plaetoria of 
constitutional principles, such as the right of citizens to be considered active forces within 
society, remain core concerns. This is with regards to the effectiveness of state efforts in favour 
 
5  CIHAN TUĞAL, Transforming everyday life: Islamism and social movement theory, Theor Soc, No. 38 (2009), 423-458, 
available at 
<http://sociology.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/faculty/tugal/Transforming%20everyday%20life,%20Islamism%20and%20so
cial%20movement%20theory.pdf>, last accessed 30 January 2015, at 425. 
6  RABAB EL-MAHDI, Egypt, The moment of change, ed. Rabab El-Mahdi & Philip Marfleet, London 2009, at 36. 
7  YAHYA SADOWSKY, The new Orientalism and the Democracy Debate, Middle East Report No. 183 (1993), 14-21+40, at 15-
17. In details, SADOWSKY is discussing what qualifies a civil society. She states that groups are common enough in all human 
societies, but those with a level of internal organization and assertiveness that enables them to challenge state power are rare. 
She also claims that for decades Western Scholars stated that for many years such groups were missing in the Orient (p. 15). 
The incompatibily between Islam as theocratic nizam al-kamil is also discussed in p. 17. 
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of al-mujtama al-madaniyya (civil society) promoted through social, political and religious 
pluralist inclusion (taaddudiyya), in order to safeguard the principle of muwatana (citizenship); a 
civil right accused of having been ‘salafized’ under the al-Horria wa al-‘Adala party in 2012.  
II. Comparing Civil Rights with Citizenship   
Many concerns have also emerged in relation to the referendum, which was approved on the 
14th and 15th of January 2014, with 98.1 % of votes in favour. The unexpected result officially 
legitimated Field Marshal Al-Sisi as candidate for the presidential elections that took place on 
the 26th and 28th May in 2014.8 Doubtless, in the contexts of political transition and 
contemporary affairs, using the past to manage the present creates a long conflicted 
perspective in discussing events. Long-term predictions are unpredictable, but there is an 
interesting perspective about the debate of role of the military in 2013 and 2014, which should 
be reapproached as an examination of the power of the army’s propaganda. Arguably, this 
‘propaganda’ was sold to the masses, which eventually bought about the events of the 3rd of 
July 2013; effectively the time the coup took place. The success of the army, as seen in 2013, was 
due to the Islamist governments’ civic astaticism, alongside the inability to fix the financial 
stagnancy and reduce the public debt generated by the economic liberalism. It was in 2012 that 
the electricity and gas crises, in terms of prices, increased in line with inflation. The persistent 
daily intermittency and black out in the usage legitimated the creation of a scapegoat by the 
revolutionaries and moderate forces, represented in 2012 by Abdel Fotuh, which focused on 
the risk of instability, derived from the possible election of the Islamists. However, this 
narrative was deconstructed by the army, which indirectly supported the game of compromise 
with al-Ikhwan al-muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood). During the same year, in the 2012 
turmoil, heavy clashes in Madina Nasr and Abbassiyya occurred in concomitance of the political 
transition. Harrassment in Tahrir, as well as black outs, occurred on a daily basis and 
exponentially increased, and was interpreted metaphorically by some Cairenes as symptomatic 
of a consistent sense of ostracization, reflecting the significantly increased support for the 
Islamists, especially the Salafis Hazem Saleh Abu Ismail. This dominant, highly pragmatic, 
schizophrenic relationship governing the triad of society, media and politics, reflected the 
consistent socio-political uncertainity within Cairo’s social fabric, which was at that time split 
into a plaetoria of factions. However, the pragmatic scenario did not foreclose the roads for the 
weakened Muslim Brotherhood, which won the presidential elections through the support 
gained from the Salafis. It is not inappropriate to be reminded of the shape of governance in 
Egypt as an enduring orchestration, driven by the strong cyclic rhetorics of Islamization, 
Sharizatization, secularization, securitization and the search for a form of stability that in 
August 2014, after the military coup, brought the release of former NDP members. Thus, the 
election of Al-Sisi could be discussed from a social-strategic perspective. In detail, the lack of 
fundamental services in the country, part of the discourse on public and civil rights’s crisis, 
alongside which al-wataniyya and muwatana discussed and which still today, are highly 
expected to be implemented on a spatial urban level. This aspect has been considered 
mandatory of the representation of the army’s propaganda as guarantors of domestic 
‘stability’.  
 
8  The thesis on the boycotting remains the most accredited line of reasoning to the ballot box’s results in January 2014. 
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From a historical comparative discourse analysis, after the action carried out by the Free 
Officers in 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser imposed himself and the role of the army as a sovereign 
entity that would have provided suburban areas with access to basic needs. However, the 
inability to match such expectations in 1954 contributed to a shift in the role of the army to a 
military dictatorship. The neoliberalist policies that were rolled out further exacerbated the 
economic and social inequalities. This perspective of re-considering Egyptian politics should 
not be contaminated with the historical discourse on the ‘military republic’, as a vehicle for the 
political flagship of the country, inscribed into patron-clients relationships as a legitimate force 
for the strengthening of authoritarisms. If, on the one hand, this issue requires an in-depth 
analysis concerning the dynamics of legitimating the construction of a national hero during 
national or transnational political crises; on the other hand, it requires also looking at the 
relationship between Islamism and the deep state, or what is defined as ‘patronage politics’.  
The political agendas implemented by Sadat and Mubarak, both based on the apparent 
criminalization of suburban areas and the paradoxical promotion of state promoted Islam 
through Saudi television channels, contributed to the revival of fundamentalist-jihadist actions 
in their political return to the ‘complex of martyrdom’. The historical perspective to reconsider 
Qutbian’s theories after the 2013 coup d’etat discloses that the revolutionarism affecting Islamist 
fundamentalist movements is today unilaterally driven by political goals, expressed through 
constructivist dialectic. This constructivist approach which proclaims self-legitimacy today also 
engulfs a great majority of terrorist groups.  
In contrast to the definition of Islamic-militant fundamentalism, which could be defined as a 
force acting against reactive repressions, the shared definition of terrorism should be first and 
foremost read through the lens of an organized and well-structured network of political 
contestation.9 In addition, it aims to demonstrate through violence that secular inclined 
regimes cannot protect people nominally under their authority.10 It is interesting to note that 
terrorist groups do not have the preponderance of military force necessary for a direct 
overthrow of the government, as in the Bolshevik revolution.11  
The flaring up of ‘Islamist’ violence in Egypt in the wake of the 2013 coup and the 
fragmentation of the Islamist actors, as well as the formation of small sized jihadi groups 
(mainly based in the Sinai),which recently pledged allegiance to Da’aesh, today provides a key-
reading on the essentiality of de-centering from social movements theory and reconsidering 
the importance of ‘reflexive subjectivism’, by which is meant the importance given to the 
power of people rather than to old structured political parties or movements. As for Egypt, the 
reflexivity of the youth’s subjectivism impacted on the fate of the old structured Islamist 
parties and split the new generation of Islamists from old leaderships connected to old political 
elites in their actions as co-opted state agents. In order to have a deeper understanding of the 
juridical dynamics of al-qiada (leadership) and muwatana (here conceived as extension to the 
 
9  The discussion is addressed to the new Sinai based jihadi movement Ansar Bait Al-Maqdis, today turned into Wilayat Sinai, 
and Ajnad Masr, a small sized new formed terrorist group, not officially affiliated to Al-Qaeda but which is benefitting from 
the context of instability. 
10  THOMAS P. THORNTON, Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation, in: Internal War, Problems and Approaches, ed. Harry 
Eckstein, New York 1964, at 71-99. 
11  Cf. DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force, A Comparative Study of fifteen Countries with Special 
Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa, New York 1974. 
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right to the city), it is worth taking a look into the Civil Law Code of the country and the 
problematization of the role addressed to Shari’a12.  
Similarly to the 2012 constitution, Shari’a in the 2014 text keeps its validity as a source of 
consultation. What differs between the two constitutions is not so much the approval or 
rejection of the Shari’a from a legitimation into the state’s discourse and as symptom of an 
attitude to secularize the country; rather what does differ is the suppression of article 219 from 
the constitution, which modifies its conceptualization and limits of implementation in today’s 
Egypt. The suppression of the article opens interesting debates, albeit from different 
perspectives, where the fulcrum of the analysis is embedded in the way aqida, ibadaat and what 
is defined as the ‘civic reason’, could be processed under what is apparently defined as the 
‘post-modernist’ Islamic-Islamist framework, in which Islam has been constitutionalized. It is 
important to note that the Egyptian intra-state framework in the aftermath of the 2013 coup, 
did push more directly for the demands of the Al-dawla al-madaniyya (or civil society), which 
for really the first time appeared, in the 2014 approved constitution. However, after pressure 
from the ‘ideologically independent’ Al-Azhar institution and Al-Nour, the latter an offshoot of 
the Salafis al-Dawla al-Salafiyya party, the word madaniyya was no longer included in the article 
at the moment of approval, prior to the 2013 referendum. 
It does follow that the 2014 constitution remains not of the civil state but of the civil 
government. This aspect can impose many limits from a domestic and international 
perspective, as it implies a strict direction of constitutionalism to the ruler and members of 
government, rather than to the character of the state.  
Pressure exerted by the Copts in December 2013, which addressed the fragmented liberal and 
secular front, can be considered a further positive element before the introduction of the 
concept and principle of muwatana (citizenship) as prerogative for Muslims and religious 
minorities existing in the country.  
The constitutional text was initially aimed at representing first of all, the main source of 
affiliation to the state and in terms of religious non-discrimination; a guarantee of complete 
freedom of belief; restoration of the ban on religion-based activity and political parties.13 
 
12 The term muwatana literally refers to citizenship. However, it is here used in Lefevbrian terms as ‘right to the city’.  
13 URIS DAVIS, Jinsiyya versus Muwatana: the Question of Citizenship and the State in the Middle East, Arab Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 17, Winter/Spring 1995, 19-26. In the Arab world there are three words to conceptualize the principle of 
citizenship: Ra’wyyia (archaic), Jinsyyia and Muwatana (nationality/citizenship). In the case of Jinsyyia it means the principle of 
nationality on the basis of a certificate, by differing from the implications given to the meaning of Muwatana. Article 1 of the 
2014 draft constitution states: “The Arab Republic of Egypt is a sovereign state, united and indivisible; no (part of it) is 
dispensable, and its system is (a) democratic republic based on citizenship and the rule of law. (The Egyptian people) is part 
of the Arab nation and (works for) its integrity and unity (Egypt) is part of the Muslim world, belongs to the African 
continent, is proud of its Asian dimension, and contributes to building human civilization” (available at 
<http://www.memri.org/report/en/print7737.htm>, last accessed 6 February 2015). In 2007, the Mubarak regime added 
several amendments to the 1971 constitution, including an amendment to article 1 stating that the Egyptian regime was 
based on the principle of citizenship, a principle which stipulates that an individual's belonging to the state is based on 
citizenship (jinsyyia) – i.e. not religion – and that discrimination due to religion, faith, ethnicity, gender etc. is forbidden. 
While the 2012 constitution moved this citizenship clause to article 6, in the new constitution text it has been restored to its 
original place in article 1 to indicate its great importance. The new constitution replaces the 2012 constitution's definition of 
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Nevertheless, there exists a second narrative framing Shariʿa, not as by-product of fossilization 
and astaticism to an interpretative religious archaism, rather, as a possible postmodernist 
approach embedding potentialities with regards to the possibility of enabling a form of 
integrating support to create a ‘secular state’ – a state system theoretically compatible with 
Shari’a. The conceptualization of the term ‘secularization’ does not embrace the religious, but 
rather, the social sphere.14 However, challenges to the role played by Shari’a remain pragmatic 
given the strong and radical politicization of its use. The new 2014 constitution, if compared to 
the previous 2012 and 1971 amended texts, embeds the law system into the rhetoric over anti-
Islamizing campaign and counter-terrorism strategies. It includes 40 new articles concerning 
the so-called ‘identity clauses’ regarding the status of religion. However, out of 247 articles, 100 
taken from the 2012 text have been amended.15 
It seems that the more the text assumes a civil and rationalist tone (more ‘enlightened and 
tolerant’, firmly anchored to human rights and gender equality), the more its effect could risk 
being turned into a boomerang, giving even more privileges to the military. Not surprisingly, 
the 2014 constitution allows the authority to prosecute civilians in military tribunals, and as a 
consequence, it is feared there may be a return to a ‘less rigid militarization of the state’. 
Concerning the role of the ruler, he is expected to act mainly from a ‘right to the city’ basis. 
This principle, in spite of its cruciality and fundamental importance, has remained pragmatic 
since the 1960s, following the Free Officers’ action. 
III. Questioning the Relationships between Shari’a and 
Liberal Rights 
From a comparative critical discourse analysis, when reviewing the 2012 and 2014 constitution 
texts in terms of representative forces, the first juridical structural change which comes to light 
is the removal of Majlis al-Shura Masri. With regards to this, article 6 of the 2012 text stated as 
follows: 
“The political system is based on the principles of democracy and shura (council), 
citizenship (under which all citizens are equal in rights and duties), multi-party 
pluralism, peaceful transfer of power, separation of powers and the balance between 
them, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and freedom; all as elaborated in the 
Constitution”.16 
                                                                                                                                                                         
the Egyptian people as part of ‘the Islamic nation (umma)’ with a definition of Egypt as part of the Muslim world – thus 
removing the pan-Islamic approach from the constitution. 
14  See D. PARVAZ, Can Secularism survive in Egypt?, Al-Jazeera, 9 August 2013, available at 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/08/201389204726720412.html>, last accessed 15 January 2015. In this case 
the statement by Adly Al-Mansour concerning the secularization of Egypt could be read in this sense or the secularization of 
the state by not rejecting. 
15  See 2014 constitution, Appendix, 17 onwards. 
16  Article 6 of the 2012 constitution, available at <http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-
translated>, last accessed 6 February 2015. 
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Doctrinally conceived as anchored to the establishing of the Islamic state, the ‘Upper Houses of 
the Egyptian Parliament’ imply that the understanding of Shari’a should have been translated 
and adapted to contemporary life by avoiding the principle of darura (or the doctrine of 
necessity).17 The al-Horria wa al-‘Adala party, by contrast, kept the doctrinal principles of the 
Islamic jurisprudence stuck in irksome interpretations of the code, by depicting Islamism as 
strictly anchored to an out of date process, to which Al-Nour has deeply struggled to see article 
219 from the 2012 constitution implemented in the 2013 draft .18 A different reading and 
approach to the processing of Majlis al-Shura, defended in a different historical 
contextualization of the Egyptian alliances and leaders, would have probably brought a 
different conceptualization of the role addressed by the Houses of Parliament, as a possible 
integrating part of the institutionalized and constitutional asset of the country. The narrative is 
very controversial and based on structural and legal axioms. 
Concerns persist while analyzing the 2014 enacted constitution as the outputs seem anchored 
to the 1971 amended text. In more detail, in the 2013 draft, approved in January 2014, article 5 
was excluded; Majlis al-Shura. The choice fuelled criticisms with regards to the way of 
conceiving the meaning of ‘democracy’ as a pluralistic approach to citizenship, 
constitutionalism and inclusivism in the Arab region as a whole.19 From a comparative 
discourse analysis, what is defined in Arabic as Majlis al-Shura, could be considered as a 
representative body compared to the parliament in ‘democratic’ western countries. Thus, it 
implicates that doctrinally, a procedural form of direct democracy was structurally inscribed 
into the Islamist democratically elected government. 
The military’s manoeuvre, while aiming to suppress any forms of civic association ‘’ala- al-asas 
dinia’ (on religious principles), did not deter the Salafis circuit (Al-Nour) from interfering, with 
domestic politics exposing itself.20 Since 1998, the Egyptian government had frozen out almost 
 
17  MUHAMMAD ASAD, Principles of State and Government in Islam, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1961, at 36. For a better 
understanding of the Caliphate see NOMAN HANIF, Hizb ut-Tahrir and its influence on the revival of a Caliphate in the 
Islamic world. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA’s 49th Annual Convention, Bridging Multiple Divides, San 
Francisco 2008. 
18  Achcar, supra Fn. 4. 
19  Davis, supra Fn. 13. 
20 From a comparative discourse analysis it is important to shed light on the same article as reported in the two different 
constitution drafts: the 1971 and the 2014. Article 5 in the 1971 constitution states: “The political system of the Arab Republic 
of Egypt is a multiparty one, within the framework of the basic elements and principles of the Egyptian society as stipulated 
in the Constitution.” Please, note that the constitution text here considered refers to the text after the amendments ratified on 
May 22, 1980 Referendum. Full text available at <http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/mideast/EG 
/Egyptian%20Constitution%20-%20english.pdf>, last accessed 30 January 2015.  
Article 5 in the 2014 constitution by contrast, reminds of the limits to the partisan and political multiplicity in Article 74 
(Freedom to form political parties), where it is stated that all “citizens shall have the right to form political parties by 
notification as regulated by Law. No political activity may be practiced and no political parties may be formed on the basis of 
religion or discrimination based on sex, or origin, or on sectarian basis or geographic location. No activity that is hostile to 
democratic principles, secretive, or of military or quasi-military nature may be practiced.” In article 5 the legitimacy of the 
partisan and political multiplicity and the respect for human rights and freedom is safeguarded. The article is in direct 
collision with article 4 (Sovereignty) in which is explained that it does belong to people alone, who safeguards their national 
unity (strong anchor to Nationalism) which is based on the principle of ‘equality’ justice and equal opportunity between 
citizens (the limitations imposed in article 4 are dichotomist to article 5 where the processing of ‘freedom’ and ‘equal rights’ 
remain very questionable). 
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sixteen legalised opposition parties.21 Transferring citizens from an autocratic regime to a 
democratic order implies the firm respect of pluralism, as a pillar before the establishing of al-
mujtama al-madaniyya, as a social goal advocated by the EU Foreign Policy’s fanfare in the 
Mediterranean area.  
Due to the highly subjective and pragmatic interpretations of the principles of Shari’a, the 
removal of al-Majlis al-Shura from the 2014 constitution was seen as a ‘successful’ de-Islamizing 
attempt, however, as stated here, article 4 and 5 in the 2014 text remain very questionable and 
dichotomist in terms of liberalism and democratization. These conceptualizations are thought 
to be impossible to be put into practice, as is claimed here, because of the form of doctrinal 
compatibility between Islam as a state religion and Islamism as expression of religion in social-
politics.22 
In introducing the concept of pluralism, it is worth shifting the axis of this analysis towards a 
further change which occurred in 2014: the acclamation for the absolutism given to the freedom 
of belief. A few words deserve to be spent on this issue. During the deliberations over the new 
constitution, representatives of the Coptic church and civil forces pressed for replacing 
‘Christians and Jews’ with ‘non-Muslims’, so that it would have encompassed other religious 
minorities such as Baha'i, Buddhists, Qadianis (Ahmadis) and Quranists. However, the demand 
was rejected, following the objections by Al-Azhar and Hizb al-Nour (Al-Nour party). Article 235 
in the 2014 constitution indeed states that, in its first session after the approval of the 
constitution, the parliament was expected to pass a law to organize the construction and 
renovation of churches, guaranteeing Christians the freedom to practice their religious rituals. 
Before the ratifying of the 2012-2014 text, as reported by PURCELL next to BROWNLEE, freedom 
of belief and religious-sectarian clashes between Copts and Muslims have always been 
symptomatic of a political failure addressed by the former regimes, rather than a matter which 
needed to be constitutionally regulated.23 
In 2007, under Papa Shneouda Copt, women were kidnapped and then forced to convert to 
Islam in order to be given as wives to Muslims. The demagogy of conversions aimed to 
construct a politically driven narrative around the Muslim Brotherhood, by eventually 
marginalizing ‘political Islam’ from any weak intromission into the political apparatus of the 
state. The demagogical approach, subsequently, legitimated the EU to further prioritize 
security and counter-terrorism as strategies in the Middle East region, even though scholars 
claim that there is still a lack of a clear definition of terrorism in the field of social science.  
Absolutism, before freedom of belief, as stated in article 64 of the 2014 constitutional text, has 
to be carefully acclaimed.24 Many concerns remain about the establishing of an interfaith state 
 
21  JOSHUA A. STACHER, Parties over: The Demise of Egypt’s Opposition Parties, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol. 31 (November 2004) Nr. 2, 215-233, at 217. 
22  See Appendix. 
23  MARK PURCELL, A Place for the Copts: imagined territory and spatial conflict in Egypt, Ecumene 5 (1998), pp. 432-451, at 
435. For a comparative approach see JASON BROWNLEE, Violence against Copts in Egypt, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, November 2013, available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/violence_against_copts3.pdf>, last 
accessed 21 January 2015. 
24  See Appendix. 
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in the future of Egypt. With regards to freedom of belief, while the 2012 constitution stated that 
such freedom was guaranteed, the 2014 constitution states that freedom of belief is absolute, 
restoring the word ‘absolute’ which appeared in the 1923 constitutional text. From a 
comparative approach, the article in the 2012 constitution guaranteeing freedom of worship 
and the establishment of houses of worship for monotheistic religions is the only unchanged 
aspect in the 2014 text. Hence, under the de-facto 2014 government, freedom of belief is 
processed as theoretically absolute, but freedom of worship will not be.25 
IV. Public Civil Rights 
1. Pluralism of Media System and State Authority: Challenges from Inside 
For decades, state authority of media and press systems has had an impact on intra-state 
politics and freedom of speech. The emphasis is remarkable when applied to journalism. Since 
1970, the Egyptian government’s control of the public space and media has been filled with 
many contradictions, which have definitively blocked the formation of independent 
institutions and organizations working toward a civil society and an independent press. In 
contrast, the 1971 constitution ‘protected’ journalism’s independence. However, over three 
decades; intellectuals, writers, journalists, revolutionaries and dissidents have been 
experiencing brutal torture and censorship on intellectual property and the free right to 
report.26 There is no dedicated regime for the regulation of private broadcasting in Egypt.  
As a consequence, many of the characteristics that are commonly associated with broadcast 
licensing and regulation – such as rules on diversity, public complaints systems, systems for 
allocating frequencies and rules on election coverage – are simply still not present in the 
country. There were proposals to introduce a broadcasting law in late 2008, however, these 
proposals never came to fruition. 
The main reason for this could be linked to the fact that there are no private terrestrial 
broadcasters in Egypt. There are a number of Saudi private satellite television stations, all of 
which are based in the media public free zone. This is a special area to which special rules, 
including tax-free status, are applied.27 
 
25  MOHAMED SALMAWI explained to the daily Al-Masry Al-Youm on 18 September 2013: "Article 64 states that 'freedom of 
belief is absolute', which means that a person has the right to adopt any belief he wishes, as Islam states: 'For you is your 
religion, and for me is my religion' (Qur’an 109:6). Moreover, as stated by Salmawi Islam is devotion to God, grants man the 
right to not have any faith 'Whoever wills – let him believe; and whoever wills – let him disbelieve' (Qur’an 18:29). Faith is a 
heart matter, disclosed to Allah. Therefore, it is not the right of people to search for it.” The constitution, according to 
Salmawi, does not forbid the adoption of any non-monotheistic faith or participation in its rituals. It does not forbid a 
Chinese tourist who believes in Buddhism or an Indian who believes in Hinduism from praying in their hotel room 
according to their beliefs. However and by contrast, Egyptian author and human rights activist Nawal Al-Sa'adawi 
dismissed the significance of this addition, saying that article 2 abnegates the article of absolute freedom of belief. 
26  VIRGINIA N. SHERRY, Behind Closed Doors: Torture and Detention in Egypt, New York 1992. 
27  TOBY MENDEL, Political and Media Transitions in Egypt, A Snapshot of Media Policy and Regulatory Environment, 
Internews, August 2011, available at 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Egypt/Internews_Egypt_MediaLawReview_Aug11.pdf>, last accessed 21 
January 2015, at 12-13. 
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Written press, due to it being dated back to the 1920s, encompasses over 600 newspapers and 
journals, most of them state-owned, like Al-Ahram (which remains the venerable state-owned 
flagship daily newspaper), Al-Akhbar and Al-Gumhuriya. It’s worth bearing in mind that, in 
spite of the constitutional principles, under Sadat and Mubarak, journalists working for private 
newspapers were jailed, persecuted and tortured under the accusation of breaching the law 
prohibiting criticism of the President or state institutions.28 
It was in 2005, after the parliamentental elections, that the media gave way to fair coverage of 
all the parties involved in the election. In 2006, Al-Jazeera journalists were again persecuted, 
detained and investigated with the accusation of harming the country’s reputation.29 In 2009 
the Egyptian court suspended al-Ibdaa (creativity) due to the publication of the blasphemous 
poem by Hilmi Salem.30 Broadcasting in Egypt is still today mainly authorized on a public 
basis, and concerning the case of private television channels and newspapers; until 2011 these 
were categorically prohibited. 
The number of opposition and independent newspapers has grown rapidly over the past 
decade. Al-Arabi and Rose El-Youssef, however, remain the flagship of pro-government 
propaganda.31 It is interesting to point out how the opposition newspapers generally devote 
more space to issues of corruption and human rights abuses than the state-owned newspapers. 
In spite of this, the opposition press has always been dependent on the government for 
newsprint and distribution. The dependency on the state, apart from the restrictions imposed 
by the emergency law, derives from poor facilities, limited financial resources, lack of 
advertising and small circulations. The opposition press, moreover, has always been denied 
access to government information sources; many of the requested interviews with 
governmental officials are denied, which, alongside a perceived lack of objectiveness in factual 
reporting standards, is thought to have eroded press credibility with the public.  
According to REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, Egypt, in terms of the freedom of the press index, 
was in 2008-2009 ranked 146 out of 173.32 Ten years later, in 2013 – before the coup d’état – the 
rank slightly improved, jumping up eight positions.33  
In 2011, further restrictions and controls on the freedom of the press worsened the political 
panorama with the sentencing of Maikel Nabil, accused of having insulted the SCAF for 
 
28  NAHED EL-TANTAWI & JULIE B. WIEST, Social Media in the Egyptian Revolution, Reconsidering resource mobilization 
theory, International Journal of Communication 5 (2011), 1207-1224, at 1212. 
29  FREEDOM HOUSE, Freedom of the Press 2007: A global survey of Media Independence, ed. Karin Deutsch Karlekar and 
Eleanor Marchant, 2007, available at 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTP%202007%20Full%20Report.pdf>, last accessed 14 January 2015, at 1-
2. 
30  Al-Azhar, which at the time was considered an independent religious institution (as also stated in the 2014 constitution) 
petitioned the courts, who ruled that ‘freedom of the press’. Moreover, in the following years (2009-2011) Al-Azhar censored 
more than 196 texts. The incriminated paragraph was the following one (defended by Hilmi as accused to the dependency 
and passivity of Muslims): “God is not a policeman, grabbing perpetrators by their necks. He is a simple villager, feeding the 
duck, checking the cow’s udder with his fingers, crying: There is plenty of milk”. 
31  Rose El-Youssef represented for decades the mouthpiece for the Hosni Mubarak regime. In 2012 it adopted a tone more in 
line with the anti-Mubarak sentiment. 
32  REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, Freedom of the Press Worldwide in 2008, Annual Report, available at 
<www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_en-2.pdf>, last accessed 14 January 2015, at 149. 
33  REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, supra Fn. 32. 
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undermining the revolution behind the statement claiming the co-optation between the army 
and the people, which is as historical as explicative of the domestic political excursus.34 
In 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood guided government struggled to maintain a consistent policy 
on new deliberated media.35 In relation to this, the most discussed event of suppression is the 
case of Bassem Youssef who accused the Islamists in Al-Barnamagh of menacing the 
fundamental pillars of freedom in the country, in light of the irksome applications of religion to 
the social level. Morsi’s former government suspended the programme proving ruler’s 
imposition on control on freedom of dissent, which in a presumed democratic inclined system 
should be conceived as the backbone of the state. The monopolization of intellectual and 
political freedom, as forms of dissent, is also what rescues ‘democracy’ from a quiet death.  
Following this critique of the sabotage of freedoms in late 2012, the Salafist Hazem Abu Ismail 
publicly and deliberatively spurred direct intimidation and menace to journalists who would 
have blamed him, by inciting as a consequence al-Hazemoon (or a part of Salafis followers).36 In 
an impartial comparative discourse analysis, the secularist front has not been alienated from 
the contextualization of violence over media channels. Al-Jazeera during 2012 was quite often 
accused of being bias towards the Muslim Brotherhood; this demagogy of intimidiation 
protrated on many occasions until being ostracized by Al-Sisi’s in 2014 under the framework of 
the banning of the Muslim Brotherhood’s satellite supporters.  
In the aftermath of the 3rd of July 2013 coup, the de-facto government’s policy, in terms of the 
freedom of the press, proved to be very discrepantic in promoting pluralism by suppressing 
every single factor indirectly linked to the implementation of a procedural form of civil society, 
and therefore, of pluralism and the concept of madaniyya (citizenship). After a distance of two 
years, the main focus of the post-Islamist campaign still grasps the arcane in questioning how 
little the media evolved during 2012 under Morsi’s flash government. Morsi removed the 
entire leadership of the government, ran press syndicates and replaced it with Brotherhood 
appointees by posing many questions on the grade of ‘auto(theo)cracy’ (with an Islamic 
reference), which the party would have implemented in that transition. MARIZ TADROS 
questioned the issue by reminding us that the principle of religious equality synthetized in the 
‘lahum ma la’na wa aleikom ma aleina’, as stated by Hassan al Banna, came to be deposed by 
conservative leaders in modern times.37 A further important question for Egypt in the post-
uprising is what kind of changes need to be implemented to ensure that the Journalist 
Syndicate can, in the future, operate free of government control in a more ethically regulated 
system, and far from any political criminalization of the media and the press, as occurred in 
relation to the depiction of the unplanned areas in Munira Gharbiyya.38 In article 48 of the 2012 
 
34  SHARIF A. KOUDDOUS, Jailed Egyptian Blogger on Hunger Strike Now in Critical Condition, Pulitzer Center, 8 September 
2011, available at <http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/egypt-cairo-maikel-nabil-sanad-jailed-trial-revolution>, last accessed 14 
January 2015. 
35  MENDEL, supra Fn. 27, at 12. 
36  HEATHER MCROBIE, Egypt: A tale of two constitutions, Opendemocracy, 16 January 2014, available at 
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/heather-mcrobie/egypt-tale-of-two-constitutions>, last accessed 14 January 2015.  
37  MARIZ TADROS, The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt. Democracy defined or confined?, London/New York 
2012, at 7. 
38  MENDEL, supra Fn. 27, at 10-11. 
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amended constitution, the Al-Horria wa al-‘Adala party insisted on the need to ensure 
independence for the press so that they can serve the community in their moral mission.39 
Indeed, in 2012, Egypt saw an influx of private, but not independent, channels, owned by 
businessmen inclined to prove to the government their capacity for proving influence through 
power. Businessmen in 2014 supported the military in the second transition; therefore, the 
interest of such new channels in the future of the country is not to be actually independent but, 
once again, not to enter in conflict with the deep state’s interests. Articles 71 and 72 in the 2014 
constitution can be read as a replicated model, anchored to articles 48 and 49 in the former 2012 
text, and to articles 209 and 210 in the 1971 constitution.40 In all three aforementioned cases, 
independence is constitutionally safeguarded against control over the media, but episodes of 
journalists and reporters who faced charges and tortures remain hidden ‘behind closed 
doors’.41 
The issue of freedom of the press in the country remains a borderline aspect, which could 
impact the establishing of a pluralist civil society based on the fundamental right of freedom of 
thought. As occurred in 1967, the same media system has in 2013 been demagogically exploited 
by the state authority as a strategy aimed at exacerbating the negative depiction of Islamists 
parties. In the scholarly literature, the way limitations are imposed act as catalysing tools 
through which Al-Sisi has reshaped the nature of his post-modernist authority.42 
Article 179 of the 2014 constitution established the National Council for Media, which is set to 
become the regulatory authority on the media in Egypt and whose composition will be later set 
by law. Nonetheless, it presents some problematic language amendments. While the 2012 text 
already had, for instance, the vague stipulation that the council was supposed to protect the 
values of society and its constructive traditions, the 2013-2014 text also includes protecting 
national unity and societal peace. The parameters of freedom are extended to the religion 
sphere and with regards to this, any issues concerning interfaith dialogue cannot be 
undervalued while examining the meaning of ‘socio-political freedom’. Rather, this latter issue 
remains the most urgent, if not crucial, aspect about which the new government is being called 
to implement reforms. It is a challenging effort that could subsequently gather all the 
counterparts around the call for an effective pluralist idea of nation-state.   
Now, the problem with this vague use of the language is that, while purely decorative if left 
alone, it could also open the door for potentially restrictive practices.43 
 
39  As stated by MCROBIE (supra Fn. 36): Article 210 of the 1971 constitution, in vigour until 2011, states that journalists have 
the right to obtain news and information, their activities are not subject to any authority other than the law (the regime). 
40  Article 71 of the 2014 constitution states: “It is prohibited to censor, confiscate, suspend or shut down Egyptian 
newspapers and media outlets in any way”, see Appendix.  
41  The reminding is both of the Al- Jazeera journalists currently detained in Cairo with the accusation of spreading terrorism 
and false news, harming national unity and social peace and using terrorism as a mean for their goals. Al-Jazeera Cairo 
bureau Chief Mohammed Fahmy is also accused of belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood.  
42  Brownlee, supra Fn. 23, at 4-6. 
43  BASSEM SABRY, 22 Key points in Egypt’s New Draft Constitution, Al-Monitor, The Pulse of the Middle East, 23 August 
2013, available at <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/egypt-draft-constitution-guide.html#>, last accessed 
14 January 2015. 
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2. Conceptualizing the Juridical Meaning of Freedom 
The uprisings produced a database of memories full of street art, as was personalized in 
Mohammed Mahmoud’s street, and the walls leading to Tahrir Square. Once art turns into 
pop-nationalism, Egyptian artists’s graffiti in downtown have become subject to contestation, 
and on many occasions, attempted to be removed by the state. Among the state’s amendments 
on freedom of expression stands the one ratified by the Ministry of Local Development Labib 
in late 2013, which legitimated and authorized the criminalization of street art as a crime equal 
to dumping trash on the streets.44 
Now, socially and politically, revolutionary graffiti has always driven the historical narration 
of the Egyptian neo-national identity during the days of uprising and the political transition in 
2012. It is under this framework that the condemnation of street art by the de-facto government 
can be translated as a tactic to following the political failure, crack down on the Trotskyist 
revolutionary opposition known as al-ishtirakiyyun al-thawriyyun: a political block ideologically 
in opposition with the liberals or the secularists aligned on the National Salvation Front.45 
Ostracizing popular culture, threatening artists and dissenters contravenes the principle of 
parresia, whose ethymological interpretation is embedded into the fundamental right to 
pluralism in the process of establishing a new political order.46 The attempt of suppressing 
forms of neo-nationalism and identity self-reformulation, again, represents the Egyptian 
rhetoric over the principle of taaddudiyya (pluralism) and is reflected both in social and political 
terms as a form of fear captured by the regime before possible, even though at the present 
stage, remote attempts at an Islamist re-mobilization.47 
V. Limits on Civilian Assessment and President’s Authority 
The discourse on the president’s authority, the independence of the judiciary and Al-Azhar 
shows some positive and negative aspects. Under the 2014 constitution, the president’s powers 
are not very different than those granted to him in the 2012 model. Some of them have been 
restricted even further than in the previous constitution, and only in a few cases, expanded. 
The 2014 constitution basically grants the president more leeway in appointing MPs compared 
to the 2012 constitution, which enabled him to appoint up to 10% of the Shura council, meaning 
up to 15 representatives.48 The change implies that the president is given the authority to 
 
44  LINA KHATIB, Image Politics in the Middle East: The Role of the Visual in Political Struggle, London/New York 2013, at 17-
25. The American University in Cairo has been accused of being politically involved in. On the same issue see SORAYA 
MORAYEF, Angels caught in a tightening noose, Opendemocracy, 13 November 2013, available at 
<https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/soraya-morayef/angels-caught-in-tightening-noose>, last accessed 14 
January 2015. 
45  KHATIB, supra Fn. 44. 
46  SUHAIR EL-QARRA, Arab Spring: Changes and Challenges, Freedom of expression, hate, speech, discrimination and social 
media, On the ongoing big public debate on freedom of expression, Lisbon Forum, Council of Europe 2012. 
47  The identification of the roots of this value in different cultural heritages is essential to understand the universality of this 
civil right. The international human rights law stresses on the states’ responsibility in combating cultural, ethnic based 
violence, especially if the violence is disguised as a religious or a cultural practice, United Nation Human Right Commission 
1989.  
48  Article 128 of the 2012 constitution. 
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appoint up to 5% of these delegates, meaning up to 23.49 The expanding of the president’s 
authority is meant to enable the ruler to ensure representation by weak groups with no 
reserved seats such as women, Copts, youths and workers. Limiting the president's authority is 
manifested in cancelling his exclusivity in appointing a defence minister in the coming years. 
Agreements made by the president regarding a ceasefire, alliance or sovereign, for the time 
being, requires approval by referendum (article 151), and not just by parliament, in contrast 
with the 2012 constitution. Article 159, rather, determines that if the president stands trial, the 
verdict given by the special court established for that purpose is final.50 
Contrary to the 2012 constitution, the 2014 text does not require the president to appoint a 
deputy. The 2014 constitution highlights that if the president is temporarily unable to perform 
his duties, the prime minister will stand in for him, as detailed in article 160.51 In addition, the 
2014 amended text seems to enable the president to declare a state of emergency with the 
approval of parliament for six months and with the possibility of extending it to another six 
months, on referendum approval, as stated in article 154 of the 2012 constitution:  
“If the vacancy of the presidential office occurs at the same time that a referendum or 
the election of either the House of Representatives or the Shura Council is being held, 
precedence shall be given to the presidential elections. The existing Parliament shall 
continue in place until the completion of the presidential elections”.52 
Concerns, however, remain about the way this procedural form of pluralistic and shared 
decision-making will be applied.  
It is deduced in article 154 of the 2014 constitution that the new constitution limits state of 
emergency to three months, where extensions to which must be eventually approved by the 
parliament.53 
VI. Conclusions 
One of the most worrisome aspects generated by the Arab uprisings is the way politics and the 
Islamist revival has been reshaped. As concerns the call for pluralism many gaps will remain un-
bridged for many years to come. With regard to this, the de jure crack down of the Al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimin is designated to remain at the core of this enduring controversial discussion.  
Even though from a structural and legal perspective the 2014 constitution strictly limits president’s 
powers; predictions and expectations concerning the definitive suppression of the Islamists as 
phenomenology in social-politics is unlikely to happen. The coercive suppression, rather, is 
misleading whilst examining not only the political stability of the Southern Mediterranean area, but 
also the history of Egypt’s domestic politics. As for the restoration of the military guard, old state 
security agents have returned to their old ways and humiliating dissidents by leaking their private 
 
49  Article 102 of the 2014 constitution. 
50  Appendix. 
51  Appendix. 
52  Appendix. 
53  Appendix. 
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phone calls to the media. Crackdowns today keep targeting all representatives of social pluralism 
between who atheists or blasphemers. Most of the leaders of the 2011 original uprising are in prison 
or exile. Some have been silenced, and some seem still willing to accept the military repression as 
that necessary price for getting rid of Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, considered the biggest threat in the 
country. Such hardline tactics could reflect a military confidently in charge.  
Al-Sisi today contemplates the cult for the personality in his celebration as national hero in a 
pragmatic nationalistic sentiment.54 As for the directly political domains of parliament and political 
parties, Al-Sisi does not have the need, as did Nasser, to formulate a single party or to restore the 
old guard of the National Democratic Party, in spite of the release of many former NDP members as 
occurred in August 2014 and in December 2014, to crowd out opposition, including parliamentary 
elections, and to burnish his image. Al-Sisi is proving to be as talented as enormously manipulative 
and highly politicised officer who managed to rescue the military and the deep state more generally 
from potential destruction at the hands of revolutionary movements or al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin.  
The danger Egypt could face is that Al-Sisi’s ambitions and abuses, combined with the institutional 
interests of an overly large, inadequately trained and corrupt military, will lead to socio-political 
and economic backlashes.  
  
 
54  ROBERT SPRINGBORG, Abdul Fattah al-Sisi: New face of Egypt’s old guard, BBC, 26 March 2014, available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26188023, last accessed 21 January 2015. 
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Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt (2014)55  
 
In the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful 
This is Our Constitution, Egypt is the gift of the Nile for Egyptians and the gift of Egyptians to 
humanity. 
With its unique location and history, Egypt is the Arab heart of the world. It is the meeting 
point of world civilizations and cultures and the crossroads of its maritime transportation and 
communications. It is the head of Africa on the Mediterranean and the estuary of its greatest 
river: the Nile. 
This is Egypt, an immortal homeland for Egyptians, and a message of peace and love to all 
peoples. 
In the outset of history, the dawn of human conscience arose adn shone forth in the hearts of 
our great ancestors, whose goodwill banded together to found the first central State that 
regulated and organized the life of Egyptians on the banks of the Nile. It is where they created 
amazing wonders of civilization, and where their hearts looked up to heavens before earth 
knew the three Abrahamic religions. 
Egypt is the cradle of belief and the banner of glory of the revealed religions. 
On its land, Prophet Moses - to whom Allah spoke - grew up and on Mount Sinai, the 
Revelation of Allah shone on his heart and Divine message descended.  
On its land, Egyptians harbored in their bosoms Virgin Mary and her baby and offered 
thousands of martyrs in defense of the Church of Jesus, Peace Be Upon Him. 
When the Seal of the Messengers Mohammad (Peace and Blessings Be Upon Him) was sent to 
all mankind to perfect the sublime morals, our hearts and minds were opened to the light of 
Islam, and we, labeled the best soldiers on Earth fighting for the cause of Allah, disseminated 
the message of truth and sciences of religion across the world. 
This is Egypt, a homeland in which we live and in our souls it lives. 
In modern age, minds were enlightened, humanity became mature, and nations and peoples 
progressed on the path of knowledge, raising the banners of freedom and equality. Mohamed 
Ali founded the modern Egyptian State with a national army as its pillar. Refaa, the Azharian, 
called for having the homeland “a place of happiness shared by all its people.” 
We, Egyptians, strived to keep up with the pace of advancement and offered up martyrs and 
made sacrifices in several uprisings and revolutions until our patriotic army stood up for the 
overwhelming will of the people in the “Jan 25 – June 30” Revolution that called for freedom, 
human dignity and social justice for all, and for Egypt to regain its independent will. 
 
55  The version in use in this appendix is the unofficial English translation, available at 
<http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf>, last accessed 12 February 2015. The official Arabic 2014 constitution can 
be downloaded from <http://www.egypt.gov.eg/arabic/laws/download/Constitution_2014.pdf>, last accessed 12 February 
2015. 
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This revolution is continuation of national struggle whose brightest symbols were Ahmed 
Oraby, Mostafa Kamel, and Mohamed Farid, and is a culmination of two great revolutions in 
our modern history: 
The 1919 revolution that had rid Egypt and the Egyptians of the British protection, established 
the principle of citizenship and equality for all the people. Its leader, Saad Zaghloul, and his 
successor, Mosfata El-Nahhas, in adopting democracy asserted that “Right is above power and 
the nation is above government”. During this revolution, Talaat Harb laid down the 
cornerstone of the national economy. 
The July 23, 1952 revolution led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and embraced by the popular will 
rendered true the dream of generations for independence and evacuation of foreign forces. 
Egypt affirmed its Arab allegiance, opened up to its African continent and Muslim world, 
supported liberation movements across continents, and took firm steps on the path of 
development and social justice. 
This revolution is an extension of the revolutionary march of Egyptian patriotism, and 
enhances the strong bond between the Egyptian people and their national army that assumed 
the duty and shouldered the responsibility of protecting the homeland, by virtue of which we 
achieved victory in our greatest battles including driving off the 1956 Tripartite Aggression to 
defeating our defeat through the glorious victory of October 1973 that gave President Sadat a 
special place in our recent history. 
Compared to major revolutions in the history of mankind, the Jan 25 – June 30 Revolution is 
unique with its high density of popular participation - estimated to be in the tens of millions - 
and the prominent role of youth aspiring at a brighter future. It is also unique in that the 
masses transcended class and ideology divides to reach out to more expansive horizons, the 
people’s will was defended by their army, and that it had the blessings of Al-Azhar and the 
Egyptian church. This Revolution is further unique because of its peacefulness and ambition to 
achieve freedom and social justice combined.  
This revolution is both a sign and a good omen; a sign of a past that is still present and a good 
omen of a future at which all humanity aspires. 
The world is about to turn the last few leaves of this era that has been torn up by conflicts of 
interest between the East and the West, and the North and the South; an era where disputes 
and wars erupted between classes and peoples, where dangers grew threatening the existence 
of mankind and life on Earth which Allah entrusted us to preserve. As humanity hopes to 
move from the age of maturity to the age of wisdom to build a new world where truth and 
justice prevail, and where freedoms and human rights are protected, we, Egyptians, believe 
that our revolution is a resumption of our contribution to drafting a new history for humanity. 
We believe that we are capable of using the past as an inspiration, stirring up the present, and 
making our way to the future. We are capable of raising this homeland and rising with it. 
We believe that every citizen is entitled to live in this homeland safe and secure, and that every 
citizen has the right to live at present and in the future. 
We believe in democracy as a path, a future, and mode of living, political pluralism and the 
peaceful rotation of power. We affirm the right of the people to make and determine their 
future. The Egyptian people, is the sole source of authority. Freedom, human dignity, and 
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social justice are the rights of every citizen. We and our future generations are masters in a 
sovereign homeland that is master of its destiny. 
We are now drafting a Constitution that embodies the dream of generations for a prosperous 
consolidated society and a just State that realizes the present and future ambitions for the 
individual and the community. 
We are now drafting a Constitution that seeks the completion of building a modern democratic 
State having a civil government. 
We are drafting a Constitution that prevents any corruption or tyranny and by which we heal 
the wounds of the past, from the days of the old Eloquent Peasant to the victims of negligence 
and the martyrs of the revolution in our present time, and relieve our people who have – for 
long – been suffering injustice. 
We are drafting a Constitution that affirms that the principles of Islamic Sharia are the 
principal source of legislation, and that the reference for the interpretation of such principles 
lies in the body of the relevant Supreme Constitutional Court Rulings.1 
We are drafting a Constitution that paves the way to the future for us, and which is consistent 
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which we participated in drafting and 
adopted.. 
We are drafting a Constitution that maintains our freedom and protects our nation against any 
peril that threatens it or our national unity. 
We are drafting a Constitution that holds all of us equal in rights and duties without 
discrimination of any kind. 
We the citizens, women and men, the Egyptian people, sovereigns in a sovereign homeland, 
this is the manifestation of our volition; this is the Constitution of our revolution.  
This is our Constitution.  
Part I The State 
Article (1) 
The Arab Republic of Egypt is a sovereign, united, indivisible State, where no part may be 
given up, having a democratic republican system that is based on citizenship and rule of law. 
The Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation seeking to enhance its integration and unity. 
Egypt is part of the Islamic world, belongs to the African continent, cherishes its Asian 
dimension, and contributes to building human civilization.  
Article (2) 
Islam is the religion of the State and Arabic is its official language. The principles of Islamic 




1 The rulings are to be deposited in the minutes. 
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The principles of Christian and Jewish Sharia of Egyptian Christians and Jews are the main 
source of legislations that regulate their respective personal status, religious affairs, and 
selection of spiritual leaders. 
Article (4) 
Sovereignty belongs only to the people, who shall exercise and protect it. The people are the 
source of powers, and safeguard their national unity that is based on the principles of equality, 
justice and equal opportunities among all citizens, as stated in the Constitution.  
Article (5) 
The political system is based on political and partisan pluralism, peaceful rotation of power, 
separation and balance of powers, the inevitable correlation between powers and 
responsibilities, and respect for human rights and freedoms, as stated in the Constitution.  
Article (6) 
Nationality is a right to anyone born to an Egyptian father or an Egyptian mother, and legal 
recognition through official papers proving his/her personal data, is a right guaranteed and 
regulated by Law. 
Requirements for acquiring nationality shall be specified by law.  




Al-Azhar is an independent Islamic scientific institution, with exclusive competence over its 
own affairs. It is the main reference for religious sciences and Islamic affairs. It is responsible 
for calling to Islam, as well as, disseminating religious sciences and the Arabic language in 
Egypt and all over the world. 
The State shall provide sufficient financial allocations thereto so that it can achieve its 
purposes. 
Al-Azhar’s Grand Sheikh is independent and may not be dismissed. The Law shall regulate the 
method of appointing the Grand Sheikh from amongst the members of Council of Senior 
Scholars.  
Article (8) 
Society is based on social solidarity. 
The State shall achieve social justice and provide the means to achieve social interdependence, 
in order to ensure a decent life for all citizens, as regulated by Law.  
Article (9) 
The State shall ensure equal opportunities for all citizens without discrimination. 
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The family is the nucleus of society, and is founded on religion, morality, and patriotism. The 
State shall ensure its cohesion, stability and the establishment of its values.  
Article (11) 
The State shall ensure the achievement of equality between women and men in all civil, 
political, economic, social, and cultural rights in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution. 
The State shall take the necessary measures to ensure the appropriate representation of women 
in the houses of representatives, as specified by Law. The State shall also guarantee women’s 
right 8 of holding public and senior management offices in the State and their appointment in 
judicial bodies and authorities without discrimination. 
The State shall protect women against all forms of violence and ensure enabling women to 
strike a balance between family duties and work requirements. 
The State shall provide care to and protection of motherhood and childhood, female heads of 
families, and elderly and neediest women.  
Article (12) 
Work is a right, duty and honor guaranteed by the State. No citizen may be forced to work 
except as required by Law and for the purpose of performing a public service for a fixed period 
in return for a fair consideration, and without prejudice to the basic rights of those obliged to 
carry out such work.  
Article (13) 
The State shall protect workers' rights and strive to build balanced work relationships between 
both parties to the production process. It shall ensure means for collective negotiations, protect 
workers against work risks, guarantee the fulfillment of the requirements of security, safety 
and occupational health, and prohibit unfair dismissal, all as regulated by Law.  
Article (14) 
Public offices are a competence-based right for all citizens without bias or favoritism, and are 
deemed a mandate to serve the people. The State shall ensure the rights and protection of 
public servants and that they perform their respective duties in serving the interests of the 
people. They may not be dismissed without disciplinary procedures except in the cases 
specified by Law.  
Article (15) 
Peaceful strike is a right regulated by Law.  
Article (16) 
The State shall honor the martyrs of the nation; shall care for revolution-wounded persons, 
veterans and wounded warriors, families of those missing in war and its equivalents, and 
persons wounded in security operations, as well as their wives, children and parents; and shall 
strive to provide all of them with job opportunities, all as regulated by Law. 
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The State shall encourage the participation of the civil society organizations in achieving those 
objectives.  
Article (17) 
The State shall ensure that social insurance services are provided. 
All citizens who do not benefit from the social insurance system have the right to social 
security, in a manner that ensures a decent life in the event of being incapable to provide for 
themselves and their families, as well as in cases of incapacity to work, old age or 
unemployment. 
In accordance with Law, the State shall strive to provide suitable pensions to small farmers, 
agricultural workers and fishermen, and irregular labor. 
The funds of social insurance and pensions are deemed private funds that enjoy all aspects and 
forms of protection afforded to public funds. Those funds along with their returns are the 
rights of their respective beneficiaries; they shall be safely invested, and shall be managed by 
an independent entity in accordance with the Law. 
The State shall guarantee social insurance and pension funds.  
Article (18) 
Every citizen has the right to health and to comprehensive health care which complies with 
quality standards. The State shall maintain and support public health facilities that provide 
health services to the people, and shall enhance their efficiency and their equitable 
geographical distribution. 
The State shall allocate a percentage of government spending to health equivalent to at least 3% 
of Gross National Product (GNP), which shall gradually increase to comply with international 
standards. 
The State shall establish a comprehensive health insurance system covering all diseases for all 
Egyptians; and the Law shall regulate citizens' contribution to or exemption from its 
subscriptions based on their income rates. 
Refusing to provide any form of medical treatment to any human in emergency or 
lifethreatening situations is a crime. 
The State shall improve the conditions of physicians, nursing staff, and health sector workers. 
All health facilities as well as health-related products, materials and means of advertisement 
shall be subject to State control. The State shall encourage the participation of private and 
nongovernmental sectors in providing health care services according to the Law.  
Article (19) 
Every citizen has the right to education. The goals of education are to build the Egyptian 
character, preserve the national identity, root the scientific method of thinking, develop talents 
10 and promote innovation, establish cultural and spiritual values, and found the concepts of 
citizenship, tolerance and non-discrimination. The State shall observe the goals of education in 
the educational curricula and methods, and provide education in accordance with international 
quality standards. 
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Education is compulsory until the end of the secondary stage or its equivalent. The State shall 
provide free education in the various stages in the State's educational institutions according to 
the Law. 
The State shall allocate a percentage of government spending to education equivalent to at least 
4% of the Gross National Product (GNP), which shall gradually increase to comply with 
international standards. 
The State shall supervise education to ensure that all public and private schools and institutes 
abide by its educational policies.  
Article (20) 
The State shall encourage and develop technical and technological education as well as 
vocational training, and expand all their types in accordance with international quality 
standards and in accordance with labor market needs.  
Article (21) 
The State shall guarantee the independence of universities and scientific and linguistic 
academies, and provide university education in accordance with international quality 
standards. It shall develop and ensure free provision of, university education in State 
universities and institutes according to the Law. 
The State shall allocate a percentage of government spending to university education 
equivalent to at least 2% of the Gross National Product (GNP), which shall gradually increase 
to comply with international standards. 
The State shall encourage the establishment of non-profit, non-governmental universities. The 
State shall guarantee the quality of education in private and non-governmental universities, 
ensure that they comply with international quality standards and the = build their own faculty 
members and researchers, and allocate a sufficient percentage of their returns to educational 
and research development.  
Article (22) 
Teachers, and faculty members and their assistants, are the main pillars of education. The State 
shall guarantee the development of their academic competencies and professional skills and 
shall care for their financial and moral rights in order to ensure the quality of education and 
achieve its goals.  
Article (23) 
The State shall ensure freedom of scientific research and encourage scientific research 
institutions as a mean to achieve national sovereignty and build a knowledge economy. The 
State shall sponsor researchers and inventors and allocate a percentage of government 
spending to scientific research equivalent to at least 1% of the Gross National Product (GNP), 
which shall gradually increase to comply with international standards. 
The State shall ensure effective means of contribution by private and non-governmental sectors 
and the participation of Egyptian expatriates in the progress of scientific research. 
 
Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law | Vol. 3 (2015)     
The 2014 Egyptian constitution | by Maria Gloria Polimeno 




Arabic Language, Religious Education and National History, in all its stages, are core subjects 
in public and private pre-university education. Universities shall teach human rights and 
professional values and ethics of the various academic disciplines.  
Article (25) 
The State shall develop a comprehensive plan to eradicate alphabetical and digital illiteracy 
among citizens of all ages. The State shall develop its implementation mechanisms with the 
participation of civil society organizations within a definite timeline.  
Article (26) 




The economic system aims at achieving prosperity through sustainable development and social 
justice so as to raise the real growth rate of the national economy and the standard of living, 
increase job opportunities, reduce unemployment rates and eliminate poverty. 
The economic system shall adhere to transparency and good governance standards; enhance 
pillars of competitiveness, encourage investment, ensure balanced geographical, sectorial, and 
environmental growth, prohibit monopolistic practices, maintain financial and trade balances 
and a fair tax system, in the context of a regulated economy guaranteeing the various types of 
ownership and striking a balance between the interests of various stakeholders preserving the 
rights of workers and protecting consumers. 
From a social perspective, the economic system shall ensure equal opportunities and fair 
distribution of development returns, reduce the differences among incomes and adhere to a 12 
minimum wage and pension ensuring a decent life, as well as a maximum one in State agencies 
for every salaried employee according to the Law.  
Article (28) 
The productive, service and information related economic activities are key components of the 
economy. The State shall protect them and strive to increase their competiveness; provide 
investment-attracting environment, increase productivity, encourage exports, and regulate 
imports. 
The State shall pay special attention to small, medium and micro enterprises in all fields, and 
shall regulate and rehabilitate the informal sector.  
Article (29) 
Agriculture is a basic component of the economy. 
The State shall protect and expand agricultural land, and shall criminalize encroachments 
thereon. It shall develop rural areas; raise the standard of living of their population and protect 
them from environmental risks; and shall strive to on develop agricultural and animal 
production and encourage industries based thereon. 
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The State shall provide agricultural and animal production requirements, and shall buy basic 
agricultural crops at suitable prices generating profit margins for farmers in agreement with 
agricultural unions, syndicates and associations. The State shall also allocate a percentage of 
reclaimed lands to small farmers and youth graduates, and protect farmers and agricultural 
workers against exploitation. All the foregoing shall be as regulated by Law.  
Article (30) 
The State shall protect fish resources, as well as protect and support fishermen and empower 
them to carry out their work without jeopardizing ecosystems, as regulated by Law.  
Article (31) 
The security of cyberspace is an integral part of the economic system and national security. The 
State shall take the necessary measures to preserve it as regulated by Law.  
Article (32) 
The State's natural resources belong to the people. The State shall preserve and effectively 
exploit them, may not deplete them, and shall observe the rights of future generations to them. 
The State shall make the best use of renewable energy sources, motivate investment therein, 
and encourage relevant scientific research. The State shall encourage the manufacture of raw 
materials and increase their added value as per economic feasibility. 
Disposing of State’s public properties is prohibited. Granting the right of exploitation of 
natural resources or public utility concessions shall be by virtue of a law for a period not 
exceeding thirty (30) years. 
Granting the right of exploitation of quarries, small mines and slatterns, or granting public 
utility concession shall be based on a law for a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years. 
The Law shall define provisions of disposing of the State's private properties as well as the 
regulating rules and procedures.  
Article (33) 
The State shall protect ownership with its three types: the public, the private and the 
cooperative.  
Article (34) 
Public properties are inviolable and may not be infringed upon. Protection thereof is a duty 
according to the Law.  
Article (35) 
Private properties shall be protected, and the right to inheritance thereto is secured. It is not 
permissible to impose guardianship thereon except in the cases defined by Law and by virtue 
of a court judgment. Expropriation shall be allowed only in the public interest and for its 
benefit, and against fair compensation to be paid in advance according to the Law.  
Article (36) 
The State shall motivate the private sector to undertake its social responsibility in serving the 
economy and society.  
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Cooperative ownership shall be protected. The State shall give due care to cooperatives, and 
the Law shall guarantee their protection, support and independence. 
It is prohibited to dissolve cooperatives or their board of directors except by virtue of a court 
judgment. 
Article (38) 
The tax system, as well as other public liabilities, aim at developing State resources and 
achieving social justice and economic development. 
Public taxes may not be created, altered, or cancelled except by a law; and exemption 
therefrom may only be made in the cases defined by the law. No person may be required to 
pay other taxes or fees except as provided for in the Law. 
Multi sources shall be observed in imposing taxes. Progressive multi bracket taxes shall be 
imposed on incomes of individuals according to their respective financial capabilities. Taxation 
system shall ensure promoting labor-intensive economic activities and motivating their role in 
the economic, social and cultural development. 
The State shall improve the taxation system and develop modern systems that guarantee 
efficiency, easiness and control in tax collection. The Law shall define the methods and tools of 
collecting taxes, charges and any other sovereign proceeds, and amounts thereof to be 
deposited into the State public treasury. 
Tax payment is a duty and tax evasion is a crime.  
Article (39) 
Saving is a national duty protected and encouraged by the State that shall guarantee savings, 
as regulated by the law.  
Article (40) 
General confiscation of properties is prohibited. 
Specific confiscation is impermissible except by virtue of a court judgment.  
Article (41) 
The State shall implement a population program aiming at striking a balance between 
population growth rates and available resources; and shall maximize investments in human 
resources and improve their characteristics in the framework of achieving sustainable 
development.  
Article (42) 
Workers shall have a share in the management and profits of enterprises according to the law, 
and shall develop production and implement the respective plans of their productive units. 
Preserving production tools is a national duty. 
Workers shall be represented by 50% of the elected members of the boards of directors of 
public sector units. Their representation in the boards of directors of public enterprise sector 
companies shall be subject to the Law. 
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The Law shall regulate the representation of small farmers and craftsmen with a minimum 
representation percentage of 80% in the boards of directors of agricultural, industrial and 
handicraft cooperatives.  
Article (43) 
The State shall protect and develop the Suez Canal and preserve it as an international 
waterway owned by the State. The State shall also develop the Canal sector as a distinguished 
economic center.  
Article (44) 
The State shall protect the River Nile, preserve Egypt's historical rights thereto, rationalize and 
maximize its use, and refrain from wasting or polluting its water. The State shall also protect 
groundwater; adopt necessary means for ensuring water security; and support scientific 
research in that regard. 
Every citizen is guaranteed the right to enjoy the River Nile. It is prohibited to trespass the 
riverbank reserve or harm the riverine environment. The State shall guarantee eliminating any 
trespass against the River Nile as regulated by Law.  
Article (45) 
The State shall protect its seas, shores, lakes, waterways and natural protectorates. 
Trespassing, polluting or misusing any of them is prohibited. Every citizen is guaranteed the 
right of enjoying them. The State shall protect and develop the green space in the urban areas; 
preserve plant, animal and fish resources and protect those under the threat of extinction or 
danger; guarantee humane treatment of animals, all according to the law.  
Article (46) 
Every person has the right to a sound healthy environment. Environment protection is a 
national duty. The State shall take necessary measures to protect and ensure not to harm the 
environment; ensure a rational use of natural resources so as to achieve sustainable 




The State shall maintain the Egyptian cultural identity with its diversified branches of 
civilization.  
Article (48) 
Culture is a right to every citizen. The State shall secure and support this right and make 
available all types of cultural materials to all strata of the people, without any discrimination 16 
based on financial capability, geographic location or others. The State shall give special 
attention to remote areas and the neediest groups. 
The State shall encourage translation from and into Arabic. 
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The State shall protect and preserve monuments and give due care to monumental sites. It shall 
also maintain and restore them; recover stolen antiquities; and organize and supervise 
excavation operations. 
Presenting monuments as gifts or exchanging them is prohibited. 
Aggression against or trafficking in monuments is a crime that is not subject to prescription.  
Article (50) 
Egypt's civilization and cultural heritage, whether physical or moral, including all diversities 
and principal milestones – namely Ancient Egyptian, Coptic, and Islamic – is a national and 
human wealth. The State shall preserve and maintain this heritage as well as the contemporary 
cultural wealth, whether architectural, literary or artistic, with all diversities. Aggression 
against any of the foregoing is a crime punished by Law. The State shall pay special attention 
to protecting components of cultural pluralism in Egypt.  
Part III 
Public Rights, Freedoms & Duties 
Article (51) 
Dignity is the right of every human being and may not be violated. The State shall respect and 
protect human dignity.  
Article (52) 
Torture in all forms and types is a crime that is not subject to prescription.  
Article (53) 
All citizens are equal before the Law. They are equal in rights, freedoms and general duties, 
without discrimination based on religion, belief, sex, origin, race, color, language, disability, 
social class, political or geographic affiliation or any other reason. 
Discrimination and incitement of hatred is a crime punished by Law. 
The State shall take necessary measures for eliminating all forms of discrimination, and the 
Law shall regulate creating an independent commission for this purpose.  
Article (54) 
Personal freedom is a natural right, shall be protected and may not be infringed upon. Except 
for the case of being caught in flagrante delicto, it is not permissible to arrest, search, detain, or 
restrict the freedom of anyone in any way except by virtue of a reasoned judicial order that was 
required in the context of an investigation. 
Every person whose freedom is restricted shall be immediately notified of the reasons 
therefore; shall be informed of his/her rights in writing; shall be immediately enabled to contact 
his/her relatives and lawyer; and shall be brought before the investigation authority within 
twenty four (24) hours as of the time of restricting his/her freedom. 
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Investigation may not start with the person unless his/her lawyer is present. A lawyer shall be 
seconded for persons who do not have one. Necessary assistance shall be rendered to people 
with disability according to procedures prescribed by Law. 
Every person whose freedom is restricted, as well as others, shall have the right to file 
grievance before the court against this action. A decision shall be made on such grievance 
within one (1) week as of the date of action; otherwise, the person must be immediately 
released. 
The Law shall regulate the provisions, duration, and causes of temporary detention, as well as 
the cases in which damages are due on the state to compensate a person for such temporary 
detention or for serving punishment thereafter cancelled pursuant to a final judgment 
reversing the judgment by virtue of which such punishment was imposed. 
In all events, it is not permissible to present an accused for trial in crimes that may be 
punishable by imprisonment unless a lawyer is present by virtue of a power of attorney from 
the accused or by secondment by the court.  
Article (55) 
Every person who is either arrested, detained, or his freedom is restricted shall be treated in a 
manner that maintains his dignity. He/she may not be tortured, intimidated, coerced, or 
physically or morally harmed; and may not be seized or detained except in places designated 
for that purpose, which shall be adequate on human and health levels. The State shall cater for 
the needs of people with disability. 
Violating any of the aforementioned is a crime punished by Law. 
An accused has the right to remain silent. Every statement proved to be made by a detainee 
under any of the foregoing actions, or threat thereof, shall be disregarded and not be relied 
upon.  
Article (56) 
A prison is a place of correction and rehabilitation. 
Prisons and places of detention shall be subject to judiciary supervision, where actions 
inconsistent with human dignity or which endanger human health shall be prohibited. 
The Law shall regulate the provisions of reform and rehabilitation of convicted persons and 
facilitating decent lives after their release.  
Article (57) 
The right to privacy may not be violated, shall be protected and may not be infringed upon. 
Postal, telegraphic and electronic correspondences, telephone calls, and other means of 
communication are inviolable, and their confidentiality is guaranteed. They may not be 
confiscated, revealed or monitored except by virtue of a reasoned judicial order, for a definite 
period, and only in the cases defined by Law. 
The State shall protect citizens' right to use all forms of public means of communications. 
Interrupting or disconnecting them, or depriving the citizens from using them, arbitrarily, is 
impermissible. This shall be regulated by Law.  
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Privacy of homes is inviolable. Except for cases of danger or call for help, homes may not be 
entered, inspected, monitored or eavesdropped except by a reasoned judicial warrant 
specifying the place, the time and the purpose thereof. This is to be applied only in the cases 
and in the manner prescribed by Law. Upon entering or inspection, the residents of houses 
must be apprised and have access to the warrant issued in this regard.  
Article (59) 
Everyone has the right to a safe life. The State shall provide security and reassurance for its 
citizens and all those residing in its territory.  
Article (60) 
The human body is inviolable and any assault, deformation or mutilation committed against it 
shall be a crime punishable by Law. Organs trade shall be prohibited, and it is not permissible 
to perform any medical or scientific experiment thereon without a certified free consent 
according to established principles in medical sciences and as regulated by Law.  
Article (61) 
Tissue and organ donation is a gift for life. Every person shall have the right to donate his body 
organs either during his lifetime or after his death by virtue of consent or a certified will. The 
State shall develop a mechanism regulating the rules of organ donation and transplantation in 
accordance with the Law.  
Article (62) 
Freedom of movement, residence and emigration shall be guaranteed. 
No citizen may be expelled from the State territory or prevented from returning thereto. 
No citizen may be prevented from leaving the State territory, placed under house arrest or 
prevented from residing in a certain place except by a reasoned judicial order for a specified 
period of time and in the cases as defined by the Law.  
Article (63) 
All forms and types of arbitrary forced displacement of citizens shall be prohibited and shall be 
a crime that does not lapse by prescription.  
Article (64) 
Freedom of belief is absolute. 
The freedom of practicing religious rituals and establishing worship places for the followers of 
Abrahamic religions is a right regulated by Law.  
Article (65) 
Freedom of thought and opinion is guaranteed. 
Every person shall have the right to express his/her opinion verbally, in writing, through 
imagery, or by any other means of expression and publication. 
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Freedom of scientific research is guaranteed. The State is committed to sponsor researchers and 
inventors and to provide protection for and endeavor to apply their innovations.  
Article (67) 
Freedom of artistic and literary creativity is guaranteed. The State shall encourage arts and 
literature, sponsor creative artists and writers and protect their productions, and provide the 
means necessary for achieving this end. 
No lawsuit may be initiated or filed to stop or confiscate any artistic, literary, or intellectual 
works, or against their creators except by the Public Prosecutor. No freedom restricting 
sanction may be inflicted for crimes committed because of the publicity of artistic, literary or 
intellectual product. As for crimes related to the incitement of violence, discrimination between 
citizens, or impingement of individual honor, the Law shall specify the penalties therefore. 
In such cases, the court may obligate the sentenced to pay punitive compensation to the victim 
of the crime, in addition to the original compensations due to the victim for the damages 
incurred. All the foregoing shall be in accordance with the Law.  
Article (68) 
Information, data, statistics and official documents are the property of the People and the 
disclosure thereof from their various sources is a right guaranteed by the State for all citizens. 
The State is committed to provide and make them available to citizens in a transparent manner. 
The Law shall regulate the rules for obtaining them and terms for their availability and 
confidentiality; the rules for their deposit and storage; and the rules for and filing complaints 
against the refusal to provide them. The Law shall also impose penalties for withholding 
information or deliberately providing wrong information. 
The State institutions shall deposit official documents with the National Library and Archives 
once they are no longer in use. The State institutions shall also protect, and secure such 
documents against loss or damage, as well as restoring and digitizing them using all modern 
means and instruments according to the Law.  
Article (69) 
The State shall protect all types of intellectual property rights in all fields, and establish a 
specialized agency to uphold such rights and their legal protection as regulated by Law.  
Article (70) 
Freedom of the press, printing and paper, visual, audio and electronic publication is 
guaranteed. Every Egyptian - whether being natural or legal, public or private person – shall 
have the right to own and issue newspapers and establish visual, audio and digital media 
outlets. 
Newspapers may be issued once notification is given as regulated by Law. The Law shall 
regulate the procedures of establishing and owning visual and radio broadcast stations and 
online newspapers. 
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It is prohibited to censor, confiscate, suspend or shut down Egyptian newspapers and media 
outlets in any way. By way of exception, they may be subject to limited censorship in times of 
war or general mobilization. 
No freedom restricting penalty shall be imposed for publication or publicity crimes. As for 
crimes related to the incitement of violence, discrimination between citizens, or impingement 
of individual honor, the Law shall stipulate the penalties therefor.  
Article (72) 
The State shall ensure the independence of all State-owned press institutions and media 
outlets, in a manner ensuring their neutrality and presentation of all political and intellectual 
opinions and trends as well as social interests and also guaranteeing equality and equal 
opportunities in addressing public opinion.  
Article (73) 
Citizens shall have the right to organize public meetings, marches, demonstrations and all 
forms of peaceful protests, without carrying arms of any kind, by serving a notification as 
regulated by Law. 
The right to peaceful and private assembly is guaranteed without need for prior notification. 
Security forces may not attend, monitor or eavesdrop on such meetings.  
Article (74) 
All citizens shall have the right to form political parties by notification as regulated by Law. No 
political activity may be practiced and no political parties may be formed on the basis of 
religion or discrimination based on sex, or origin, or on sectarian basis or geographic location. 
No activity that is hostile to democratic principles, secretive, or of military or quasi-military 
nature may be practiced. 
Political parties may not be dissolved except by virtue of a court judgment.  
Article (75) 
All citizens shall have the right to form non-governmental associations and foundations on 
democratic basis, which shall acquire legal personality upon notification. 
Such associations and foundations shall have the right to practice their activities freely, and 
administrative agencies may not interfere in their affairs or dissolve them, or dissolve their 
boards of directors or boards of trustees save by a court judgment. 
The establishment or continuation of non-governmental associations and foundations, whose 
statutes or activities are secretive or conducted in secret or which are of military or quasi-
military nature is prohibited as regulated by Law.  
Article (76) 
The establishment of syndicates and federations on democratic basis is a right guaranteed by 
Law. Syndicates and federations shall acquire legal personality, shall have the right to practice 
their activities freely, shall improve the level of efficiency among their members and defend 
their rights and interests. 
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The State shall guarantee the independence of all syndicates and federations and their boards 
of directors may only be dissolved by a court judgment. 
No syndicate or federation may be established in the military or police agencies.  
Article (77) 
The Law shall regulate the establishment of professional syndicates and the administration 
thereof on a democratic basis, shall guarantee their independence and shall specify their 
resources and the manner of recording their members, and holding them accountable for their 
conduct in practicing their professional activities according to the codes of ethics and 
professional conduct. 
No profession may have more than one syndicate for the regulation of its affairs. Receivership 
may not be imposed on any syndicate. Administrative bodies may not interfere in the affairs  
thereof. The board of directors of any syndicate may not be dissolved save by a court 
judgment. The opinion of the syndicate shall be sought on draft legislations pertaining to it.  
Article (78) 
The State shall ensure the citizens' right to adequate, safe and healthy housing in a manner 
which preserves human dignity and achieves social justice. 
The State shall devise a national housing plan which upholds the environmental particularity 
and ensures the contribution of personal and collaborative initiatives in its implementation. 
The State shall also regulate the use of State lands and provide them with basic utilities within 
the framework of comprehensive urban planning which serves cities and villages and a 
population distribution strategy. This is to be applied in a manner serving the public interest, 
improving the quality of life for citizens and safeguards the rights of future generations. 
The State shall also devise a comprehensive national plan to address the problem of unplanned 
slums, which includes re-planning, provision of infrastructure and utilities, and improvement 
of the quality of life and public health. In addition, the State shall guarantee the provision of 
resources necessary for implementing such plan within a specified period of time.  
Article (79) 
Each citizen has the right to healthy and sufficient food and clean water. The State shall ensure 
food resources to all citizens. The State shall also ensure sustainable food sovereignty and 
maintain agricultural biological diversity and types of local plants in order to safeguard the 
rights of future generations.  
Article (80) 
Anyone under the age of 18 shall be considered a child. Each child shall have the right to a 
name, identity documents, free compulsory vaccination, health and family or alternative care, 
basic nutrition, safe shelter, religious education, and emotional and cognitive development. 
The State shall ensure the rights of children with disabilities, their rehabilitation and their 
integration in the society. 
The State shall provide children with care and protection from all forms of violence, abuse, 
mistreatment and commercial and sexual exploitation. 
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Every child shall be entitled to acquire early education in a childhood center until the age of 
six. It is prohibited to employ children before the age of completing their preparatory 
education (six years of primary and three years of preparatory) or in jobs which subject them to 
danger. 
The State shall also develop a judicial system for children that have been victims and or are 
witnesses. Children may not be held criminally accountable or detained save as provided in 
the Law and for the period of time specified therein. In such a case, they shall be provided with 
legal assistance and detained in appropriate locations separate from those allocated for the 
detention of adults. 
The State shall endeavor to achieve the best interest of children in all measures taken against 
them.  
Article (81) 
The State shall guarantee the health, economic, social, cultural, entertainment, sporting and 
educational rights of persons with disabilities and dwarves, strive to provide them with job 
opportunities, allocate a percentage of job opportunities to them, and adapt public facilities 
and their surrounding environment to their special needs. The State shall also ensure their 
exercise of all political rights and integration with other citizens in compliance with the 
principles of equality, justice and equal opportunities.  
Article (82) 
The State shall guarantee the provision of care to the youth and youngsters shall endeavour to 
discover their talents; develop their cultural, scientific, psychological, physical and creative 
abilities, encourage their engagement in group and volunteer activities and enable them to 
participate in public life.  
Article (83) 
The State shall guarantee the health, economic, social, cultural and entertainment rights of the 
elderly people, provide them with appropriate pensions which ensure a decent life for them, 
and enable them to participate in public life. In its planning of public facilities, the State shall 
take into account the needs of the elderly. The State shall encourage civil society organizations 
to participate in taking care of the elderly people. 
All the foregoing is to be applied as regulated by Law.  
Article (84) 
Everyone has the right to exercise sports. The State institutions and civil society shall endeavor 
to discover and sponsor the talented athletes and take the necessary measures to encourage the 
exercise of sports. 
The Law shall regulate the affairs of sports and non-governmental sporting agencies in 
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Every individual shall have the right to address public authorities in writing and under his 
own signature. Public authorities may not be addressed in the name of any groups except for 
any entity having a legal personality.  
Article (86) 
Protecting national security is a duty. The responsibility of all parties to uphold national 
security is guaranteed by the Law.Defending the nation and the protection of its land are an 
honor and a sacred duty. Military service is mandatory according to the Law.  
Article (87) 
Participation of citizens in the public life is a national duty. Every citizen shall have the right to 
vote, run for elections, and express his/her opinion in referendums. The Law shall regulate the 
exercise of these rights. There may be exemption from the performance of this duty in certain 
cases to be specified by Law. 
The State shall be responsible for entering the name of each citizen in the voters database 
without request therefrom provided he/she satisfies the conditions for voting. The State shall 
also purge this database on a periodic basis in pursuance of the Law. The State shall guarantee 
the safety, neutrality and integrity of referendum and election procedures. It is prohibited to 
use public funds, government agencies, public facilities, worship places, business sector 
institutions and non-governmental organizations and institutions for political purposes or 
election publicity.  
Article (88) 
The State shall safeguard the interests of Egyptians living abroad, protect them and protect 
their rights and freedoms, enable them to perform their public duties towards the State and 
society, and encourage their contribution to the development of the nation. 
The Law shall regulate the participation of Egyptians living abroad in elections and 
referendums in a manner consistent with their particular circumstances, without being 
restricted by the provisions of voting, counting of ballots and announcing of results, set forth in 
this Constitution. This is without prejudice to providing guarantees to ensure the integrity and 
neutrality of the election and referendum process.  
Article (89) 
All forms of slavery, oppression, forced exploitation of human beings, sex trade, and other 
forms of human trafficking are prohibited and criminalized by Law.  
Article (90) 
The State shall encourage the charitable endowment system for the establishing and 
sponsoring of scientific, cultural, health, social institutions and others, and shall ensure the 
independence thereof. The affairs of such institutions shall be managed in accordance with the 
conditions set by the person who created the endowment, as regulated by Law. 
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The State may grant political asylum to any foreigner persecuted for defending the interests of 
people, human rights, peace or justice. 
Extradition of political refugees is prohibited. All of the foregoing shall be according to the 
Law.  
Article (92) 
Inalienable rights and freedoms of citizens may not be suspended or reduced. 
No law regulating the exercise of rights and freedoms may restrict such rights and freedoms in 
a manner prejudicing the substance and the essence thereof.  
Article (93) 
The State shall be bound by the international human rights agreements, covenants and 
conventions ratified by Egypt, and which shall have the force of law after publication in 
accordance with the prescribed conditions.  
Part IV 
Rule of Law  
Article (94) 
The rule of law shall be the basis of governing in the State. 
The State shall be governed by Law. The independence, immunity and impartiality of the 
judiciary are essential guarantees for the protection of rights and freedoms.  
Article (95) 
Penalties are personal. There shall be no crime or punishment except pursuant to a law, and a 
penalty may only be inflicted by a court judgment. Penalty shall only be imposed for acts 
committed after the effective date of the law imposing it.  
Article (96) 
The accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty in a fair legal trial in which the 
right to defend himself is guaranteed. 
The law shall regulate the appeal of judgments passed on felonies. 
The State shall provide protection to victims, witnesses, accused and informants as necessary 
and in accordance with the Law.  
Article (97) 
Litigation is a right that is safeguarded and an inalienable right for all. The State shall 
guarantee the accessibility of judicature for litigants and rapid adjudication on cases. It is 
prohibited to immunize any administrative act or decision from judicial review. No person 
may be tried except before the ordinary judge. Exceptional courts are prohibited. 
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The right of defense either in person or by proxy is guaranteed. The independence of the legal 
profession and the protection of its rights is a guarantee for the right of defense. 
The law shall provide all means by which those who are financially unable can resort to justice 
and defend their rights.   
Article (99) 
Any violation of personal freedom, or the sanctity of the private life of citizens, or any other 
public rights and freedoms which are guaranteed by the Constitution and the Law is a crime. 
The criminal and civil lawsuit arising of such crime shall not abate by prescription. The 
affected party shall have the right to bring a direct criminal action. 
The State shall guarantee fair compensation for the victims of such violations. The National 
Council for Human Rights may file a complaint with the Public Prosecution of any violation of 
these rights, and it may intervene in the civil lawsuit in favor of the affected party at its 
request. All of the foregoing is to be applied in the manner set forth by Law.  
Article (100) 
Court judgments shall be issued and enforced in the name of the People. The State shall 
guarantee the means of the enforcement thereof as regulated by Law. Refraining from or delay 
in the enforcement of such judgments by the competent public servants is a crime punishable 
by Law. In such a case, the party in favor of whom the judgment is passed shall have the right 
to bring a direct criminal action before the competent court.The Public Prosecution shall, at the 
request of the party in favor of whom the judgment is passed, initiate criminal action against 
the public servant refraining from executing the judgment or interrupting such execution.  
Part V 
The System of Government 
Chapter One 
The Legislative Power (House of Representatives)  
Article (101) 
In the manner stated in the Constitution, the House of Representatives is entrusted with the 
authority to enact legislations and approve the general policy of the State, the general plan of 
economic and social development and the State budget. It exercises oversight over the actions 
of the executive power.  
Article (102) 
The House of Representatives is composed of no less than four hundred and fifty members 
elected by direct secret public ballot. 
A candidate for the membership of the House must be an Egyptian citizen, enjoying civil and 
political rights, a holder of at least the certificate of basic education, and should not be below 25 
Gregorian years of age on the day of opening candidacy registration. 
Other candidacy requirements, the electoral system, and division of electoral constituencies 
shall be defined by law in a manner which observes fair representation of the population and 
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governorates and equitable representation of voters. Elections based on the plurality voting 
system or proportional list, or a combination of both at whatsoever ratio may be adopted. 
The President of the Republic may appoint no greater than 5% of the members, the method of 
nomination thereof shall be stipulated by Law.  
Article (103) 
A member of the House of Representatives shall devote him/herself on a full time basis for the 
tasks of membership and his/her post shall be reserved for him/her in accordance with the 
Law.  
Article (104) 
As a condition for undertaking his/her duties, a House of Representatives member shall take 
the following oath: “I swear by The Almighty God to loyally uphold the republican system, 
respect  the Constitution and the Law, fully uphold the interests of the People, and to 
safeguard the independence of the nation and the integrity and safety of .”  
Article (105) 
A House of Representatives member shall receive a remuneration determined by Law. In case 
the remuneration is changed, such change will only come into force at the commencement of 
the legislative term following the one during which the change was adopted.  
Article (106) 
The term of membership in the House of Representatives is five calendar years, commencing 
from the date of its first session. 
Elections for a new House of Representatives shall be held during the sixty days preceding the 
end of the term of previous House.  
Article (107) 
The Court of Cassation shall have jurisdiction over the validity of membership in the House of 
Representatives. Appeals shall be submitted to the Court of Cassation within a period not 
exceeding thirty days from date on which the final election results are announced. Appeals 
shall be adjudicated within sixty days from the date of the receipt thereof. 
In the event that a judgment declares a membership invalid, the invalidity of the membership 
shall be effective as of the date on which the court judgment is notified to the House.  
Article (108) 
In case a seat of a House of Representatives becomes vacant at least six months prior to the 
expiry of his tenure, the vacant position must be filled in accordance with Law within sixty 
days from the date on which the House reports the vacancy.  
Article (109) 
Throughout its membership tenure, no House of Representatives member may, whether in 
person or by proxy, buy, rent or lease any asset owned by the State or a public-law legal 
persons or a public sector company or a public enterprise sector company; sell to or barter with 
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the state any part of its own property or conclude a contract with the State as a vendor, 
supplier, contractor or otherwise as set out by Law. Any of such acts shall be void. 
A member must submit a financial estate disclosure upon taking membership and at the end of 
membership and at the end of each year of membership. 
In case a House of Representatives member receives cash or in-kind gift because of or in 
connection with his/her membership, title thereto shall devolve to the State public treasury. 
All the foregoing shall be as regulated by Law.  
Article (110) 
Membership in the House of Representatives may only be dropped or cancelled if a member 
has lost confidence and esteem or ceases to satisfy any membership condition based on which 
he was elected or if he has violated the duties of membership. 
The decision of cancellation must be issued by a majority of two-thirds of the members of the 
House of Representatives.  
Article (111) 
The House of Representatives shall accept resignation of its members, which must be 
submitted in writing. To be accepted, a resignation must not be submitted after the House has 
initiated procedures for cancelling the membership of the resigning member.  
Article (112) 
A House of Representatives member shall not be held accountable for any opinions expressed 
concerning the performance of his duty in the House or its committees.  
Article (113) 
Except in cases of flagrante delicto, it shall be prohibited to take any criminal action, under the 
Articles of felonies and misdemeanors, against a House of Representatives member without 
the prior permission from the House. In case the House of Representatives is not in session, a 
permission must be obtained from the House’s Bureau, and the House must be notified at its 
first session. 
In all cases, a decision should be taken on any motion for permission to take legal action 
against a House of Representatives member within thirty days; otherwise, the motion shall be 
deemed accepted.  
Article (114) 
The seat of the House of Representatives shall be in Cairo. 
However, in exceptional circumstances, the House may hold its sessions elsewhere, at the 
request of the President of the Republic or one-third of the members of the House of 
Representatives. 
Any meetings held otherwise and any resolutions passed thereby shall be void. 
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The President of the Republic shall invite the House of Representatives for its annual ordinary 
session before the first Thursday of October; failing such invitation, the House is required by 
the Constitution to meet on the stated day. 
The ordinary session shall continue for at least nine months. The President of the Republic 
shall bring each session to close with the approval of the House. This shall not be permissible 
except after State's General Budget has been approved.  
Article (116) 
At the President of the Republic's request or upon a motion signed by at least one tenth of the 
House members, the House of Representatives may hold an extraordinary meeting to consider 
an urgent issue.  
Article (117) 
At the first meeting of its annual regular session, the House of Representatives shall elect, from 
among its members, a speaker and two deputies for the full legislative term. If the office of any 
of the aforementioned persons becomes vacant, a substitute shall be elected by the House. The 
House’s internal regulations shall provide for the rules and procedures of election. If any of the 
aforementioned persons fails to fulfill the duties of his office, one-third of the House members 
may request to relieve him of his office. The relevant decision shall be issued by a majority of 
two-thirds of the members. 
In all cases, neither the Speaker nor any of the two deputies may be elected for more than two 
consecutive legislative terms.  
Article (118) 
The House of Representatives shall set its own internal regulations of its work and the manner 
of exercising its authorities and maintaining order therein. Such internal regulations shall be 
issued by a law.  
Article (119) 
The House of Representatives shall be competent to maintain order therein and this duty shall 
be incumbent upon the Speaker of the House.  
Article (120) 
The sessions of the House of Representatives shall be held in public. 
The House may hold a secret session at the request of the President of the Republic, the Prime 
Minister, the Speaker of the House, or at least twenty of the House members. By the majority of 
33 its members, the House shall decide whether the discussion in question is to be conducted in 
a public or a secret session.  
Article (121) 
The meetings of the House and resolutions passed thereby shall not be deemed valid unless 
attended by the majority of its members. 
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In cases other than those requiring a special majority, resolutions shall be passed by the 
absolute majority of the members present. In case there is a tie of votes, the subject matter in 
deliberation shall be deemed rejected. 
Laws shall be issued by the absolute majority of the members present, provided that such 
majority constitutes not less than one third of the House members. 
The Laws deemed complementary to the Constitution shall be issued by a majority of of two 
thirds of the House members. Laws regulating presidential or parliamentary or municipal 
elections, political parties, the judiciary, related to judicial bodies and judicial organizations, 
and those regulating the rights and freedoms stipulated in the Constitution shall be deemed 
complementary to the Constitution.  
Article (122) 
The President of the Republic, the Cabinet, and every House member shall have the right to 
propose laws. 
Every bill presented by the government or one tenth of the House members shall be referred to 
the competent specialized committees of the House for review and submission of a report to 
the House. A committee may seek the opinion of experts on the matter in question. 
No bill presented by a member can be referred to the specialized committee unless it has been 
permitted by the committee responsible for proposals and approved by the House. If the 
committee responsible for proposals rejects a bill, it must provide a reasoned decision. 
Any bill or proposed law rejected by the House may not be re-presented during the same 
legislative term. 
(Article 123) 
The President of the Republic has the right to issue laws or reject them. 
If the President of the Republic objects to a draft law approved by the House of 
Representatives, he/she shall refer it back to the House of Representatives within thirty (30) 
days as of the date when the House of Representatives notified the President of such approval. 
If the President does not refer the draft law back to the House of Representatives within this 
period, the draft law shall be deemed a Law and shall be issued. 
If the draft law is referred back to the House of Representatives within the aforementioned 
period and approved again by a majority of two-thirds of its members, it shall be deemed a 
Law and shall be issued.  
Article (124)  
The State budget shall include all of its revenues and expenditures without exception. The 
draft budget shall be submitted to the House of Representatives at least ninety (90) days before 
the beginning of the fiscal year; and shall not be effective unless approved thereby. Voting 
thereon shall be made on a section-by-section basis. 
The House of Representatives may alter the expenditures stated in the draft budget, except for 
those allocated to honor a specific State liability. 
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Should such alteration result in an increase in total expenditures, the House of Representatives 
must reach an agreement with the Government on the means to procure sources of revenue so 
as to restore a balance between both. The State budget shall be issued by a law which may 
include an amendment of another existing law to the extent necessary to achieve such balance. 
In all cases, the budget law may not include any provision that puts new burdens on citizens. 
The Law shall specify the fiscal year, the method of preparing the State budget, and the 
provisions of the budgets of public bodies and organizations and their accounts. 
The House of Representatives must approve the transfer of any funds from one section of the 
State budget to another, as well as any expenditure not included therein or in excess of its 
estimate. Such approval shall be issued by a law.  
Article (125)  
The final accounts of the State budget must be submitted to the House of Representatives 
within a period not exceeding six (6) months as of the end of the fiscal year. The annual report 
of the Central Auditing Organization (CAO) and the latter’s notes on the final accounts shall be 
submitted therewith. 
The final accounts shall be put to vote on a section-by-section basis and shall be issued by a 
law. 
The House of Representatives has the right to ask CAO for any additional data or reports. 
Article (126) 
The Law shall regulate the basic rules for the collection of public funds and the procedures for 
their disbursement.  
Article (127) 
The executive power may not obtain a loan or funding or engage in a project that is not listed 
in the approved State budget which entails expenditure from the State treasury within a 
subsequent period, except with the approval of the House of Representatives.  
Article (128) 
The Law shall specify the rules for setting salaries, pensions, indemnities, subsidies, and 
bonuses which are paid from the State treasury; and shall set out the cases in which exception 
from such rules may be made, as well as, the authorities in charge of their application.  
Article (129) 
Every member of the House of Representatives may direct any question to the Prime Minister, 
or one of his/her deputies, or a minister, or one of his/her deputies on any matter that falls 
within their respective authorities; and the latter must respond to such question during the 
same annual session. 
The member may withdraw the question at any time. A question may not be converted to an 
interrogation in the same session. 
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Every member of the House of Representatives may direct an interrogation to the Prime 
Minister, or one of his/her deputies or a minister or one of his/her deputies in order to hold 
them accountable for matters that fall within their respective authorities. 
The House of Representatives shall discuss the interrogation at least seven (7) days after its 
submission, within a maximum of sixty (60) days, except in cases of urgency as determined by 
the House and agreed by the Government.  
Article (131) 
The House of Representatives may decide to withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister, or 
one of his/her deputies or a minister or one of his/her deputies. 
Filing a motion of no confidence may not be made except after an interrogation and upon a 
proposal submitted by at least one-tenth of the members of the House of Representatives. The 
House of Representatives shall issue a decision after considering the interrogation. Withdrawal 
of confidence requires the affirmative vote of a majority of the House members. 
In all cases, a no-confidence motion may not be filed in connection with an issue that has 
already been decided upon in the same annual session. 
If the House of Representatives decides to withdraw confidence from the Prime Minister, or 
one of his/her deputies, or a minister or one of his/her deputies, with whom the Government 
has announced its solidarity with before voting, then that Government must resign. If the 
noconfidence resolution concerns a certain member of the Government, that member must 
resign.  
Article (132) 
At least 20 members of the House of Representatives may request the discussion of a public 
issue for the purpose of seeking a clarification on the Government’s policy relating to such 
issue.  
Article (133) 
Any member of the House of Representatives may present a proposed recommendation on a 
public issue to the Prime Minister or one of his/her deputies, or a minister or one of his/her 
deputies.  
Article (134) 
Every member of the House of Representatives may submit an early day motion or urgent 
statement to the Prime Minister or one of his/her deputies, or a minister or one of his/her 
deputies in relation to urgent matters of public importance.  
Article (135) 
The House of Representatives may form a special fact-finding committee or entrust one of its 
existing committees with finding facts on a public matter or inspect the activities of an 
administrative body, public agency or public projects, for the purpose of finding facts on a 
specific issue, and inform the House of Representatives of the true financial, administrative or 
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economic status, or to conduct investigations on a past activity or otherwise. The House of 
Representatives shall decide what it deems appropriate in this regard. 
In order to carry out its mission, such a committee may collect the evidence it deems necessary 
and may summon individuals to give statements. All bodies shall comply with the committee's 
requests and place at its disposal all the documents, evidence, or anything otherwise required. 
In all cases, every member of the House of Representatives is entitled to obtain any data or 
information from the executive power which is related to its performance of his/her duties at 
the House of Representatives.  
Article (136) 
The Prime Minister and his deputies, and the ministers and their deputies may attend the 
sessions of either the House of Representatives or any of its committees. Their attendance shall 
be obligatory if requested by the House. They may seek assistance from senior officials of their 
choice. 
They must be heard whenever they request to speak. They must answer questions relating to 
issues under discussion, without having the right to vote.  
Article (137) 
The President of the Republic may not dissolve the House of Representatives except in cases of 
necessity, by a reasoned decision and following a public referendum. The House of 
Representatives may not be dissolved for the same reason which caused the dissolution of the 
previous House. 
The President of the Republic shall issue a decision to suspend the sessions of the House and 
hold a referendum on the dissolution within no more than twenty days. If the voters agree by 
majority of valid votes, the President of the Republic shall issue the decision of dissolution, and 
call for new elections within no more than thirty days from the date of the stated decision. The 
new House shall convene within the ten days following the announcement of final the results.  
Article (138) 
Every citizen may submit written proposals to the House of Representatives regarding public 
issues, and may also submit complaints to the House of Representatives to be referred to the 
competent ministers. If the House of Representatives so requests, the Minister must provide 
clarifications, and the concerned person shall be informed of the result.  
Chapter Two 
The Executive Power 
Branch I 
The President of the Republic 
Article (139) 
The President of the Republic is the head of State and the head of executive power. He shall 
care for the interests of the people, safeguard the independence of the nation and the territorial 
integrity and safety of its lands, abide by the provisions of the Constitution, and assume his 
authorities as prescribed therein.  
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The President of the Republic shall be elected for a period of four calendar years, commencing 
from the day following the termination of the term of his predecessor. The President may only 
be reelected once. 
The procedures for electing the President of the Republic shall be initiated at least one hundred 
twenty days prior to the end of the presidential term. The result must be announced at least 
thirty days prior to the end of such term. 
The President of the Republic may not hold any partisan position throughout his presidential 
term.  
Article (141) 
A presidential candidate must be an Egyptian born to Egyptian parents, and neither he or his 
parents or his spouse may have held any other nationality. He must enjoy civil and political 
rights, must have performed the military service or have been exempted therefrom by law, and 
shall not be less than forty calendar years of age on the day of commencing candidacy 
registration. Other requirements for candidacy shall be set out by Law.  
Article (142) 
To be accepted as a candidate for the presidency, candidates must receive the recommendation 
of at least twenty elected members of the House of Representatives, or support from at least 
twenty five thousand citizens enjoying the right to vote, in at least fifteen governorates, with a 
minimum of one thousand supporter from each governorate. 
In all cases, no one can support more than one candidate as regulated by Law.  
Article (143) 
The President of the Republic shall be elected by direct secret ballot, with an absolute majority 
of valid votes. 
Procedures for electing the President of the Republic are regulated by Law.  
Article (144)  
As a condition for assuming his duties, the President of the Republic shall take the following 
oath before the House of Representatives: “I swear by The Almighty God to loyally uphold the 
republican system, respect the Constitution and the Law, fully uphold the interests of the 
People and to safeguard the independence of the nation and the integrity and safety of its 
territories.” 
In case of the absence of the House of Representatives, the oath shall be taken before the 
General Assembly of the Supreme Constitutional Court.  
Article (145) 
The salary of the President of the Republic shall be determined by Law. The President may not 
receive any other salary or remuneration. No modification to the salary may come into effect 
during the presidential term during which it is approved. Throughout his presidential term, 
the President may not, whether in person or by proxy, be self-employed, engage in 
commercial, financial or industrial activity, buy, rent or lease any property owned by the state 
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or by a publiclaw legal person, or a public enterprise sector company, sell or barter any part of 
his own property with the State, or conclude a contract with the State as a vendor, supplier, 
contractor or otherwise as set out by Law. Any of such acts shall be void. 
The President must submit a financial estate disclosure upon taking office, upon leaving it, and 
at the end of each year of service. Such financial estate disclosure is to be published in the 
Official Gazette. 
Throughout the presidential term, the President of the Republic may not award himself any 
orders, decorations or medals. 
In case the President of the Republic receives, in person or by proxy a cash or in-kind gift 
because of or in connection with the presidential office, title thereto shall devolve to the State 
public treasury.  
Article (146) 
The President of the Republic shall assign a Prime Minister to form the government and 
introduce his/her program to the House of Representatives. If his government does not win the 
confidence of the majority of the members of the House of Representatives within thirty days 
at the most, the President shall appoint a Prime Minister who is nominated by the party or the 
coalition that holds the majority or the highest number of seats in the House of 
Representatives. If the government of such prime minister fails to win the confidence of the 
majority of the members of the House of Representatives within thirty days, the House shall be 
deemed dissolved, and the President of the Republic shall call for the election of a new House 
of Representatives within sixty days from the date on which the dissolution is announced. 
In all cases, the total periods for choice of government set forth in this Article shall not exceed 
sixty days. 
In case the House of Representatives is dissolved, the Prime Minister shall present to the new 
House of Representatives the formation of his government and its program, at its first session. 
In the event the government is chosen from the party or the coalition that holds the majority or 
the highest number of seats in the House of Representatives, the President of the Republic 
shall, in consultation with the Prime Minister, choose the Ministers of Defense, Interior, 
Foreign Affairs and Justice. 
Article (147) 
The President of the Republic may relieve the government from carrying out its duties, subject 
to the approval of the majority of the members of the House of Representatives. 
The President of the Republic may conduct a cabinet reshuffle after consultation with the 
Prime Minister and approval of the House of Representatives by an absolute majority of the 
members present, which must not be less than one third of its members.  
Article (148) 
The President of the Republic may delegate some of his powers to the Prime Minister, his 
deputies, ministers, or governors. None of them may delegate such authorities to others. All of 
the foregoing shall be regulated by Law.  
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The President of the Republic may call the government to convene a meeting to consult on 
important issues, and the President shall preside over the meetings that he attends.  
Article (150) 
Jointly with the Cabinet, the President of the Republic shall set the State’s General Policy and 
oversee its implementation as stated in the Constitution. 
The President of the Republic may deliver a statement on the State’s General Policy before the 
House of Representatives at the opening of its annual regular session. 
The President may deliver other statements or address other messages to the House.  
Article (151) 
The President of the Republic shall represent the State in its foreign relations and conclude 
treaties and ratify them after the approval of the House of Representatives. Such treaties shall 
acquire the force of law following their publication in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. 
Voters must be called for referendum on the treaties related to making peace and alliance, and 
those related to the rights of sovereignty. Such treaties shall only be ratified after the 
announcement of their approval in the referendum. 
In all cases, no treaty may be concluded which is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution 
or which results in ceding any part of state territories.  
Article (152) 
The President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The President 
shall not declare war, or send the armed forces to a combat mission outside the State borders, 
except after consultation with the National Defense Council and obtaining the approval of the 
House of Representatives by a majority of two-thirds of the members. 
In case the House of Representatives has not been elected, the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF) must be consulted and the approval of both the Cabinet and National Defense 
Council must be obtained.  
Article (153) 
The President of the Republic shall appoint and dismiss civil and military employees and 
political representatives and accredit political representatives of foreign States and bodies in 
accordance with the Law.  
Article (154) 
After consultation with the Cabinet, the President of the Republic may declare the state of 
emergency as regulated by Law. Such declaration must be presented to the House of 
Representatives within the following seven days to decide thereon as it deems fit. 
If the declaration takes place while the House of Representatives is not in regular session, the 
House must be invited to convene immediately in order to consider such declaration. 
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In all cases, the declaration of the state of emergency must be approved by a majority of the 
members of the House of Representatives. The state of emergency shall be declared for a 
specified period not exceeding three months, which may only be extended for another similar 
period after obtaining the approval of two-thirds of the House members. In case the House of 
Representatives has not been elected, the matter shall be referred to the Cabinet for approval 
provided, however, that it is presented to the new House of Representatives at its first session. 
The House of Representatives may not be dissolved while the state of emergency is in force.  
Article (155) 
After consultation with the Cabinet, the President of the Republic may issue a pardon or 
reduce a sentence. 
General amnesty may only be granted by virtue of a law, ratified by the majority of the 
members of the House of Representatives.  
Article (156) 
In case an event which requires taking urgent measures, which cannot be delayed, occurs while 
the House of Representatives is not in session, the President of the Republic shall call the 
House for an urgent meeting to present the matter thereto. If the House of Representatives 
have not been elected, the President of the Republic may issue decrees having the force of law, 
provided that they are then presented to, discussed and approved by the new House of 
Representatives within fifteen days from the commencement of its session. If such decrees are 
neither presented nor discussed by the House, or if they are presented but not ratified thereby, 
their force of law shall retroactively be revoked without need for issuing a decision to that 
effect, unless the House confirms its effectiveness during the previous period or decides to 
settle the consequences thereof.  
Article (157) 
Without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution, the President of the Republic may call 
for a referendum on issues relating to the supreme interests of the State. 
In case a call for referendum involves more than one issue, voting must be made separately on 
each issue.  
Article (158) 
The President of the Republic may submit his resignation to the House of Representatives. If 
the House has not been elected, he shall submit the same to the General Assembly of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court.  
Article (159) 
Accusing the President of the Republic of violating the provisions of the Constitution, treason 
or any other felony must be based on a motion signed by at least the majority of the members 
of the House of Representatives. The indictment shall only be issued by the majority of two-
thirds of the members of the House of Representatives and after carrying an investigation by 
the Prosecutor General. In case the Prosecutor General is prevented from same, he shall be 
replaced by one of his assistants. 
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As soon as this indictment is issued, the President of the Republic shall be stopped from 
carrying out his duties; this is considered as a temporary impediment precluding the President 
from performing his competences until a verdict is issued in the case. 
The President of the Republic shall be tried before a special court headed by the President of 
the Supreme Judicial Council with the membership of the most senior deputy of the President 
of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the most senior deputy of the President of the State 
Council, and the two most senior Presidents of the Courts of Appeal; prosecution is to be 
carried out before such court by the Prosecutor General. In case one of the aforementioned 
persons is prevented from serving, he shall be replaced by the person following him in 
seniority. The court verdicts shall be final and not subject to appeal. 
The Law shall regulate the investigation and trial procedures. In case of conviction, the 
President of the Republic shall be relieved of his post without prejudice to any other penalties.  
Article (160) 
In case the President of the Republic is temporarily prevented from assuming his powers, the 
Prime Minister shall act in his place. 
If the President of the Republic's office becomes vacant due to his resignation, death, or 
permanent inability to work, the House of Representatives shall announce the vacancy. If such 
vacancy is attributable to any other reason, such announcement shall be made by a majority of 
at least two thirds of the members of House of Representatives. The House of Representatives 
shall then notify the National Electoral Commission, and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives shall temporarily assume the powers of the President of Republic. 
In case the House of Representatives has not been elected, the General Assembly of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court and its Chairman shall replace the House of Representatives 
and its Speaker with respect to the above. 
In all events, a new President must be elected within a period not exceeding ninety (90) days as 
of the date of vacancy. In such a case, the presidential term shall start as of the date of 
announcement of the election results. 
The interim President may not run for presidency or request any amendment to the 
Constitution or dissolve the House of Representatives or dismiss the Government.  
Article (161) 
The House of Representatives may propose to withdraw confidence from the President of the 
Republic and hold early presidential elections upon filing a reasoned motion to be signed by at 
least the majority of the members of the House of Representatives and upon approval of 
twothirds of its members. The motion may only be filed once for the same reason within the 
presidential term. 
Upon approval of the proposal to withdraw confidence, the matter of withdrawing confidence 
from the President of the Republic and holding early presidential elections shall be put to 
public referendum to be called by the Prime Minister. If the majority approves the decision to 
withdraw confidence, the President of the Republic shall be relieved from his office, the office 
of the President of the Republic shall be deemed vacant, and early presidential elections shall 
be held within sixty (60) days as of the date of announcing the results of referendum. If the 
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result of the referendum is in the negative, the House of Representatives shall be deemed 
dissolved, and the President of the Republic shall call for election of a new House of 
Representatives within thirty (30) days as of the date of dissolution.  
Article (162) 
If the vacancy of the presidential office coincides with the holding of a referendum or the 
election of the House of Representatives, the presidential elections shall be given priority. The 
then existing House of Representatives shall remain in place until the completion of the 
presidential elections.  
Branch II 
The Government  
Article (163) 
The government is the supreme executive and administrative body of the State, and consists of 
the Prime Minister, his/her deputies, the Ministers, and their deputies. 
The Prime Minister shall head the government, oversee its work, and direct the performance of 
its functions.  
Article (164) 
The Prime Minister shall be an Egyptian citizen born to Egyptian parents and neither he/she 
nor his/her spouse may hold the nationality of any other country, shall enjoy civil and political 
rights, shall have been drafted into or legally exempted from the military service, and shall be 
at least thirty five (35) Gregorian years of age at the time of appointment. 
Anyone appointed as a member of the government shall be an Egyptian citizen, shall enjoy all 
civil and political rights, shall have been drafted into or legally exempted from the military 
service, and shall be at least thirty (30) Gregorian years of age at the time of appointment. 
It is prohibited to combine between the membership of the government and the membership of 
the House of Representatives. . If a member of the House of Representatives is appointed to the 
government, the seat thereof in the House shall become vacant as at the date of this 
appointment.  
Article (165) 
As a condition for assuming their duties, the Prime Minister and members of government shall 
take the following oath before the President of the Republic: “I swear by Allah, the Almighty, 
to loyally uphold the republican system, to respect the Constitution and the law, to fully 
uphold the interest of the People, and to safeguard the independence of the nation and the 
integrity and safety of its territories.”  
Article (166) 
The salary of the Prime Minister and the members of government shall be defined by Law, and 
they may not receive any other salary or remuneration, nor engage, throughout the term of 
their respective offices, whether in person or through an intermediary, in self-professions, or 
commercial, financial or industrial business activities. Further, they shall not buy or rent any 
property owned by the state or a public legal person or a public sector company, or a public 
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enterprise sector company, nor lease or sell any of their property to, or barter the same with the 
State, nor conclude a contract with the State as vendors, suppliers, contractors or otherwise. 
Any such actions shall be deemed null and void. 
The Prime Minister and the members of government shall submit a financial estate disclosure 
upon taking office, upon leaving the same, and at the end of each year of service. The financial 
estate disclosure shall be published in the Official Gazette. 
If the Prime Minister or any of the members of government receive cash or in-kind gifts, 
because of or in relation to their posts, the ownership thereof shall transfer to the State’s 
treasury. The foregoing shall be regulated by Law.  
Article (167) 
The government shall particularly exercise the following functions:  
1- To collaborate with the President of the Republic in developing the general policy of 
the State, and to supervise its implementation;  
2- To maintain the security of the nation, and to protect the rights of citizens and the 
interest of the State;  
3- To direct, coordinate and follow up on the work of the ministries and their affiliated 
public bodies and organizations;  
4- To prepare draft bills and decrees;  
5- To issue administrative decrees in accordance with the law, and to follow up on their 
implementation;  
6- To develop the draft for the general plan of the State;  
7- To prepare the draft annual budget of the State; 
8- To conclude loan contracts and to grant the same in accordance with the provisions of 
the Constitution;  
9- To implement the laws.   
Article (168) 
Within the framework of the State’s general policy, the minister shall develop the Ministry’s 
general policy in collaboration with the competent authorities, supervise the implementation 
thereof and provide guidance and oversight. 
Top management posts in all ministries shall include a permanent undersecretary to ensure 
institutional stability and raising the level of efficient implementation of its policy.  
Article (169) 
Any member of the government may make a statement before the House of Representatives, or 
one of its committees, concerning any matters falling within his/her mandate. 
The House or the committee shall discuss such statement and convey its opinion regarding it.  
Article (170) 
The Prime Minister shall issue the necessary regulations for the execution of laws, in a manner 
that shall not involve any disruption of, amendment to, or exemption from their execution, and 
shall have the right to delegate others in issuing them, unless the law designates who shall 
issue the required executive regulations.  
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Upon the approval of the Council of Ministries, the Prime Minister shall issue the decrees 
necessary for the creation and organization of public utilities and services.  
Article (172) 
Upon the approval of the Council of Ministries, the Prime Minister shall issue the disciplinary 
regulations.  
Article (173) 
The Prime Minister and the members of the government shall be subject to the general rules 
governing investigation and trial procedures, in case that they commit crimes while or by 
reason of exercising the functions of their posts. The end of their term of service shall not 
preclude the institution or resumption of prosecution against them. 
In case that the Prime Minister or any of the members of the government is accused of treason, 
the provisions stipulated in Article 159 herein shall apply.  
Article (174) 
In case of resignation of the Prime Minister, the letter of resignation shall be submitted to the 
President of the Republic. If a minister offers resignation, it shall be submitted to the Prime 
Minister. 
Branch III 
The Local Administration 
Article (175) 
The State shall be divided into administrative units that enjoy legal personality. Such units 
shall include governorates, cities and villages. Other administrative units that have the legal 
personality may be established, if public interest so requires. 
When establishing or abolishing local units or amending their boundaries, the economic and 
social conditions shall be taken into account. All the foregoing shall be regulated by Law.  
Article (176) 
The state shall ensure administrative, financial, and economic decentralization. The law shall 
regulate the methods of empowering administrative units to provide, improve, and well 
manage public facilities, and shall define the timeline for transferring powers and budgets to 
the local administration units.  
Article (177) 
The State shall ensure the fulfillment of the needs of local units in terms of scientific, technical, 
administrative and financial assistance, and the equitable distribution of facilities, services and 
resources, and shall bring development levels in these units to a common standard and achieve 
social justice between these units, as regulated by Law.  
Article (178) 
Local units shall have independent financial budgets. 
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The resources of local units shall include, in addition to the resources allocated to them by the 
State, taxes and duties of a local nature, whether primary or auxiliary. The same rules and 
procedures for the collection of public funds by the State shall apply to collection of such taxes 
and duties. 
The foregoing shall be regulated by law.  
Article (179) 
The law shall regulate the manner in which governors and heads of other local administrative 
units are appointed or elected, and shall determine their competences.  
Article (180) 
Every local unit shall elect a local council by direct and secret ballot for a term of four years. A 
candidate shall be at lease twenty one (21) Gregorian years of age. The law shall regulate the 
other conditions for candidacy and procedures of election, provided that one quarter of the 
seats shall be allocated to youth under thirty five (35) years of age and one quarter shall be 
allocated for women, and that workers and farmers shall be represented by no less than 50 
percent of the total number of seats, and these percentages shall include an appropriate 
representation of Christians and people with disability. 
Local councils shall be competent to follow up the implementation of the development plan, f 
monitor of the different activities, exercise of oversight over the executive authorities using 
tools such as providing proposals, and submitting questions, briefing motions, interrogations 
and others, and to withdraw confidence from the heads of local units, as regulated by Law. 
The law shall define the competences of other local councils, their financial sources, guarantees 
of their members, and the independence of such councils. 
Article (181) 
Local councils’ resolutions that are issued within their respective mandates shall be final. They 
shall not be subject to the interference by the executive authority, except to prevent the council 
from overstepping its jurisdiction, or causing damage to the public interest or the interest of 
other local councils. 
Any dispute pertaining to the jurisdiction of these local councils in villages, centers or towns 
shall be settled by the governorate-level local council. Disputes regarding the jurisdiction of 
governorate-level local councils shall be resolved, as a matter of urgency, by the General 
Assembly of the Legal Opinion and Legislation Departments of the State Council. The 
foregoing shall be regulated by Law.  
Article (182) 
Every local council shall develop its own budget and final accounts, as regulated by Law. 
Article (183) 
Local councils shall not be dissolved by virtue of a general administrative action. 
The Law shall regulate the manner of dissolving and re-electing local councils. 
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General Provisions  
Article (184) 
The Judiciary is an autonomous authority that carries out its tasks through courts of all types 
and degrees. Courts shall issue their rulings in accordance with the law, and the law shall 
define the jurisdiction of the courts. Interference in the affairs of the courts or in the lawsuits 
under their consideration shall constitute a crime that does not lapse by prescription.  
Article (185) 
Each judicial body or organization shall manage its own affairs, and shall have an independent 
budget, the components of which shall be fully examined by the House of Representatives. 
Upon its approval, this budget shall be included in the State budget under one budget line. 
Each judicial body or organization shall be consulted with regards to the bills regulating its 
affairs.  
Article (186) 
Judges are independent and immune to dismissal, are subject to no other authority but the law, 
and are equal in rights and duties. The conditions and procedures for their appointment, 
secondment and retirement shall be regulated by the law. The law shall further regulate their 
disciplinary accountability. They may not be fully or partly seconded except to the agencies 
determined by the law and to perform the tasks set forth therein. All the foregoing shall be in 
the manner that maintains the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and judges, and 
shall prevent conflicts of interest. The rights, duties and guarantees granted to them shall be 
specified by Law.  
Article (187) 
Court sessions shall be public, unless the court decides on its secrecy to safeguard public order 
or public morals. In all cases, court judgments shall be pronounced in publicly held sessions.  
Branch II 
The Judiciary & The Prosecution  
Article (188) 
The judiciary shall decide on all disputes and crimes, except those falling within the 
jurisdiction of other judicial bodies. It shall solely have the jurisdiction to settle disputes 
relating to its own 50 members. The affairs of the judiciary shall be managed by a Supreme 
Council, the structure and jurisdiction of which shall be regulated by Law.  
Article (189) 
The Public Prosecution is an integral part of the judiciary. It shall carry out the investigation 
and prosecution of criminal cases, except those excepted by the law. The law shall determine 
its other jurisdictions. 
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The Prosecutor General shall be in charge of the Public Prosecution. He shall be chosen by the 
Supreme Council of the Judiciary from among those ranked as Vice presidents of the Court of 
Cassation, or from those ranked as Presidents of the Courts of Appeal or from the Assistants to 
the Prosecutor General. He shall be appointed by virtue of a Presidential Decree for four years 
or for the remaining years until he reaches the age of retirement whichever is earlier, and this 
appointment shall be only once during his term of service.  
Branch III 
The State Council 
Article (190) 
The State Council is an autonomous judicial body, and it shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to 
settle administrative disputes and disputes relevant to the execution of all its rulings. It shall 
have jurisdiction over disciplinary suits and appeals, and the exclusive jurisdiction to provide 
advice regarding legal issues to the administrative bodies determined by the law. It shall also 
review and draft bills and decrees of legislative nature, and shall review draft contracts to 
which the state or any other public authority is a party. The law shall determine its other 
jurisdictions.  
Chapter Four 
The Supreme Constitutional Court  
Article (191) 
The Supreme Constitutional Court is an autonomous and independent judicial body having its 
headquarters in Cairo. However, in cases of emergency it may, upon the approval of its 
General Assembly, hold its sessions elsewhere in Egypt. It shall have an independent budget, 
which shall be fully examined by the House of Representatives. Upon its approval, this budget 
shall be included in the State budget under one budget line. The General Assembly of the court 
shall manage its affairs and it shall be consulted regarding bills relevant to its affairs.  
Article (192) 
The Supreme Constitutional Court shall be solely competent to decide on the constitutionality 
of laws and regulations, to interpret legislative provisions, and to adjudicate on disputes 
pertaining to the affairs of its members, on jurisdictional disputes between judicial bodies and 
entities that have judicial jurisdiction, on disputes pertaining to the implementation of two 
final contradictory judgments, one of which is rendered by a judicial body or an authority with 
judicial jurisdiction and the other is rendered by another , and on disputes pertaining to the 
execution of its judgments and decisions. 
The law shall determine the Court’s other competences and regulate the procedures that are to 
be followed before the Court.  
Article (193) 
The Court shall be composed of a President and a sufficient number of deputies to the 
President. 
The Commissioners of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall have a President and a sufficient 
number of Commission presidents, advisors and assistant advisors. 
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The General Assembly of the Court shall elect its President from among the most senior three 
vice-presidents of the Court. It shall further choose the vice-presidents and the members of its 
Commissioners, and the appointment thereof shall be made by virtue of a decree by the 
President of the Republic. The foregoing shall be regulated by Law.  
Article (194) 
The President and the vice-presidents of the Supreme Constitutional Court, and the President 
and members of its Commissioners are independent and immune to dismissal, and are subject 
to no other authority but the law. The law shall set out the conditions they must meet. The 
Court shall be responsible for their disciplinary accountability, as stated by the law. All rights, 
duties and guarantees granted to other members of the judiciary shall apply to them.  
Article (195) 
The judgments and decisions issued by the Supreme Constitutional Court shall be published in 
the Official Gazette, and they shall be binding upon everyone and all of the State authorities. 
They shall have Res judicata vis-à-vis all of them. 
The law shall regulate the consequences of a judgment rendering a text of law unconstitutional.  
Chapter Five 
Judicial Organizations  
Article (196) 
The State Lawsuits Authority is an independent judicial organization. It undertakes the legal 
representation of the State in lawsuits filed by or against the State, and of proposing amicable 
settlement of disputes at any stage of litigation. It shall further have technical oversight on the 
departments of legal affairs of the State administrative bodies with regard to cases handled 
thereby. It shall draft contracts referred thereto by administrative bodies and to which the State 
is party. The foregoing shall be regulated by Law. 
Other competences of the Organization shall be defined by the law. Its members shall have all 
of the guarantees, rights and duties assigned to other members of the Judiciary. Their 
disciplinary accountability shall be regulated by the law.  
Article (197) 
The Administrative Prosecution is an independent judicial organization. It undertakes 
investigations into financial and administrative violations, and also those referred to it. 
Regarding these violations, the Administrative Prosecution shall have the authorities of the 
administrative body to impose disciplinary penalties. Challenges against the decision of the 
Prosecution shall be filed before the competent disciplinary court at the State Council. It shall 
further initiate actions, appeals, and disciplinary proceedings before the State Council courts. 
All the foregoing shall be regulated by Law. 
Other competences of the Administrative Prosecution shall be defined by law. All guarantees, 
rights and duties assigned to other members of the Judiciary shall apply to its members. Their 
disciplinary accountability shall be regulated by the law.  
Chapter Six 
The Legal Profession  
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The legal profession is a free profession which participates with the Judicial Authority in the 
establishment of justice and the rule of law, and ensures the right to defense. It shall be 
practiced by independent attorneys, and attorneys of public authorities, public sector 
companies and public enterprise sector companies. All attorneys shall have, while performing 
their duties to uphold the right to defense before the courts, the guarantees and protection 
granted to them by the law. Such rights shall also be granted to them before investigation and 
inquiry authorities. Except in cases of flagrante delicto, the arrest or detention of attorneys 
while exercising their right to defense shall be prohibited. The foregoing shall be determined 




Judicial experts, forensic medicine experts, and notary public’s technical staff undertake their 
duties independently, and shall have the guarantees and protection required for them to 
perform their tasks, as regulated by the Law.  
Chapter Eight 
The Armed Forces & The Police 
Branch I 
The Armed Forces  
Article (200) 
The Armed Forces belong to the People, and their duty is to protect the country, and preserve 
its security and the integrity of its territories. Only the State shall be entitled to establish the 
Armed Forces. No individual, organization, entity, or group shall be allowed to create military 
or quasimilitary squadrons, groups or organizations. 
The Armed Forces shall have a supreme council, as regulated by Law.  
Article (201) 
The Minister of Defense is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, and shall be 
appointed from among its officers.  
Article (202) 
The Law regulates the military mass mobilization, and determines the conditions of the 
military service, promotion and retirement in the Armed Forces. 
The judicial committees for officers and personnel of the Armed Forces shall be solely 
competent to adjudicate on all administrative disputes pertaining to decisions affecting them. 
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National Defense Council  
Article (203) 
National Defense Council shall be chaired by the President of the Republic and comprise the 
membership of the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Minister 
of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Interior, 
the Chief of the General Intelligence Service, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces as well as 
the Commanders of the Navy, the Air Forces and Air Defense, the Chief of Operations of the 
Armed Forces, and the Head of Military Intelligence. 
The Council shall be competent to examine the matters pertaining to preserving the security 
and integrity of the country, and to discuss the budget of the Armed Forces, which shall be 
included in the State budget under one budget line. The opinion of the Council shall be 
obtained on the bills concerning the Armed Forces. 
Other competences of the Council shall be specified by Law. 
Upon discussing the budget, the Head of the Financial Affairs Department of the Armed Forces 
and the heads of the Planning and Budgeting Committee and the National Security Committee 
at the House of Representatives shall join the Council. 
The President of the Republic may invite any person having relevant expertise to attend the 
Council’s meetings without having the right to vote.  
Branch III 
Military Courts  
Article (204) 
The Military Court is an independent judicial body exclusively competent to adjudicate on all 
crimes pertaining to the Armed Forces, the officers and personnel thereof, and their 
equivalents, and on the crimes committed by the personnel of the General Intelligence while 
and by reason of performing their duties. 
No civilian shall face trial before the Military Court, except for crimes that constitute a direct 
assault against military facilities or camps of the Armed Forces, or their equivalents, against 
military zones or border zones determined as military zones, against the Armed Forces’ 
equipment, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, documents, military secrets, or its public funds, or 
against military factories; crimes pertaining to military service; or crimes that constitute a direct 
assault against the officers or personnel of the Armed Forces by reason of performing their 
duties. 
The law shall define such crimes, and specify the other competences of the Military Court. 
Members of the Military Court shall be independent and shall be immune to dismissal. They 
shall have all the guarantees, rights and duties stipulated for the members of other judicial 
bodies.  
Branch IV 
National Security Council  
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The National Security Council shall be chaired by the President of the Republic, and comprise 
the membership of the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the 
Minister of Defense, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of 
Finance, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Health, the Minister of Communication and the 
Minister of Education, the Chief of the General Intelligence Service, and the Head of the 
Committee of Defense and National Security at the House of Representatives. 
The Council shall be responsible for adopting strategies for establishing the security of the 
country and facing disasters and crises of all kinds, shall take the necessary measures to 
contain them, to identify sources of threat to the Egyptian national security, inside the country 
or abroad, and to undertake the necessary actions to address them at both official and popular 
levels. 
The Council may invite any person having relevant expertise to attend its meetings without 
having the right to vote. 
The law shall determine the other competences of the Council and its regulations.  
Branch V 
The Police  
Article (206) 
The police force is a statutory civil body that is dedicated to the service of the People and its 
loyalty shall be to the People. It shall ensure safety and security of the citizens, preserve public 
order and morality. It shall comply with the duties set out in the Constitution and the law, and 
shall respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. The State shall guarantee that the staff 
of the Police force perform their duties, and the relevant guarantees shall be regulated by Law.  
Article (207) 
A supreme police council shall be formed from among the most senior officers of the police 
force and the Head of the Legal Opinion Department at the State Council. The Council shall be 
competent to assist the Minister of Interior in the organization of the Police force and 
management of the affairs of its staff members. The other competences of the Council shall be 
determined by Law. The Council shall be consulted in connection with any laws pertaining to 
the police force.  
Chapter Nine 
National Elections Commission  
Article (208) 
The National Elections Commission is an independent authority and shall be solely competent 
to administer referenda and elections of the president, the parliament and the local councils. 
Such administration shall include the development and updating of a database for voters, 
proposing the division of constituencies, determination of controls for promotion and funding 
of electoral campaigns, as well as electoral expenditure, the disclosure of such expenditure, the 
supervision of such controls, the facilitation of the procedures for out-of-country voting by 
expatriate Egyptians, and other procedures till the announcements of the results. 
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The foregoing shall be regulated by law.  
Article (209) 
The National Elections Commission shall be administered by a board composed of 10 members 
to be equally assigned on full time basis from among those ranked as Vice-presidents of the 
Court of Cassation, those ranked as Presidents of the Courts of Appeal, Vice-presidents of the 
State Council, the State Lawsuits Organization and the Administrative Prosecution. They shall 
be selected by the Supreme Judicial Council and special councils of the aforementioned judicial 
bodies and organizations, as the case may be, provided that they are not members thereof. 
They shall be appointed by virtue of a decree by the President of the Republic. They shall be 
assigned to work on a full time basis at the Commission for one term of six years. The 
Commission shall be chaired by the most senior judge at the Court of Cassation. 
Half of the members of the Council shall be replaced every three years. 
The Commission may seek the assistance of independent public figures, specialists, and those 
deemed to have relevant expertise in the field of elections. They shall not have the right to vote. 
The Commission shall have a permanent executive body. The law shall determine the 
composition and constitution of such executive body, and the rights, duties and guarantees of 
its members in a way that achieves their neutrality, independence and integrity.  
Article (210) 
Voting and counting of votes in referenda and elections shall be administered by members of 
the Commission under the overall supervision of its Board. It may seek the help of members of 
judicial organizations. 
The voting and counting of votes in elections and referenda which take place during the 10 
years following the effective date of this Constitution shall be totally overseen by members of 
judicial bodies and organizations according to the Law. 
The High Administrative Court shall be competent to adjudicate on challenges filed against the 
Commission’s decisions pertaining to referenda, presidential and parliamentary elections, and 
the results thereof. Challenges against elections of local councils shall be filed before the 
Administrative Courts. Dates to file challenges against these decisions shall be specified by 
law, provided that challenges shall be finally decided within ten days from the date of 
recording the challenge. 
Chapter Ten 
Supreme Council for the Regulation of Media 
Article (211) 
The Supreme Council for the Regulation of Media is an independent entity that has a legal 
personality, and enjoys technical, financial and administrative independence, and has an 
independent budget. 
The Council shall be competent to regulate the affairs of audio and visual media and regulate 
the printed and digital press, and other media means. 
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The Council shall bear the responsibility for guaranteeing and protecting the freedom of press 
and media as stipulated in the Constitution, safeguarding its independence, neutrality, 
plurality and diversity, preventing monopolistic practices, monitoring the legality of the 
sources of funding of press and media institutions and developing the controls and criteria 
necessary to ensure compliance by the press and media outlets with the professional and 
ethical standards, and national security needs as stated in the Law. 
The law shall determine the composition and regulations of the Council, and the employment 
conditions for its staff. The Council shall be consulted with respect to the bills and regulations 
related to its scope of competence. 
Article (212) 
The National Press Organization is an independent organization that shall manage and 
develop state-owned press institutions and their assets, as well as ensure their modernization, 
independence, neutrality and their adherence to good professional, administrative and 
economic standards. 
The law shall determine the composition and regulations of the Organization, and the 
employment conditions for its staff. 
It shall be consulted with respect to the bills and regulations pertaining to its scope of work.  
Article (213) 
The National Media Organization is an independent organization that shall manage and 
develop state-owned visual, audio and digital media outlets and their assets, as well as ensure 
their development, independence, neutrality and their adherence to good professional, 
administrative and economic standards. 
The law shall determine the composition and regulations of the Organization and the 
employment conditions for its staff. 
It shall be consulted with respect to the bills and regulations pertaining to its scope of work.  
Chapter Eleven 
National Councils, Autonomous Organizations & Control Agencies 
Branch I  
National Councils 
Article (214) 
The law shall specify the independent national councils, including the National Council for 
Human Rights, the National Council for Women, the National Council for Childhood and 
Motherhood, and the National Council for Disabled Persons. The law shall state the 
composition, mandates, and guarantees for the independence and neutrality of their respective 
members. Each council shall have the right to report to the competent authorities any 
violations pertaining to their fields of work. 
These councils shall have legal personalities and shall be technically, financially, and 
administratively independent. They shall be consulted with respect to the bills and regulations 
pertaining to their affairs and fields of work.  
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Autonomous Organizations and Control Agencies 
Article (215) 
Autonomous Organizations and control agencies shall be specified by Law. These 
organizations and agencies shall have legal personality, and shall be technically, financially 
and administratively independent. They shall be consulted with respect to the bills and 
regulations that relate to their fields of work. These bodies and agencies shall include the 
Central Bank, the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA), the Central Auditing 
Organization (CAO), and the Administrative Control Authority. 
Article (216) 
The formation of each individual autonomous organization or regulatory agency shall be 
enacted by a law defining its competences and regulations, and stipulating guarantees for its 
independence, the necessary protection for its members, and their employment conditions in a 
way that ensures their neutrality and independence. 
The President of the Republic shall appoint the heads of such organizations and regulatory 
agencies, upon the approval of the House of Representatives by a majority of its members, for a 
one-time renewable term of four years. They shall not be dismissed, except in the cases stated 
in the law. The same prohibitions applicable to the Ministers shall apply to these heads.  
Article (217) 
Autonomous organizations and control agencies shall submit annual reports to the President of 
the Republic, the House of Representatives and the Prime Minister, immediately after their 
issuance. 
The House of Representatives shall examine such reports and take the appropriate action 
within a period not exceeding four months from the date of receipt. The reports shall be made 
available to the public. 
Autonomous organizations and control agencies shall notify the competent investigation 
authorities of any evidence discovered in relation to violations or crimes. They shall take the 
necessary measures with regards to these reports within a specified period of time. The 
foregoing shall be regulated by Law.  
Article (218) 
The State shall fight corruption, and the competent control agencies and organizations shall be 
identified by Law. 
Competent control agencies and organizations shall coordinate their activities in combating 
corruption, enhancing the values of integrity and transparency in order to ensure the sound 
performance of public functions and preserve public funds, and shall develop and follow up 
execution of a national strategy to combat corruption in collaboration with other competent 
agencies and organizations, as regulated by Law. 
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The Central Auditing Organization shall be responsible for monitoring the funds of the State, 
the funds of the State public and independent legal persons and other authorities as specified 
by Law; s well as being responsible for monitoring the implementation of the State budget and 
independent budgets and for auditing its final accounts.  
Article (220) 
The Central Bank shall be responsible for developing and overseeing the implementation of 
monetary, credit, and banking polices, and for monitoring the performance of banks. It is solely 
entitled to issue banknotes. It shall maintain the integrity of the monetary and banking system, 
and the stability of prices within the framework of the State general economic policy, as 
regulated by Law.  
Article (221) 
The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) shall be responsible for monitoring and 
supervising financial non-banking markets and instruments including capital markets, futures 
exchanges, insurance activities, mortgage finance, financial leasing, and factoring and 
securitization, as regulated by Law.  
Part VI 




The city of Cairo is the capital of the Arab Republic of Egypt.  
Article (223) 
The national flag of the Arab Republic of Egypt consists of three colors; black, white, and red 
with an eagle taken from the “Eagle of Salah El Din” in golden yellow. The emblem, 
decorations, insignia, seal and the national anthem shall be determined by Law. 
Desecration of the Egyptian flag shall be a crime punishable under the law.  
Article (224) 
All the provisions stipulated by laws and regulations prior to the promulgation of this 
Constitution shall remain in force, and they may neither be amended nor repealed except in 
accordance with the regulations and procedures prescribed herein. 
The state shall be obliged to issue laws executing the provisions of this Constitution.  
Article (225) 
Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette within 15 days from the date of their issuance, 
to be effective after 30 days from the day following the date of publication, unless the law 
specifies a different date. 
Provisions of the laws shall only apply from the date of their entry into force. However, in 
articles pertaining to non-criminal and non-tax-related matters, the contrary may be provided 
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for in the law, upon approval by a majority of two thirds of the members of House of 
Representatives.  
Article (226) 
The amendment of one or more articles of the Constitution may be requested by the President 
of the Republic or one-fifth of the members of the House of Representatives. The request shall 
specify the articles requested to be amended and the reasons for such amendment. 
In all cases, the House of Representatives shall discuss the amendment request within 30 days 
from the date of its receipt. The House shall issue its decision to accept the request in whole or 
in part by a majority of its members. 
If the request is rejected, the same articles may not be requested to be amended again before 
the next legislative term. 
If the amendment request is approved by the House, it shall discuss the text of the articles 
requested to be amended within 60 days from the date of approval. If approved by a two-
thirds majority of the House’s members, the amendment shall be put to a public referendum 
within 30 days from the date the approval is issued. The amendment shall be effective from the 
date on which the referendum’s result and the approval of a valid majority of the participants 
in the referendum are announced. 
In all cases, texts pertaining to the re-election of President of the Republic or the principles of 
freedom or equality stipulated in this Constitution may not be amended, unless the 
amendment brings more guarantees.  
Article (227) 
The Constitution and its preamble and all its provisions constitute an integral text and an 




The High Electoral Committee and the Presidential Election Committee existing at the time this 
Constitution comes into force shall undertake the full supervision of the first parliamentary 
and presidential elections following the effective date of the Constitution. The funds of the two 
committees shall be transferred to the National Electoral Commission, immediately upon its 
formation.  
Article (229) 
The elections of the House of Representatives following the date on which this Constitution 
comes into effect shall take place in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 hereof.  
Article (230) 
Election of the President of the Republic or the House of Representatives shall take place as 
regulated by Law, provided that the first of either elections shall take place within a period not 
less than 30 days and not more than 90 days after the date on which this Constitution comes 
into effect. 
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In all cases, the following electoral procedures shall commence within a period not exceeding 
six months as of the date on which the Constitution comes into effect.  
Article (231) 
The presidential term following the effective date of this Constitution shall commence as of the 
date on which the final result of the election is announced.  
Article (232) 
The Interim President of the Republic shall continue to exercise presidential powers stipulated 
herein until the elected President of the Republic takes the constitutional oath.  
Article (233) 
If the Interim President of the Republic is rendered unable to exercise his powers by reason of a 
temporary impediment, the Prime Minister shall replace him. 
If the Interim Presidential office becomes vacant due to resignation, death, permanent 
disability or any other reason, the most senior Vice-President of the Supreme Constitutional 
Court shall replace him with the same powers.  
Article (234) 
The Minister of Defense shall be appointed upon the approval of the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces. The provisions of this article shall remain in force for two full presidential terms 
starting from the date on which this Constitution comes into effect.  
Article (235) 
In its first legislative term following the effective date of this Constitution, the House of 
Representatives shall issue a law to regulate constructing and renovating churches, in a 
manner that guarantees the freedom to practice religious rituals for Christians.  
Article (236) 
The State shall guarantee setting and implementing a plan for the comprehensive economic 
and urban development of border and underprivileged areas, including Upper Egypt, Sinai, 
Matrouh, and Nubia. This shall be made with the participation of the residents of these areas in 
the development projects, and they shall be given a priority in benefiting therefrom, taking into 
account the cultural and environmental patterns of the local community, within ten years from 
the date that this Constitution comes into effect, as regulated by Law.  
The State shall work on setting and implementing projects to bring back the residents of Nubia 
to their original territories and develop such territories within 10 years, as regulated by law.  
Article (237) 
The State shall fight all types and forms of terrorism, and track its funding sources as a threat 
to the nation and its citizens, within a specific timeframe while guaranteeing basic rights and 
freedoms. 
The law shall regulate the provisions and procedures of fighting terrorism, and fair 
compensation for the damages resulting therefrom and because thereof. 
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The State guarantees gradual performance of its obligation to allocate the minimum 
government expenditure rates on education, higher education, health and scientific research 
that are stipulated in this Constitution as at the date on which it enters into effect, provided it is 
fully compliant in the State budget of the fiscal year 2016/2017. 
The State shall provide compulsory education until the completion of the secondary stage in a 
gradual manner to be completed by school year 2016/2017.  
Article (239) 
The House of Representatives shall issue a law organizing the rules for assigning judges and 
members of judicial bodies and organizations, ensuring the cancellation of full and partial 
assignment to non-judicial bodies or committees with judicial jurisdiction, or for managing 
justice affairs or overseeing elections, within a period not exceeding five years from the date on 
which this Constitution comes into effect.  
Article (240) 
The State shall ensure providing financial and human resources necessary to appealing the 
judgments issued by criminal courts on felonies within 10 years from the date on which this 
Constitution comes into effect. The foregoing shall be regulated by Law.  
Article (241) 
In its first legislative term after the enforcement of this Constitution, the House of 
Representatives shall issue a law on transitional justice that ensures revealing the truth, 
accountability, proposing frameworks for national reconciliation, and compensating victims, in 
accordance with international standards.  
Article (242) 
The existing system of municipal administration shall continue to be in force until the system 
stipulated herein is gradually implemented within five years of the date of entry into force of 
this Constitution, without prejudice to Article 180 thereof.  
Article (243) 
The State shall endeavor that workers and farmers be appropriately represented in the first 
House of Representatives to be elected after this Constitution is approved, as regulated by law.  
Article (244) 
The State shall endeavor that youth, Christians, persons with disability and Egyptians living 
abroad be appropriately represented in the first House of Representatives to be elected after 
this Constitution is approved, as regulated by law.  
Article (245) 
The employees of the Shoura Council who are still in service on the date that this Constitution 
comes into force shall be transferred to the House of Representatives with the same job levels 
and seniority on that date. Their salaries, allowances, bonuses, and their other financial 
entitlements granted to them on an individual basis shall be maintained. All funds of the 
Shoura Council shall be transferred to the House of Representatives.  
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The Constitutional Declaration issued on July 5th, 2013, the Constitutional Declaration issued 
on July 8th, 2013, and any constitutional texts or provisions of the Constitution issued in 2012 
but not covered by this constitutional document shall be deemed repealed as of the date that 
this Constitution comes into effect. Their consequential effects shall however remain in force.  
Article (247) 
This Constitution shall come into effect as at the date on which it is announced that the People 
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Abstract 
Malaysia is known as one of the 'moderate' Muslim countries in the world. Though Islam is enshrined in the 
Federal Constitution as the religion of the country, Islamic law does not fully govern the country. In fact, Islamic 
law is part of the national law, which accommodates civil, Islamic and indigenous laws. Civil laws are statutes of 
general application and civil courts are for all citizens. However, Muslims are also subjected to Islamic family law 
which governs all matters related to marriage and divorce and also the Shariah criminal offences law, below which, 
if violated, the offender can be tried in the state’s Shariah courts. This article seeks to examine the historical 
background and the development of Islamic law administration in Malaysia. It focuses on the position of Islamic 
law within the constitutional framework which sets the separation of power between the state and federal 
governments. It then examines the institutional power, religious bodies, religious authority and the Shariah courts. 
Lastly, the paper will reflect on the success, challenges and issues of developing Islamic law after more than fifty 
years since the nation’s independence. 
I. Introduction 
After more than fourteen centuries, Islam has become one of the fastest growing religions in 
the world. At the turn of the twenty-first century, there were approximately 1.3 billion 
Muslims worldwide and nearly sixty percent residing in Asia.1 This has garnered the attention 
 
*  Siti Zubaidah Ismail, PhD, is Senior Lecturer and Head of the Shariah and Law Department, Academy of Islamic Studies, 
University of Malaya, Malaysia, szubaida@um.edu.my. I would like to thank Ali Mackaben for proofreading the early draft. 
1  MALISE RUTHVEN & AZIM NANJI, Historical Atlas of Islam, Cambridge 2004.  
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of academics to focus more on the study of Islam, Islamic law and Muslim society within Asia, 
once considered periphery to the centralised and ‘normative’ Islam of the Middle East and the 
Arab world.2 Scholars writing about Muslim cultures, politics and Islamic law in the new 
millennium must now take into account the various ways in which Islam manifest itself 
outside of the popularised orientalist's depictions of desert bedouin and the harems of Persian 
royalty. 
The advent of Islam began during the 7th century C.E. (652 A.H) with the Prophet Muhammad 
(sallallahu alayhi wasallam) who was both a religious and political leader and Islamic law was 
implemented in all realms of life. In modern times, the degree of religious implementation 
would be dependent on the nature of the state and its national legal system. Therefore, Muslim 
countries, that is, those with a predominantly Muslim population, proclaimed either Islam as 
their state religion or Islamic law as the main source of legislation3 in order to give legal 
identity to the state. Currently, according to Glenn, Islamic law has become the world’s third 
major legal tradition.4 Many scholars like ANDERSON5 and OTTO6 reiterate that the national 
legal system of Muslim-majority countries can be broadly divided into three groups: (i) those 
that still consider the Shariah as the fundamental law and those laws pervade all areas of life 
(Saudi Arabia is one of the countries that has a strong orientation towards classical Shariah); (ii) 
those that have abandoned the Shariah in their legal system but maintain the waqf (endowment) 
management, like Turkey, and (iii) those that have a hybrid system with Shariah-based and the 
civil laws operating in ‘parallel’. The third group is the largest group of Muslim-dominated 
legal systems in the world today. 
One of the countries in South East Asia that has become the epicenter for implementing Islamic 
law is Malaysia. As a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Malaysia 
enjoys positive global attention for being a reputable non-Arab Muslim country with a modern 
multi-ethnic society. Praised for embracing Islam in its administrative and political context, 
Islam is deemed to be fundamental yet moderate, progressive and fast developed. 
Anthropologist like PELETZ asserts that the Islamization process in Malaysia cannot be 
compared with “the conventional areal foci of Islamic studies – that is the Middle East and 
North Africa, as Malaysia, a religiously and ethnically diverse Muslim-majority country, in 
recent decades, has experienced stunning economic transformation and patterns of sustained 
growth that are probably second to none in the Muslim world.”7 The Islamization process in 
Malaysia, that is, the intensification of Islamic influence on social, cultural, economic and 
 
2  MICHAEL J. FEENER & TERENJIT SEVEA, Islamic Connections: Muslim Societies in South and Southeast Asia. Singapore 2009. 
3  For example in Pakistan Article 227 of the 1973 constitution of Pakistan requires all laws to be brought in conformity with 
the injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah. The new Egyptian constitution of 2014 provides in Article 3 that the principles of 
Islamic Sharia law shall be THE chief source of legislation. The Saudi Arabia constitution of 1992 provides in Article 1 that 
“the Quran and Sunna constitute the ultimate and main source of the legal and constitutional rules”. 
4  PATRICK GLENN, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law, Oxford 2010. For more on Islamic law, see 
ABDULLAH SAAD ALAREFI, Overview of Islamic Law, International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 9 Is. 4 (2009), 707-731. 
5  JAMES N. D. ANDERSON, Islamic Law in the Modern World, New York 1959, at 83. 
6  JAN MICHIEL OTTO (ed.), Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries 
in Past and Present, Leiden 2010. 
7  MICHAEL G. PELETZ, Malaysia’s Syariah Judiciary as Global Assemblage: Islamization, Corporatization, and Other 
Transformations in Context, Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 55, Is. 3, 2013, 603-633, at 605. 
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political relations,8 can take place due to the fact that Islam enjoys the privilege status in the 
country’s legal system. In the area of Islamic banking and finance, education, business and 
social matters, Malaysia is ahead of her counterparts and has become the flag bearer for 
incorporating Islam into mainstream society by having services and facilities compliant with 
Shariah or Islamic law. Lately dubbed as a ‘hub’ for the Islamic finance industry and halal 
businesses, Malaysia is raising Islam to the next level, or as described by MAZNAH MOHAMAD, 
“[as] being elevated as the primus inter pares of all other religions.”9 CHOUDHURY describes 
Malaysia as a country “where Islamic values and tradition are cherished and valued and 
simultaneously a highly successful modernizing process is going on”.10 Now, Islam has gone 
beyond institutional and ceremonial garb as it used to be in the previous decades. As far as the 
Islamic legal sector is concerned, HAMAYOTSU believes that it is commonly assumed that 
greater enforcement of Islamic law is the result of growing Islamism in civil society and/or the 
state.11 This article seeks to examine the historical background and the development of Islamic 
law administration in Malaysia. It focuses on the position of Islamic law within the 
constitutional framework which sets the separation of power between the state and federal 
governments. It then examines the institutional power, religious bodies, religious authority 
and the Shariah courts. Lastly, the paper will reflect on the success, challenges and potential of 
developing Islamic law after more than fifty years since the nation’s independence. The word 
Shariah that is used throughout this article refers to a code of laws and regulations that 
administer Islam and Islamic law within the context of Malaysian society. Previously, the 
words Hukum Syarak were used to differentiate between the divinely-inspired rules from the 
customary dictates. 
II. Brief Historical Reflection: From English Law to the 
Creation of Statutory Islamic Law 
A country’s legal system is said to reflect its history, which in part is said to be one of 
syncretism. In 1938, ROSCOE POUND, an American legal scholar, observed that the history of a 
system of law is largely a history of borrowing and assimilation of materials from other legal 
systems from outside.12 As we shall further see, the historical beginning of a codified Islamic 
law in the Malay Peninsular was brought about by the British administrators duplicating 
Islamic law in India, once a British colony (1661-1951).13 Islam was brought to Southeast Asia 
and the Malay Archipelago in the 14th century, via trade and business through the port of 
Malacca, one of the earliest kingdoms in Malaysia. Even though there were many explanations 
and ‘theorizing exercise’ regarding the coming of Islam to the Malay world, all agreed that it 
 
8  JASON P. ABBOTT & SOPHIE GREGORIOS-PIPPAS, Islamization in Malaysia: Processes and Dynamics, Contemporary Politics 
Vol. 16, Is. 2 (2010), 135-151, at 136. 
9  MAZNAH MOHAMAD, The Evolution of Syariah and postcolonial modernity: embedding Malay authority through statutory 
law, available at <http://www.isa-sociology.org/publ/E-symposium/E-symposium-vol-1-2-2011/EBul-Aug2011-
MaznahMohamad.pdf>, last visited 11 March 2015, 1-19, at 2. 
10  GOLAM WAHED CHOUDHURY, Islam and the Modern Muslim World, Kuala Lumpur 1993, at 163. 
11  KIKUE HAMAYOTSU, Once a Muslim, Always a Muslim: the Politics of State Enforcement of Syariah in Contemporary 
Malaysia, South East Asia Research, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2012, 399-421, at 399. 
12  ROSCOE POUND, The Formative Era of American law, Boston 1938. 
13  For further reading, ASAF ALI ASGHAR FYZEE, Muhammadan Law in India, Comparative Study in Society and History 
Vol. 5, Is. 4 (1963), 401-415. 
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was the role of the traders, merchants and the sufis that brought the change.14 Islam had 
transformed Malay adat (customs) and Islamized their traditions, which were previously 
influenced by Hinduism and Hindu culture between seventh and 14th century.15 Not only that, 
when talking about the sociological impact, AL-ATTAS viewed that through the efforts of sufis, 
the highly intellectual and rationalistic Islamic religious spirit entered the receptive minds of 
the Malays of the archipelago and turned them away from all forms of mythology.16 
Eventually, Islamic practices in the realm of business and trade with the Arabs then merged 
under the administration of the Sultan or Malay rulers of Malacca, among others, through the 
formation of two legal codes, the Canon Laws of Malacca17 and Maritime Laws,18 which were 
compiled during the 13-year reign of Sultan Muzaffar Shah (1446–1459). Another evidence of 
this Islamization can be traced on the East Coast of the Malaysian Peninsular, where a stone 
carved with Islamic punishment provisions, dated from the year 1303, was found in the state of 
Terengganu. This stone, called Batu Bersurat Terengganu, is great evidence that the divinely-
inspired punishments from the Quran and Hadith pertaining to adultery, fornication, theft and 
other capital crimes were codified and implemented during the glorious era of the Malay 
Sultans of Terengganu. However, the advent of Islam was put to a halt from the 15th century 
onwards when the Portuguese (1511–1640), and later the Dutch (1641–1785) and British (1786-
1956) invaded the country. For over 400 years, the Tanah Melayu (Malay States) was colonized 
by the Portuguese, Dutch and British. During the colonization, trade and industry had 
increased the migration of workers from India and China and eventually transformed the 
country from a single-ethnic group into a multi-racial and multi-cultural nation. The colonial 
powers put little interest in the law-making process and instead concentrated more on 
administration. The British colonization in the 18th and 19th centuries changed the country’s 
legal landscape by bringing in its own legal influence onto the Malay land. The Royal Charter 
of Justice was first introduced in the state of Penang in 1786, followed by the second and the 
third Charter of Justice applied in Malacca and Singapore which formed the Straits of 
Settlement. Later, when the British intervened in Perak and Selangor in 1874, Pahang in 1888, 
and Negeri Sembilan in 1889, the Federated Malay States were established. The British 
administrator formed treaties with the Malay Sultans, among them, through the Raffles 
Memorandum to the Sultan of Johore 1873 and the Pangkor Treaty 1874; Sultans were thus only 
given autonomy to rule over the sphere of Malay adat (custom) and religion.19 The treaties of 
 
14  Two theories fit into the variety of explanations regarding the coming of Islam to the Malay world. One, Islam was 
brought and preached by traders from Arabia, Persia and India. Two, the role of sufists from Bengal, India. See SAYYID 
QUDRATULLAH FATIMI, Islam comes to Malaysia, Singapore 1963; GEORGE E MORRISON, The coming of Islam to the East-
Indies, Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. XXIV, Is. 1, 1951, 28-37; SYED MUHAMMAD NAQUIB 
AL-ATTAS, Preliminary Statement on a General Theory of the Islamization of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago, Kuala 
Lumpur 1967; SYED FARID ALATAS, Notes on Various Theories Regarding the Islamization of the Malay Archipelago, The 
Muslim World, Vol. 75, Is. 3-4, 1985, 162-175. 
15  See for details VIRGINIA MATHESON HOOKER, A Short History of Malaysia, Linking East and West. Crows West 2003, at 
345. 
16  SYED MUHAMMAD NAQUIB AL-ATTAS, Some Aspects of Sufism as Understood and Practised among the Malays, Singapore 
1963. 
17  Canon Laws of Malacca (Hukum Kanun Melaka) contained matters pertaining to criminal and civil offences, family law, the 
power of the ruler, rules on proper conduct, particularly with regard to sexual matters, laws regarding slavery and penalties 
for all offences. See more in LIAW YOCK FANG, Undang-Undang Melaka, The Hague 1976. 
18  Maritime Laws of Malacca (Undang-Undang Laut Melaka) consisted entirely of rules, regulations, procedures and codes of 
conduct to be used at sea, obeyed and respected by all. See for details LIAW YOCK FANG, supra n. 17. 
19  WAN ARFAH HAMZAH, A First look at the Malaysian legal system, Kuala Lumpur 2009, at 158. 
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protection between Malay rulers and the British administration included a clause prohibiting 
interference in matters relating to religion and Malay custom from the scope of the advice of 
the British resident/adviser.   
Despite the clause, the British interfered with the administration and application of Islamic 
law.20 The legislation passed by the state councils upon the direction of the British adviser 
included matters concerning Islam, such as the appointment and salaries of qadi (judges), the 
regulation of zakat (religious giving or tithes), the administration of mosques (Muslim places of 
worship), the registration of Muslim marriage and divorce, and the punishments imposed for 
certain offences against the Islamic religion. Thus, according to WAN ARFAH, Islam became 
just another subject for regulation, in the same manner as contracts, crimes, property and so 
forth.21 
While the British involved themselves in the larger sphere of governance as a strategic move to 
possess more control over the colony, the Sultan was left to man those who transgressed the 
Hukum Syarak. Examples of the laws regulating Muslims were the Order in Council of 1885 
requiring Muhammadans (Muslims) to pray in mosques on Fridays, and the Order in Council 
No. 1 1894 punishing adultery by Muhammadans (in Perak). Subsequently, the British 
administration introduced English statutory law and established the civil court system in the 
early 20th century. In most areas of law, the English-inspired codes were introduced. 
Consequently, whether directly or indirectly, the Hukum Syarak or Shariah that was neither 
written nor properly codified was phasing out and relegated to the area of personal law: 
matrimony, inheritance and religious offences, while the civil courts took over the power and 
functions of the qadi courts. It was to be expected that the qadi court was at its infant stage and 
therefore, not difficult to strategically re-construct to the extent of limiting its power and 
jurisdiction. 
At that time, a pluralistic society had already existed and even Malay people consisted of 
various tribes with their own adat. While the British were keen on imposing English law as 
statutes for general application, and to get rid of the ‘natural justice’ practice among the local 
people: Malay, Chinese, and Hindus, the British could not simply take away the indigenous 
customs and diverse legal traditions. Therefore, customary laws and Hukum Syarak regarding 
firstly, matrimony, were drafted and enacted in statutory forms. Indian-inspired Islamic law 
was subsequently introduced and the first being the Mohammedan Marriage Ordinance 1888 
(Ordinance No. 5, 1888). 
Even though the general principle was clear, that the British should not interfere with the 
custom of the people, the practical application was difficult. One area of law that created 
tensions was regarding land regulations. Policies put in place with regard to land registration 
and ownership – incorporating English rules and regulations to be embedded into the 
established practice of adat – were almost unacceptable. The practice of adat and Hukum Syarak, 
however, made the British realise that disputes on land cannot be settled through the civil 
court using English law, due to the prevailing influence of Adat Perpatih22 and Adat 
 
20  AHMAD IBRAHIM, The Administration of Islamic Law in Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur 1996, at 35–6. 
21  WAN ARFAH HAMZAH, supra n. 19. 
22  Adat Perpatih are customary laws which originated from Minangkabau land in Sumatra, Indonesia. The system practices 
democracy in electing chiefs and king. Only males are eligible to be elected as leaders for each clan and tribes. 
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Temenggong23 among the Malay-Muslim community. Tensions also arose as Adat Perpateh had 
many rules which were different from those prescribed by Hukum Syarak. Later, in most cases 
concerning land tenure and inheritance, adat prevailed and all cases were mediated and settled 
through a Lembaga Adat, or customary ruling council of the tribe.24 The British administration 
who favoured adat over religion subsequently enacted Customary Tenure Enactment 1909 and 
explicated the permission of registering female ownership and ignored the existing colonial 
land registration policies.25 In the 1930s, the Mohammedan (Offences) Enactment was introduced 
in several states, sanctioning more offences in addition to penalties for failure to perform 
Jumaat (Friday congregational) prayer. Then there existed the list of separate enactments, 
namely Muhammadan Law and Malay Custom (Determination) Enactment 1930, the Muhammadan 
Marriage and Divorce Registration Enactment 1931, the Muhammadan (Offences) Enactment 1938 and 
the Council of Religion and Malay Customs Enactment 1949. That decade also witnessed the 
strengthening of colonial influence with the Civil Law Ordinance of 1937 passed by the British 
ruler, applying the usage of English common law and the principles of equity, thus, marking 
its formal introduction to the whole Malay land. These laws were modeled on those used in 
India26 and supplanted the Malay-Muslim law that had been the foundational law in the Malay 
states. The civil court system presided by British judges were established. Despite the 
acknowledgment that Hukum Syarak was the local law and that the courts must take judicial 
notice of it and declare its principles, the judge did not hesitate to apply common law and 
equity principles to fill the gaps, thus, regarding the Civil Law Enactment 1956, in practice, as 
the foundational law.27 R. J. WILKINSON, a Colonial administrator and a historian, states that 
“there can be no doubt that Muslim law would have ended by becoming the law of Malaysia 
had not the British law stepped in to check it.”28 
After the Second World War, a transformation took place where the Sultans were losing power 
to new national ruling elites who were liberal in their perspective. Various enactments for 
Muslims remained within the purview of state rulers rather than the national federal 
government. Islam was under the purview of each individual state and hence each of the 13 
states in Malaysia enacted their own legislations to govern Muslims and their affairs within the 
state boundaries. This was the era when the movement for nationalization took place with 
great vigour, and at the same time, was also the period of “statutory rationalization”.29 
Rationalization exercises were performed to reform the Islamic law and involved an 
integration of these separate statutes into one major all-encompassing statute, namely The 
Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952 (State of Selangor). This one enactment, with 172 
sections, comprised all matters related to Islam: from zakat collection to the management of 
the mosques, from the Mufti (head jurist), to court procedures, and from matrimonial matters 
to Shariah offences. This move emphasised decentralization and at the same time, the federal 
 
23  Adat Temenggong came from the same cradle as Adat Perpatih but is based on matrilineal tradition. 
24  For further reading, see NOOR AISHA ABDUL RAHMAN, Colonial Image of Malay Adat Laws: A Critical Appraisal of 
Studies on Adat Laws in the Malay Peninsula During the Colonial Era and Some Continuities, Leiden 2006. 
25  MAZNAH MOHAMAD, supra n. 9. 
26  Some of these laws include the Penal Code and Evidence Ordinance 1902, Civil Procedure Code 1918, Civil Law Enactment 1937, 
Contract Act 1950, Civil Law Act 1956, Defamation Act 1960, Criminal Procedure Code 1935 and Employment Act 1950. 
27  Per James Thorne, a British judge in Ramah bte Taat v. Laton bte Malim Sutan (1927) 6 FMSLR 128. 
28  RICHARD JAMES WILKINSON as quoted in WILLIAM R. ROFF, Patterns of Islamization in Malaysia, 1890s-1990s: Exemplars, 
Institutions and Vectors, Journal of Islamic Studies Vol. 9, Is. 2 (1998), 210-228, at 211.  
29  MAZNAH MOHAMAD, supra n. 9, at 9. 
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government would have little power to intervene in matters concerning Islam and the Muslims 
in each state. As a consequence, matters regarding Islam and Islamic law were affirmatively 
edged out from federal jurisdiction and put firmly under state jurisdiction under the Malay 
Sultans who were then made the constitutional monarchs. The pluralistic legal system had 
resulted in not only the distribution of legislative process between the federal and states 
government, but also between civil and Qadi courts, thus creating the so-called ‘dual legal 
system’. 
Although Hukum Syarak ‘survived’ the colonial era which ended in 1957, it firmly remained 
limited to personal law (family and property) and was then reconstructed to embrace several 
aspects of offences pertaining to religion and religious duty. Be it as it may, nothing was 
changed (as far as the law was concerned) when Malaysia achieved independence in 1957. The 
Federal Constitution was established and Islam was made the federal religion. However, 
Islamic law was not the federal law, as clearly sanctioned under the Civil Law Ordinance 1937. 
Then the Civil Law Act 1956 stated that English common law and the principle of equity are the 
primary legal sources.   
The Federal Constitution clearly divides the separation of power between the federal and state, 
by creating the Federal and State List. The State List under Ninth Schedule elaborates on the 
power regarding the administration of Islamic law, including: 
Islamic law and personal and family law of persons professing the religion of Islam, 
including the Islamic law relating to succession, testate and intestate, betrothal, 
marriage, divorce, dower, maintenance, adoption, legitimacy, guardianship, gifts, 
partitions and non-charitable trusts; Wakafs and the definition and regulation of 
charitable and religious trusts, the appointment of trustees and the incorporation of 
persons in respect of Islamic religious and charitable endowments, institutions, trusts, 
charities and charitable institutions operating wholly within the State; Malay customs; 
Zakat, Fitrah and Baitulmal or similar Islamic religious revenue; mosques or any 
Islamic public places of worship, creation and punishment of offences by persons 
professing the religion of Islam against precepts of that religion, except in regard to 
matters included in the Federal List; the constitution, organization and procedure of 
Syariah courts, which shall have jurisdiction only over persons professing the religion 
of Islam and in respect only of any of the matters included in this paragraph, but shall 
not have jurisdiction in respect of offences except in so far as conferred by federal law, 
the control of propagating doctrines and beliefs among persons professing the religion 
of Islam; the determination of matters of Islamic law and doctrine and Malay custom. 
The last two decades of the twentieth century (1980s and 1990s) witnessed monumental 
changes where exclusive statutes were passed to replace the all-encompassing ‘omnibus’ 
Administration of Muslim Law Act/Enactment. Separate new statutes were enacted: Islamic 
Family Law, Shariah Criminal Offences, Criminal Procedure in Shariah Courts, Civil Procedure, 
Islamic Evidence, and Administration of Islamic Law Enactment. From 27 sections under the 
AMLA 1952, the Shariah Criminal Offences Enactment doubled to 52 sections. Laws for court 
procedures – civil and criminal – were also enacted to be used in the Shariah court and were 
modeled on the Civil Procedure Code and Criminal Procedure Code used in the civil court. The 
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Muslim Wills Enactment and Waqf Enactment were also enacted in Selangor (1999), while the 
Zakat and Fitrah Enactment (1993) and Fatwa Enactment (2004) were passed in Sabah.30   
The Shariah court was soon reformed to replace what was once a qadi court and the justice 
system. It was put under the state power, that all Islamic law matters were governed and 
administered by states’ religious council. To strengthen the uniformity of the law and 
administration between states, the federal government established federal institutions like 
Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Malaysia or the Shariah Judiciary Department (JKSM), established in 
1998) and very much earlier, Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia or the Department of 
Development of Islam (JAKIM), both under the Prime Minister’s Department. The Shariah 
Section dealing with the advisory matters on Islam was established under the Attorney 
General’s Chamber. While JAKIM coordinates matters including zakat, waqf, and hajj 
(pilgrimage to Mecca), JKSM coordinate the Sharia courts in the country.31 
The creation of the federal agencies is in line with the status of Islam as the country’s official 
religion. At the same time, states are given power, by virtue of List 2 of the Federal 
Constitution, to regulate and administer religious matters. In doing so, the state bodies like 
Islamic religious councils, religious departments with various divisions under it, Mufti office 
and Shariah court were established. Policies regarding Islamic matters are within the states’ 
power, coordinated by several technical and legal committees under JAKIM. The expansion 
and standardization of Islamic law could not have happened if not for central coordination of 
the process. To note, there are fourteen states in Malaysia, which is why the standardization 
and consistency in regards to codified Islamic laws and its administration are needed. 
III. Current Administration of Islam and Islamic Laws 
1. Institutions and religious authority 
In line with the Federal Constitution, the government established federal agencies in their 
effort to congregate matters pertaining to Islam and Muslim affairs.32 As mentioned before, 
JAKIM was established under the Prime Minister’s Department, responsible for the pilgrimage 
(hajj), endowment (waqaf), tithes (zakat) and so on. The office of Mufti exists in every state, thus 
having 14 Muftis altogether, sitting on the states’ Fatwa Committee and come under one 
umbrella of the federal Fatwa Committee with JAKIM as the permanent secretariat. The Mufti 
shall advise the Sultan in all matters of Hukum Syarak and as far as authorities to be followed, 
the Administration of Islamic Law Act 1993 of Federal Territory provides that in issuing any fatwa 
(legal ruling), the Mufti shall ordinarily follow the accepted views of the Mazhab Syafie. 
However, it does not mean that he is absolutely restricted from referring to other Mazhabs like 
Hanafi, Maliki or Hanbali if the views from other Mazhabs are more suitable in resolving issues 
 
30  This development has led to the existence of two separate systems of family and property laws: one for Muslims and one 
for non-Muslims. 
31  For further reading on the experience of the shariah court from the early setting, see MICHAEL GREGORY PELETZ, Islamic 
Modern: Religious Courts and Cultural Politics in Malaysia. Princeton 2002. 
32  For other religions, the affairs are manned by Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, 
Sikhism and Taoism. It is an interfaith organization in Malaysia established in 1983 and is composed primarily of five main 
faiths in the country. 
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that are in question.33 The table below further explains the distribution of institutions between 
states and federal. 
Table 1 








- JAKIM: Malaysia’s Department of Development of Islam 
- JAWHAR: Department of Waqf, Pilgrimage and Tithe 
- TABUNG HAJI: Department of Hajj Fund Management 




33  Section 39 of the Adminstration of Islamic Law Act 1997 of Federal Territory provides that:  
(1) In issuing any fatwa under section 31, or certifying any opinion under section 35, the Mufti shall ordinarily follow the 
accepted views (qaul muktamad) of the Mazhab Syafie. 
(2) If the Mufti considers that following the qaul muktamad of the Mazhab Syafie will lead to a situation which is 
repugnant to public interests the Mufti may follow the qaul muktamad of the Mazhab Hanafi, Maliki or Hanbali. 
(3) If the Mufti considers that none of the qaul muktamad of the four Mazhabs may be followed without leading to a 
situation which is repugnant to the public interest, the Mufti may then resolve the question according to his own 
judgement without being bound by the qaul muktamad of any of the four Mazhabs.  
JAWHAR 
JPM 
TABUNG HAJI JAKIM JKSM 
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- MAIWP: Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan-Federal Territories Religious Council 
- JAWI: Religious Department of Federal Territory 
- MUFTI: A scholar or expert appointed by the government and is qualified to issue authoritative legal opinions 
known as fatwa.  
- ZAKAT: tithe  
- WAQF: endowment 
- DAKWAH: call for Islam 
- FIDYAH: fine collected from those who fail to perform fasting due to certain reasons in Ramadhan 
- QARIAH: border for mosque  
- LUQATAH: property found with unidentified owner  
- KAFFARAH: specific fine for specific violation of ibadah 
2. Religious Enforcement and Prosecution Units 
Apart from the agencies authorized to administer the Muslim affairs as mentioned above, the 
religious enforcement unit was also established and given power to enforce offences provided 
by the Shariah Criminal Offences Enactment. The power and procedures were outlined in the 
Shariah Criminal Procedure Enactment of each state. Federal Constitution describes that, 
among the power of the states is to ensure: 
“[the] creation and punishment of offences by persons professing the religion of Islam 
against the precepts of that religion, except in regard to matters included in the Federal 
List.” 
‘Offences against the precepts of Islam’ as mentioned above in List 2 (State List) of the Federal 
Constitution, led to the creation of the Shariah Criminal Offences Enactments. There are nearly 
42 offences related to belief, institution, decency and miscellaneous offences. The offences that 
fall under the category of belief, generally related to wrongful activities of deviation. It is 
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defined as any religious act which deviates from the teaching of Islam and is not recognized by 
Islamic law according to any madhhab (sect). Wrongful worship is worshipping something 
other than God or reverence for anything in any manner contrary to the Islamic Law. Other 
offences under this category are teaching or expounding doctrines other than the beliefs and 
doctrines of Islam among Muslims. Other offences are like insulting, or bringing into contempt 
the religion of Islam, insulting al-Quran and Hadith, contempt of or defying religious authority 
or court order, giving opinion contrary to the fatwa, publishing religious materials contrary to 
Islamic law, failure to perform Friday prayer, disrespect to Ramadan, drinking intoxicating 
drinks, and gambling. Offences concerning decency or what are also popularly known as 
‘moral offences’ draw the most attention. In fact, Shariah criminal offences in Malaysia are often 
characterized by moral cases, particularly the khalwat or close proximity34 due to its frequency 
of trial in Shariah court. 
3. Shariah courts 
Since Malaysia has a dual court system, the constitution distributes jurisdiction for both civil 
and Shariah courts. Shariah court does not come under the federal court structure, instead it is 
in a separate hierarchy, or, as put by WU MIN AUN, is ‘derivative and dependent’. The power is 
based on states and administered according to certain jurisdiction and power over persons 
professing the religion of Islam only. Since 1990s, there is a three-tier court system comprising 
of Lower Court, High Court and Appeal Court in each state. Legislation as mentioned before 
pertaining to the administration of the court, procedural and substantive laws were passed by 
the State’s Assembly. Due to this dual-court system, whenever there was a conflict of law and 
jurisdiction in certain cases and the litigants brought the cases to the High Court, the decision 
of the Civil High Court would prevail over the previous decision of the Shariah court. 
However, in 1988, an amendment was made to the Federal Constitution and article 121 (1A) of 
the Federal Constitution was passed declaring that the Civil High Court will have no 
jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Shariah courts. The plain 
words of Article 121 (1A) mean that the civil courts should not interfere in matters which fall 
‘within’ the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts. This is to avoid any occurrence of overstepping 
the boundary of jurisdiction. Before the amendment was made to the Article 121, the parties 
unsatisfied with the decision of the Syariah court brought their cases to the civil court and it 
was very unfortunate to evident the decisions made by former being overturned by the latter. 
So this change was made to prevent litigants from appealing Shariah court’s decision to the 
High Court. The problem will not arise if the subject matter in question clearly belongs to one 
or the other jurisdiction. The entangling problem arises when both have jurisdiction or when 
the division of power is ambiguous like for example the issue of custody of a child when one of 
the parents embraced Islam.35 The problem of conflict is yet to be solved. 
  
 
34  SITI ZUBAIDAH ISMAIL, The Legal Dimension of Khalwat in Malaysia, Pertanika Journal of Social Science and Humanities 
2015 (forthcoming). 
35  For example the case of Myriam v Arif [1971] 1 LNS 88. 
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IV. New Issue of Hudud Law 
The Federal Constitution allows the State legislative body to create and punish offences by 
persons professing the religion of Islam against its most foundational precepts. However, the 
power of the state to enforce Islamic criminal law is limited by the words “except in regard to 
matters included in the Federal list” or “dealt with by federal law”, for example homicide, 
theft, rape, kidnapping and so on. Should there be redundancy, inconsistency or conflict with 
the federal law – for example, with provisions under the Penal Code, which is the prime statute 
of criminal law– the state law would be ultra vires and null and void. Capital punishment, for 
example life sentence, mandatory death punishment and 20 lashes are those listed under the 
Federal List of the Federal Constitution. Only the federal law can provide such punishment for 
serious crimes and consequently, offences related to life and body, namely qisas and diyat 
(retaliation and bloodmoney) involving a death sentence do not fall under the jurisdiction of 
the Shariah court. The Civil High Court is the one that has the power to try homicide cases 
which has its provision under the Penal Code of Malaysia (Act 574).  
Therefore, jurisdiction for hudud punishment to the extent of amputation of one hand for theft 
(sariqah) or hands for highway robbery (hirabah), and the death sentence for rebellion and 
treason (bughah) would fall under the civil court’s jurisdiction. However, the existing 
punishments for those offences under the Penal Code are not in accordance with hudud 
principles, as the originality of the Penal Code was modeled from the Indian Penal Code. 
Understandably, in the context of this country, the Shariah criminal law is the law limited to the 
category of taazir (secondary) crime and punishment, and not in its ‘ideal’ form as connoted by 
the classical fiqh (jurisprudence) of hudud, qisas and taazir as mentioned above.   
When the state government of Kelantan drafted and passed the Kelantan Hudud Bill 1993 at the 
state’s legislative council, containing offences and punishment beyond the state’s jurisdiction, 
it caused a national uproar. Many claimed that this draft of hudud law was designed to suit the 
political strategy of the Islamic Party (PAS) in their effort to portray a perfect Islamization 
process in Kelantan. To PAS politicians, Malaysian Islam is not complete without the hudud 
law and this is at once an opportunity for them to challenge the Islamization policy of UMNO, 
the ruling party which now controls the federal government. Be it as it may, the provisions 
pertaining to hudud with capital punishment cannot simply be implemented because of the 
limited jurisdiction in sentencing as dictated by the Shariah Court (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1984 
(The 1984 Act). This Act clearly spells out that the state’s Shariah court cannot impose 
punishment more than three years imprisonment or fine not more than five thousand Ringgit 
or six lashes. Given the hudud punishment concerning a hundred lashes (for adultery), stoning 
(for a married adulterer), limb amputation (for serious theft) and other capital punishment, the 
Shariah court cannot legitimize it. 
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After 57 years of independence, and as the historical overview has demonstrated, the Islamic 
law, or to be precise, Shariah law in Malaysia has come a long way to establish the dynamic 
implementation of codified Islamic law. In the modern context, the actualization of Islamic 
laws is determined by legislations, validated through a parliamentary process. Therefore, the 
administration of Islam must stay in the mainstream at the federal level, while the capacity at 
the state level must be empowered, the administration must be improved and most 
importantly is that the cooperation between federal and state governments must be enhanced 
and strengthened to bring the practice of Islam and Islamic law to the highest level possible. 
Despite the fact that the dual federal and state jurisdictions will remain, it is hoped that 
bureaucratic hindrances can be relaxed and the strong cooperation between the state and 
federal governments, can, to some extent, give leeway to enhance the position of Islamic law in 
the country. With all these ‘positive attributes’, Malaysia, as put by AZIZ and BAHARUDDIN, is 
seen by many countries as a model to be emulated.36
 
36  AZMI AZIZ & SHAMSUL AMRI BAHARUDDIN, The Religious, the Plural, the Secular and the Modern, Inter-Asia Cultural 
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Abstract 
Legal provisions on interfaith marriages offer a privileged observation point on the interaction of different legal 
systems in a context of migrations, minorities, and law and religion. Even within the Muslim communities in 
Scotland, predominantly South Asian, multiple and fluid identities compete and seek different arrangements within 
a legal system that refuses to consider elements of Islamic law as law, or relevant to law. Impediments to marriage 
by disparity of faith can be a good case in point, and open up the debate on the boundaries of competing definitions 
of law. 
This paper explores the adaptation and transmigration of Islamic regulations on interfaith marriages among the 
Muslim communities in Scotland. Islamic impediments to marriage by disparity of faith have somehow guaranteed 
the religious endogamic principle in Muslim-majority contexts; what happens when borders are crossed and South 
Asian communities find themselves in a Scottish context? 
In order to follow this adaptation and transmigration, we need to embark on a journey through time and space. I 
suggest to depart from the single rule on interfaith marriages produced by modernity (I), follow a leisurely meander 
along the modern/classical divide (II), tour the welcoming highlands of Scots law (III), and observe how our modern 
rule has taken root in quite a distinct environment (IV), before landing with some super-hybrid final considerations 
(V). 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, The American University in Cairo, Egypt. E-mail: gparolin@aucegypt.edu. 
1  This paper is based on the findings of a research project, undertaken in Scotland in the summer of 2010 within a fellowship 
scheme of the British Academy and Economic and Social Research Council, titled: “Invisible Barriers to Citizenship? Islamic 
Inter-Faith Marriages in Europe: The Case of Scotland”. I feel truly indebted to the faculty and staff of the University of 
Edinburgh where I was based during the research, in particular Jo Shaw, Lisa Pilgram, and Elspeth Reid in the School of 
Law, Marilyn Booth of the Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies Center, and Hugh Goddard of the Waleed bin Talal Centre for 
the Study of Islam in the Contemporary World. I am also especially thankful to David Carey-Miller of the University of 
Aberdeen. 
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I. ‘Modern’ law and its single rule 
A modern articulation of the regulations on interfaith marriages in Islam would probably read: 
“Interfaith marriages are prohibited, except in the case of a Muslim male marrying a Scriptural 
female (kitābīyah).” 
Such an abridgement can serve as a good example of a larger legal phenomenon that affected 
classical Islamic law in its encounter with modernity. As WAEL HALLAQ aptly described it, 
modernizing the law in the age of nation-states meant to remold Islamic legal tradition into the 
structures of codification. The style and mentality of a single rule to be applied uniformly 
dispensed with what he called the “ijtihādic plurality”2 that both allowed for fluidity in the 
creation of the law, and for flexibility in its application.  
This operation not only detached the single rule from the traditional dynamics of Islamic law 
production, but it also abstracted the product of legal reasoning. The abstraction consisted in 
selecting what had to be included in the abstract, single rule (a practice alien to classical Islamic 
jurisprudence) and severing this selection from the legal context and considerations that 
surrounded it (and were often conducive to such regulations). As a result of the abstraction, a 
change in the context or surrounding considerations (the relevance of which became a matter 
of contention) no longer has an immediate effect on the re-articulation of the rule. 
The single rule produced by the modernizing effort had yet to pass the courtroom test, as has 
been pointed out with regard to the use of discretionary powers by judges.3 The rule on 
interfaith marriages, however, has rarely been included in the family law codes of Muslim-
majority countries. Judicial discretion had then to be channeled through the ‘šarʿī postulate’ (a 
residual provision usually incorporated in modern codifications to direct the judge to resort to 
Islamic law in case of legislative gaps or interpretive dilemmas). Tunisian law and courtroom 
practice is quite instructive on the rule on interfaith marriages in this respect. In Tunisian law 
there is neither a provision banning interfaith marriages nor a šarʿī postulate, yet in 1966 the 
Court of Cassation voided a marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man declaring it 
“an unpardonable crime”4 and state authorities followed suit in 1973 by prohibiting the 
registration of such marriages.5 There seem to be signs now of a timid change of heart by the 
Tunisian judiciary, but the overruling has not yet ossified. 
II. Selection and abstraction in a single rule 
The ‘modern’, single rule on interfaith marriages seems to be consonant with the classical 
theory and its interpretation of the relevant Qurʾānic verses, yet its brevity and abstraction 
 
2  WAEL B. HALLAQ, Sharī`a: Theory, Practice, Transformations, Cambridge 2009, at 449. 
3  NAHDA YOUNIS SHEHADA, Justice Without Drama: Enacting Family Law in Gaza City Shari ̄ʻa Court, Maastricht 2005; 
LYNN WELCHMAN, Beyond the Code: Muslim Family Law and the Shariʼa Judiciary in the Palestinian West Bank, The Hague 
2000; LYNN WELCHMAN, Women and Muslim Family Laws in Arab States: A Comparative Overview of Textual 
Development and Advocacy, Amsterdam 2007. 
4  HAFIDHA CHEKIR, Le statut des femmes entre les textes et les résistances: le cas de la Tunisie, Tunis 2000, at 286, cit. in 
WELCHMAN 2007, supra n. 3, at 47. 
5  WELCHMAN 2007, supra n. 3, at 47. 
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from the background considerations on which the rule depends sensibly limit the possibilities 
of legal change and modulated application. 
The ‘modern’, single rule (“Interfaith marriages are prohibited, except in the case of a Muslim 
male marrying a Scriptural female (kitābīyah)”) appears to be a combination of the prohibition 
of interfaith marriages based on Q. 2:221 and the exception of permitted marriages with 
Scriptural women based on Q. 5:5. 
Q. 2:221, also known as the verse of interdiction, reads:6 
Do not marry unbelieving women (idolaters), until they believe: A slave 
woman who believes is better than an unbelieving woman, even though she 
allures you. Nor marry (your girls) to unbelievers until they believe: A man 
slave who believes is better than an unbeliever, even though he allures you. 
This verse, considered an early Medinan revelation and traditionally interpreted as referring to 
polytheist Arabs (mušrikāt and mušrikīn) was later read in conjunction with Q. 5:5 as a general 
prohibition of interfaith marriages - Yusuf Ali’s translation of mušrikāt and mušrikīn as 
‘unbelieving women and men’ somehow captures this late reading while sidelining the etymon 
širk, which is the act of associating to God other Gods. 
Q. 5:5, also known as the verse of permission, reads:  
This day are (all) things good and pure made lawful unto you. The food of the 
People of the Book is lawful unto you and yours is lawful unto them. (Lawful 
unto you in marriage) are (not only) chaste women who are believers, but 
chaste women among the People of the Book, revealed before your time,—
when ye give them their due dowers, and desire chastity, not lewdness, nor 
secret intrigues. 
This verse, almost unanimously dated after the verse of interdiction (Q. 2:221) and traditionally 
connected to Muhammad’s ‘Last Pilgrimage’ (ḥağğ al-widāʿ), raises two main interpretative 
problems: one related to the definition of muḥṣanāt (YUSUF ALI’s ‘chaste women’), and the other 
to the gendering of the permission. 
Qurʾānic interpretation of muḥṣanāt varies. Some read it as requiring the status of liberty, some 
chastity (defined here as lack of promiscuity and observance of ritual purity), and some both. 
However, none of these readings made it to the single rule. One could speculate that the 
disappearance of slavery on the one side, and the unwillingness or inability to verify 
compliance with chastity regulations on the other side, both played a role in the operation of 
(de-)selection and abstraction to the single rule. 
Interpretation of the gendering of the permission, however, slightly varies according to the 
different theoretical approaches of the four maḏāhib (legal schools) of Sunni Islam.7 I will only 
consider here the Ḥanafī perspective, as most Muslims in Scotland follow this school. 
 
6  For the purposes of this article, the rendering of Qur’ānic meanings is that of ‘ABDALLĀH YŪSUF ALI. 
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A general remark is in order. Jurists seem to feel the need to provide further arguments to the 
gendering, rather than merely considering the Qurʾānic verse. 
Jurists tend first to conflate the unequal position of spouses in marriage and the hierarchy of 
religions in articulating their arguments in favor of the gendering. A patriarchal reading of 
gender roles in marriage – which probably reaches its apex when the Ḥanafī jurist AL-SARAḪSĪ 
(d. 1096) equates it to enslavement (riqq) in his reference work al-Mabsūṭ – sets the stage for an 
outright refusal of subjecting a Muslim woman to the authority of a non-Muslim man. An ad 
absurdum argument takes it a step further: had the marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-
Muslim man not been completely prohibited, the extreme lack of wedding adequacy (kafāʾah) – 
itself strongly gendered – would nonetheless afford grounds for dissolution of such marriage 
by the judge (fasḫ). 
The gendering is also supported by an argument advanced by modern jurists on the basis of 
the combined reading of Q. 2:221 and 5:5 – an inescapable outcome of articulating the 
regulations on interfaith marriages in the modern, single rule. Modern jurists argue that the 
fact that Q. 2:221 repeats the prohibition verbatim for females (mušrikāt) and males (mušrikīn), 
whereas Q. 5:5 only mentions permission for females (muḥṣanāt) is a clear indication in favor of 
the gendering. This argument seems at best tenuous as the categories of širk and iḥṣān-cum-ahl-
al-kitāb do not overlap, and Q. 5:5 is not traditionally framed as an instance of abrogation (nasḫ) 
of Q. 2:221. It becomes an issue of particularization (taḫṣīṣ) only in the minority view that the 
Christian woman (by saying that Jesus is God, or that he is one of three) commits širk, yet she is 
exempted from the prohibition of Q. 2:221 because she belongs to those who were given the 
Book of Q. 5:5 (al-muḥṣanāt min al-laḏīna ʾūtū al-kitāb). 
The gendering of the permission is also connected by some modern jurists to the issue of 
filiation. Since the child is Muslim because the father is Muslim, marriage of a Muslim woman 
to a non-Muslim man is deemed inconceivable as it would produce non-Muslim offspring to a 
Muslim mother. This patriarchal reading of membership in the Muslim community by paternal 
descent only (thus generating a gendered (religious) endogamic rule for the Muslim woman) 
collides with the de-gendered rule of attribution to the child of religious affiliation according to 
a hierarchy of religions (the child will follow the religion of whichever parent belongs to the 
higher religion).8 This latter rule is the one applied in Islamic law to the interfaith marriages 
between non-Muslims. 
Beyond the Qurʾānic texts, classical Islamic law scholars further interconnect interfaith 
marriages with a broader contextual distinction of the territory where Islamic law applies (dār 
al-islām) and where it does not (dār al-ḥarb). Scholars differently qualify the marriage of a 
Muslim male with a Scriptural female (kitābīyah) that lives as a protected person in the dār al-
islām (ḏimmīyah) from the one with a kitābīyah that lives in the dār al-ḥarb (kitābīyah ḥarbīyah). 
Mālikī and Šāfiʿī jurists, for instance, employ different degrees of reprehensibility (karāhīyah), 
whereas Ḥanbalī jurists do not attach any further qualification to that of permissibility (ibāḥah) 
                                                                                                                                                                         
7  For an outstanding overview of the gender bias in tafsir and fiqh literature on interfaith marriages, see: LEENA AZZAM, The 
Gendered Perception of Interfaith Marriages in Islamic Legal Discourse, LLM Thesis, The American University in Cairo 2015. 
8  IBN AL-QAYYIM says that kitābīs are superior to maǧūsīs, and within kitābīs Christians are superior to Jews. Therefore, the 
child of a kitābī(yah) with a maǧūsī(yah) is considered a kitābī, and the child of a Christian with a Jew is considered a Christian. 
IBN AL-QAYYIM, Aḥkām ahl al-ḏimmah, Dammām 1997, 2: 771. 
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of Q. 5:5. Ḥanafī jurists are the ones that show the most hostile attitude towards marriages in 
the dār al-ḥarb with a kitābīyah ḥarbīyah qualifying the marriage either as reprehensible (makrūh) 
and imposing further restrictions (like avoiding generating offspring through ʿazl), or sheerly 
as forbidden (ḥarām) in open conflict to the un-contextualized permission of Q. 5:5.9 
The ‘classical’ regulation of interfaith marriages was the logical outcome of a particular 
worldview in which the discourse of the dominant political elite placed the other (the woman, 
the non-Muslim) in a hierarchically subordinated position, and it served the purpose of 
maintaining that peculiar power-balance. The crystallization that led to what was to be known 
as classical Islamic law took place during the later Abbasid caliphate (through the 13th century 
AD), and just as the patriarchal approach of the jurists of the Abbasid times affected and keeps 
affecting the consideration of the woman in the law and her role in it,10 so it does for the non-
Muslim.11 Modernity has a mixed record on the de-patriarchalization of Islamic law, as it has in 
more than one respect confirmed and strengthened the Weltanschauung of the jurists and the 
elites they originated from in the late Abbasid caliphate.12 
The ‘modern’, single rule – while apparently solidly based on the mere Qurʾānic verses and 
discarding all the scholarly interpretations – is rather the product of a selection and abstraction 
that favored the patriarchal reading of classical jurists while avoiding all problematic 
references to their background considerations. The modern selection and abstraction, therefore, 
secures the patriarchal reading from critique or review. Gendered permission based on 
unequal relations between spouses and adverse qualification based on the hostility of the legal 
environment are the two areas in which the rule on interfaith marriages can be put to test in the 
Scottish context. If Scots law does not discriminate on the basis of gender or religious 
affiliation, do Islamic law impediments to marriage by disparity of faith still stand unaffected 
or can Muslim communities in Scotland reconsider them? 
Before considering the Scottish context, let me mention here in passing that interfaith 
relationships and marriages that do not conform to our ‘modern’, single rule are likely to 
exacerbate social conflict even in a Muslim-majority setting. In Egypt, a heated debate on 
interfaith marriages followed the sectarian clashes of April 2011 in Imbābah (a lower-class 
Cairo neighborhood) between Muslims and Copts, which often occur over allegations of (a) 
love relationships beyond the ‘modern’, single rule, (b) conversions and reconversions to avoid 
application of confessional family law, or (c) construction of new churches. A few days after 
the clashes, on 3 May 2011, ʿAmr Ḥamzāwī, a political science professor championing 
liberalism in the country, appeared on the tv talk show al-Qāhirah al-yawm and, while 
explaining the key concepts of liberalism/democracy, on the freedom of choice he mentioned 
the necessity of introducing a two-track system in family law matters, in order to allow the 
citizen to freely choose between religious or civil marriage (civil marriage not being currently 
available in Egypt). The host, ʿAmr Adīb, interjected to ask Ḥamzāwī whether he was 
suggesting that a Christian (man) could marry a Muslim (woman). Ḥamzāwī replied that in 
 
9  IBN AL-QAYYIM, supra n. 8, at 2: 809. 
10  LEILA AHMED, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, New Haven 1992. 
11  YOHANAN FRIEDMANN, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition, Cambridge 2003. 
12  LAMA ABU-ODEH, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
(37/2004), 1043-1146. 
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order to be in accordance with his principles, the principles of liberalism/democracy, he 
believed that an option had to be offered to the citizen, regardless of whether the majority of 
Egyptian society agreed or not. This was picked up and heavily criticized on the web and in 
the media. In particular, videos were extracted and circulated on the web under the titling: 
“Ḥamzāwī invites Muslim women to marry Christian men”. Ḥamzāwī accurately denied that 
he was ‘inviting’ Muslim women to marry Christian men, but in his response to a column by 
ᶜUmar Ṭāhir13 he added to his previous televised statement that such an option needs to be 
available “within limits that do not contravene confessional laws” (fī ḥudūd lā tuḫālif al-šarāʾiʿ 
al-dīnīyah).14 This episode shows once more how delicate and sensitive the issue of the 
‘modern’, single rule is, and seems to suggest that the latter has left the sheer realm of law 
proper to be assumed as an element of identity. 
III. The Scottish context 
Scots law has always maintained a less holistic conception of marriage than the one found at 
common law. However, until 1920 husbands had extensive rights over their wives’ property, 
first of property and administration then of administration only after 1881. In 1920, the Married 
Woman’s Property (Scotland) Act 1920 provided for the general principle that marriage shall 
not of itself affect the respective rights of the spouses in relation to their property and their 
legal capacity.15 This principle is now to be found in sect. 24 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 
1985. The previous year, however, another bill was passed which is of even higher significance 
to the present study: Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) 1984. 
The 1984 Law Reform established the prohibition of actions of adherence, whereby no spouse 
can be entitled to apply for a decree from any court in Scotland ordaining the other spouse to 
adhere (i.e., to live together and be sexually faithful to each other, sect. 2(1)). The reform also 
abolished curatory after marriage (sect. 3), the husband’s right to choose the matrimonial home 
(sect. 4), and defined ante-nuptial onerous agreements (except gifts, sect. 5), husband’s liability 
for wife’s debts incurred before marriage by reason only of being her husband (sect. 6), the 
praepositura (sect. 7),16 and husband’s liability for wife’s judicial expenses when neither a party 
nor dominus litis (sect. 8).17 
Equal relations between spouses seem to have been the main goal and achievement of the Law 
Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) 1984. From the absence in contemporary Scots Law of 
any reference to the legal entitlement of either spouse to force any decision on the other one 
 
13  c UMAR ṬĀHIR, Ḥamzāwī wa-l-mutasalfanūn wa-l-muta’aqbaṭūn, al-Miṣrī al-yawm (Cairo, May 9, 2011), available at 
<http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/207122>, last accessed April 29. 
14  c AMR ḤAMZĀWĪ, al-Zawāğ al-madanī, al-Šurūq (Cairo, May 11, 2011). The column, no longer available on the 
Shorouknews.com portal, is still available at <http://www.ahl-alquran.com/arabic/show_news.php?main_id=17498>, last 
accessed April 29. 
15  LILIAN EDWARDS & ANNE M. O. GRIFFITHS, Family Law, Edinburgh 2006, at 349. 
16  Praepositura in Scots Law was “the right of a wife to incur debts on behalf of her husband for food and household 
requirements, ‘the managership of a married woman in domestic matters … entitling her to pledge her husband's credit for 
necessaries’ (Sc. 1946 A. D. Gibb Legal Terms 66)” in Dictionary of the Scots Language, Edinburgh 2004, available at 
<http://www.dsl.ac.uk/entry/snd/praepositura>, last accessed April 29. 
17  A dominus litis is a party with a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation (Sc. 1853  Session Cases (1853–54) 23). 
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may infer that any act involving, for instance, unreasonable impediment to practice one’s 
religion will be deemed unlawful and treated as such irrespective of marriage between the two. 
The non-Muslim husband cannot therefore legally interfere with his Muslim wife’s religious 
practices under Scots law. The possibility of the husband to force his wife to neglect her 
religious duties is one of the main concerns often articulated as an argument to justify the 
gendered single rule. Whereas this may be plausible, even legally recognised, in jurisdictions 
where the husband retains powers over the wife, as in most of the legal systems where most 
non-Scottish Muslims in Scotland originate from, this would not be legally justifiable in 
Scotland. 
Moreover, confessions in Scotland are not hierarchically ranked, and even the Church of 
Scotland has long challenged its own status as established church under UK law – a battle 
fought in the name of independence in matters spiritual and eventually won with the passing 
of the Church of Scotland Act 1921 by the Westminster Parliament. Muslim communities in 
Scotland are therefore entitled to the same rights as other confessions. They are neither 
hierarchically superior nor inferior to any other. 
What legal arrangements does the Scottish legal system offer to its Muslim communities in 
matters of family law? The system adopts quite a liberal stance on the ways in which a 
marriage can be solemnized, but it then regulates the effects of marriage and its termination 
under general Scots law. However, Scottish courts also try to accommodate even elements 
traditionally classified as elements that affect the validity of a Muslim marriage (such as the 
mahr or dower) by recourse to the existing available legal categories of Scots law (be them 
within the law of marriage, liberalities, or other). 
The Scottish legal system provides a hybrid solution for the law of marriage (religious or civil), 
according to the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977.18 The marriage may be solemnized by an 
authorized registrar (civil),19 or by an approved celebrant (religious)20 according to different 
forms, but it will be uniformly regulated by Scots law. 
The solemnization of a religious marriage in Scotland is quite open to religious bodies that are 
not the ‘traditional’ or prescribed ones. Marriage can be solemnized by (i) a minister of the 
Church of Scotland,21 (ii) a minister, clergyman, pastor or priest of a religious body prescribed 
by regulations made by the Secretary of State, or who, not being one of the foregoing, is 
recognized by a religious body so prescribed as entitled to solemnize marriages on its behalf,22 
(iii) a person who is registered under section 9 of the 1977 Act (defining the conditions for 
registration, basic requirements to qualify as celebrant, and a minimum appropriate form for 
the marriage ceremony),23 or (iv) is temporarily authorized under section 12 of this Act.24 
 
18  As amended by the Marriage (Scotland) Act 2002. Marriage has also been partially reformed by the Family Law (Scotland) 
Act 2006. 
19  Sect. 8(1)(b) Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. 
20  Sect. 8(1)(a) Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. 
21  Sect. 8(1)(a)(i) Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. 
22  Sect. 8(1)(a)(ii) Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. 
23  Sect. 8(1)(a)(iii) Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. 
24  Sect. 8(1)(a)(iv) Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. 
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Some Muslim clerics in Scotland did register under sect. 9 of the 1977 Act, and can therefore 
solemnize marriages. The requirement of an appropriate form for the marriage ceremony is 
satisfied if it includes, and is in no way inconsistent with (a) a declaration by the parties, in the 
presence of each other, the celebrant and two witnesses, that they accept each other as husband 
and wife; and (b) a declaration by the celebrant, after the declaration just mentioned, that the 
parties are then husband and wife.25 Islamic law does not stipulate for the conclusion of a valid 
marriage either a celebrant (even if in practice the presence of a religious figure is often 
sought), or the declaration of such celebrant that the parties are husband and wife. Yet, both 
requirements could be easily accommodated in the conclusion of an Islamic marriage. 
Registering under sect. 9 of the 1977 Act, however, will prevent a Muslim cleric from 
solemnizing an Islamic marriage without a marriage schedule, since that would be considered 
an offence in Scotland.26 
Upon verification of lack of legal impediments, a marriage schedule is issued by a district 
registrar including date and place of the solemnization.27 If an approved celebrant solemnizes a 
marriage without a marriage schedule ((a)in respect of the marriage, (b) issued in accordance 
with this act, (c) being available to him at the time of the marriage ceremony), he shall be guilty 
of an offence and shall be liable of (i) on conviction on indictment, to a fine or to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding 2 years or to both; (ii) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding 
Level 3 on the standard scale (GBP 1,000)28 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 
months or to both.29 
If Muslim clerics want to be free to perform un-registered nikāḥ (the most common term for 
Islamic marriage used in Scotland by South Asian Muslims and Muslims of South Asian 
descent), then they cannot be registered and solemnize marriages to be valid under Scots Law. 
The only other open option of an irregular marriage at common law, the marriage by 
cohabitation with habit and repute, has been recently abolished in 2006.30 The abolishment is 
prospective, and does not affect marriages by cohabitation with habit and repute that ended 
before the commencement of the law (4 May 2006), those that began before but ended after the 
commencement, and those that began before and continue after commencement.31 The Court of 
Session, Scotland’s supreme civil court, in an Outer House decision in 2005 granted a 
declarator of marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute even to a pursuer who had 
apparently refused to enter into an un-registered nikāḥ with the defender, but was yet 
considered his wife at common law. From the proceedings it is difficult to conclude whether 
the Court would have reached the same decision, had the pursuer accepted to contract a nikāḥ, 
or rather the Court granted the declarator precisely because she refused to do so. Among the 
arguments brought to justify her repeated refusals of the nikāḥ marriage proposals, the pursuer 
mentioned that “she felt that she would be trapped if she were to convert to Islam” [18], but the 
 
25  Sect. 9(3) Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. 
26  Sect. 24(1)(c) Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. 
27  Sect. 6 Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. 
28  Sect. 289G, Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975, as substituted by the Criminal Justice Act 1991. 
29  Sect. 24(1) Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. 
30  Sect. 3 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006. 
31  EDWARDS & GRIFFITHS, supra n. 15, at 341. 
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defender maintained that “he would not have required the pursuer to convert to Islam before 
he married her. He wanted to get married whether she was willing to convert or not. He was 
even willing to become a Sunni Muslim or, as he put it, to take a Christian oath just to be 
married to her” [30].32 Even though the defender’s affiliation is not known, both parties’ 
account is consistent with the outright rejection of interfaith marriages in Ğaʿfarī law (the main 
Shiʿi maḏhab). 
Does Scots law set impediments to marriage by disparity of faith for the validity of marriage? 
In its early days Roman Catholic canon law was the law that regulated marriages in Scotland. 
Early Roman Catholic canon law itself was an adaptation of the Roman law of marriage, which 
through the lack of connubium recognized a number of what we would now call impediments 
to marriage based on status (mainly citizenship, social class, freedom). It is here worthwhile to 
underscore that also Islamic law classifies some impediments to marriage under the heading of 
lack of wedding adequacy (or status: kafāʾah). During the early Middle Ages, canon law 
rejected all the status-based impediments of Roman law, including the late Roman law 
impediment by disparity of cult between Christians and Jews. In the late Middle Ages, 
however, marriages between Christians and Jews were declared null according to canon law, 
just as some marriages between Christians and ‘heretics’ (canonists held different opinions on 
the ones that should have been considered valid and those null). Quite unsurprisingly, the 
Reformation in Scotland disregarded all the status-based impediments of late medieval canon 
law, including those by disparity of cult, and there has been no turnaround on the point ever 
since. Other impediments to marriage have been debated in Scots law ever since the 1560 
Reformation (e.g.: impotency, relationship, and identity of sex), but not the ones based on 
status (even if some of the Scotsmen I interviewed referred to the fact that conversions to 
Catholicism or marriages with Catholics were socially looked down on through the early 20th 
century).33 
Scottish courts (just like courts elsewhere in non-Muslim contexts) are developing an 
interesting case law trying to accommodate requests from Muslim parties on elements of the 
Islamic marriage such as the dower (mahr); but it is clear that the logic applied is that of 
subsuming new facts (the mahr) into existing legal categories (variably a nuptial gift, an ante-
nuptial marriage contract, a sheer act of liberality..).34 Parties try, for instance, to induce courts 
in framing mahr in one or the other category in order to achieve their goals rather than 
considering it within its own legal environment, as a recent study has shown.35 And the legal 
profession assists; John Fotheringham, child and family law specialist in a large Scottish law 
firm, wittingly framed it as: “Scottish solicitors can serve their Muslim clients by being 
sensitively and creatively aware of what can be done within existing structures of Scots law”.36 
 
32  Sheikh v. Sheikh [2005] CSOH, 25. 
33  For a thorough analysis of impediments to marriage in Scots law in a historical and comparative perspective, see JOHN 
RANDALL TRAHAN, Impediments to Marriage in Scotland and Louisiana: an Historical-Comparative Investigation, in: Vernon 
Palmer & Elspeth Reid (Eds.), Mixed Jurisdictions Compared: Private Law in Louisiana and Scotland, Edinburgh Studies in 
Law, Edinburgh 2009, 173-207. 
34  RUBYA MEHDI & JØRGEN S. NIELSEN (Eds.), Embedding Mahr (Islamic Dower) in the European Legal System, Copenhagen 
2011. 
35  PASCALE FOURNIER, Muslim Marriage in Western Courts: Lost in Transplantation, Farnham 2010. 
36  JOHN FOTHERINGHAM, When Muslims look to Shari’ah principles, the law of Scotland can be quite accommodating, The 
Scotsman, Edinburgh, August 24 2008, available at <http://news.scotsman.com/scotland/John--Fotheringham--
When.4422319.jp>, last accessed April 29. 
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Recourse to expert advice is at times requested, at times rejected by courts,37 allowing for even 
wider freedom in the framing of the different elements of Muslim marriage. For example, the 
English Court of Appeal38 and the Scottish Court of Session39 recently took two conflicting 
decisions on the validity of a Muslim marriage by telephone based on the same expert advice. 
The strategy of Western courts to accommodate elements of Muslim marriage within the 
‘acceptable’ framework of existing legal categories unavoidably produces a piecemeal, super-
hybrid outcome that is neither the classical solution, nor the modern one. 
Can Islamic impediments to marriage by disparity of faith be recognized by Scottish courts 
within Scots law? Since Scots law no longer recognizes impediments based on status (including 
by disparity of cult), it is unlikely to see a case filed in front of a Scottish court for an interfaith 
marriage that does not conform to our ‘modern’, single rule. It is hence moot to delve into 
standing requirements for such a dispute. The only case in which an Islamic impediment to 
marriage by disparity of faith is likely to appear in front of a Scottish court is the case of the 
wife who converts to Islam and wants to terminate her marriage with her non-Muslim 
husband. One such case could be framed in quite a varied number of ways, but all revolving 
around the grounds for divorce and the ensuing financial provisions. A group of contemporary 
Islamic scholars is advancing a partially different view from the single-rule approach to the 
consequences of the conversion to Islam of a woman who is in wedlock with a non-Muslim 
man, and the debate it may generate needs to be analyzed a bit further. 
The discussion on the accommodation of voluntary jurisdictions in the various forms of 
Muslim arbitration tribunals (MATs) or Šarīʿah councils in Scotland is of secondary importance 
for matters of impediments to marriage.40 Even in an unlikely request of an opinion on such an 
issue, the body would most probably be able to issue only an advisory opinion, not an award 
final and binding on parties.41 
IV. The single rule in Scotland 
One of the main objectives of the research project was to investigate the interplay between the 
‘modern’, single rule on interfaith marriages in Islamic law and the Scottish legal context. The 
abstraction of the single rule has de-contextualized the regulations on interfaith marriages; is 
the rule now immune from the context, or would a re-contextualization affect its content (and 
application)? 
Interviews were conducted to that end with a diversified range of figures from Muslim 
communities in different regions of Scotland. Qualitative methods were applied, considering 
the extremely narrow research question of the possible re-contextualization by Muslim 
 
37  Cfr. WERNER MENSKI, Law, religion and culture in multicultural Britain, in: Rubya Mehdi, Hanne Peterson, Erik R. Sand 
and Gordon R. Woodman (Eds.), Law and Religion in Multicultural Societies, Copenhagen 2008, 43-62, at 45. 
38  EWCA Civ 198 [2009] 2 WLR 185. 
39  MRA v. NRK [2011] CSOH, 101. 
40  See the AHRC/ESRC-sponsored report on religious courts and bodies in England and Wales: GILLIAN DOUGLAS ET AL., 
Social Cohesion and Civil Law: Marriage, Divorce and Religious Courts, Cardiff University, June 2011, available at 
<http://www.law.cf.ac.uk/clr/Social%20Cohesion%20and%20Civil%20Law%20Full%20Report.pdf>, last accessed April 29. 
41  Sect. 11 ff. Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010. 
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communities in Scotland of the legal impediments to marriage by disparity of faith in Islamic 
law. The research covered major cities with large Muslim communities as well smaller urban 
centers (namely Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Dundee and Inverness), and included active 
participants in the legal debates with the Muslim communities (mainly scholars, local imams, 
women active in faith-based NGOs, and community leaders). 
The data seem to suggest that there is a language divide that affects the debate. On the one 
hand, those who speak Arabic – either because it is the language they use or because they 
received religious training – are aware and participate in a debate on interfaith marriages from 
a very specific angle, that of the so-called islām al-zawğah case. This is the case of the conversion 
to Islam of a woman who is married to a non-Muslim (who does not convert, neither wishes to 
do so); will she be requested to divorce her husband when embracing Islam? Or, else, be 
instructed to refuse conjugal relations with her husband, based on some reports of 
Muḥammad’s injunction on his daughter Zaynab regarding her marriage to Abū al-ʿĀṣ? The 
debate is open, and scholars are divided on the answers to give to such questions. On the other 
hand, non-Arabic speakers (the majority of Muslims in Scotland) seem to be less involved in 
the debate and more inclined to perpetuate the single rule developed by modernity on grounds 
of its supposedly higher traditional legitimacy. 
The language divide can be explained in terms of ability to participate in the wider rather than 
in the local debate, and the absence of a debate that could be properly considered local. The 
peculiarities of the Scottish context thus become quite irrelevant, as even the Arabic-speakers 
depend on the larger Muslim communities in England or overseas. 
Effects of the conversion to Islam of a woman married to a non-Muslim (islām al-zawğah) have 
attracted the attention of a group of Muslim scholars who intend to develop a ‘new’ body of 
Islamic law based on the special conditions of Muslim communities who live as minorities 
(especially in the West). However, these attempts to develop ‘new’ rules tailored on the needs 
of Muslim living in non-Muslim majority contexts seem to have met with tepid reception so 
far. Arabic being the main language used for this ‘jurisprudence for minorities’ (fiqh al-
aqallīyāt), it should come to no surprise that references to the debate on the islām al-zawğah case 
were made exclusively by Arabic-speaking members of the Muslim communities in Scotland. 
It is worth mentioning here that advocates and supporters of fiqh al-aqallīyāt engaged directly 
with the classical Islamic regulations on interfaith marriages in the second issue of al-Mağallah 
al-ʿilmīyah of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) in 2003; the issue was 
entirely dedicated to the status of the marriage of a woman who converts to Islam while her 
husband does not. Among the contributors featured most of the well-established (and 
sometime discussed) Muslim legal scholars, from ʿABDALLĀH AL-ĞUDAYʿ to ʿABDALLĀH AL-
ZUBAYR, from FAYṢAL MAWLAWĪ to MUḤAMMAD ABŪ FĀRIS, from NIHĀT ʿABD AL-QUDDŪS to 
YŪSUF AL-QARAḌĀWĪ.42 The grounds for re-consideration of the islām al-zawğah case mentioned 
in the general presentation of the issue could even warrant a re-consideration of the classical 
regulations on interfaith marriages beyond the islām al-zawğah case.43  
 
42  See the discussion in: DINA TAHA, Muslim Minorities in the West: Between Fiqh of Minorities and Integration, in 
Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law (1/2013), 1-36, at 25-28. 
43  FAYṢAL MAWLAWĪ, Taqdīm, al-Mağallah al-ᶜilmīyah (2/2003), 9-10. 
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In its final decision, however, the ECFR adopted quite a conservative reading while 
recognizing to the woman who converted to Islam after consummation of marriage the right to 
wait (for an indefinite period of time) for the conversion of the husband.44 The line closes with 
the unclear stipulation that, when the husband converts, there will be no need for a renewal of 
the marriage. Relations between the spouses during this indefinite period during which the 
woman waits for the conversion of her husband is addressed further down in the decision, 
where the opening statement leaves no room to doubt that all schools agree that the wife 
cannot remain with her husband after the termination of the waiting period (ʿiddah). The 
Council, however, also mentions a minority view that the wife can remain with her husband 
with full marriage rights and duties, provided he does not prejudice her in her religion and she 
harbors hopes that he will eventually convert. Not unsurprisingly, the issue of the religious 
affiliation of the offspring is not addressed. 
Indeed, according to the ECFR fatwá, if the wife wishes to maintain her marriage after her 
conversion to Islam (against the consensus of Muslim scholars to the contrary), she either has 
to suspend conjugal relations with her husband until his conversion (in line with Zaynab’s 
episode), or follow the other minority view of full marriage rights and duties. This view finds 
support in two traditions, the first attributed to ʿUmar and the second to ʿAlī – ʿAlī’s decision 
in this latter tradition is based on the consideration that the husband enjoys protection 
(literally: ʿahd, a contract, short for: ʿahd al-ḏimmah, contract of protection), i.e. he is a ḏimmī. A 
condition that certainly does not hold in Scotland. 
V. A Hybrid Legal Solution? 
It is rare to find another area of Islamic law where the consensus of scholars seems to be more 
widespread than on interfaith marriages. Despite the inconsistent practice of the early days of 
Islam,45 during the 3rd century AH (9th AD) an articulated system of impediments to marriage by 
disparity of faith somehow stabilized around a series of considerations revolving around 
certain arrangements of unequal relations between spouses, a hierarchized system of religious 
communities, and an horizon of territories ruled by Islamic law and others not. Modernity 
uprooted such a system from its environment, and transformed it into a single rule through 
selection and abstraction. The end-result is a rigid formulation unable to interact either with 
the legal environment that produced the system (and hence grasping its own gist), or with the 
different conditions that an unknown and not-necessarily-unfriendly legal environment may 
offer. 
The hybridity of the modern single rule is therefore magnified by its application in a context 
like the Scottish one, where the law guarantees equality of spouses, religious communities are 
not ordered in ranks, and Islamic law does not govern the system. If one argued from a 
conservative standpoint that, based on the last remark (i.e.: Islamic law does not govern the 
Scottish legal system), the legal category of dār al-ḥarb should apply, then all the provisions 
regarding interfaith marriages in the dār al-ḥarb should apply (not the ones developed for the 
dār al-islām). 
 
44  Qarār 3/8, ECFR, 8th Ordinary Session, Sevilla 18-22 July 2001, in al-Mağallah al-ᶜilmīyah (2/2003), 445-446. 
45  FRIEDMANN, supra n. 11. 
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This selective approach to the classical regulations generates a super-hybrid solution that is 
neither the classical, nor a new one (in fact it is, but it is not purported as such). The authority 
of the super-hybrid solution seems to be strengthened by the oblivion of the contextualization-
cum-localization of the classical solutions; regulations for a šarīʿah-ruled context are extended 
to a non-šarīʿah-ruled one – disregarding the provisions set out for the latter context. One could 
speculate that this ‘extension’ of the regulations developed for a šarīʿah-ruled context mirrors a 
certain conception of the migratory phenomena that might change as newer generations 
progressively lessen their ties with the ‘homelands’ of their ancestors. 
Impediments to marriage by disparity of faith fall out of the purview of contemporary legal 
systems – so adamantly committed to the principle of territoriality of the law, and its professed 
religious-blindness. These restrictions fall in a blind spot of Scots law and court system, but it 
would amount to mystification to discard them as irrelevant to law, especially when reasoning 
in terms of multiculturalism46 and citizenship theories.47 
When introducing the distinction between multiculturalism and plural monoculturalism, 
AMARTYA SEN points precisely at a case of rejection of an interfaith relationship for an 
immigrants’ daughter and considers it an overt act of separateness embedded in plural 
monoculturalism rather than multiculturalism.48 Our single rule seems to prove also SUSAN 
MOLLER OKIN’s point,49 if the patriarchal roots of both the modern articulation and the classical 
crystallization are not revisited. The bases for the gendered, hierarchical single rule appear 
much less monolithic when stripped of the patriarchal readings of the classical jurists of the 
13th century AD and those of the abridging jurists belonging to the new elites of the modern 
nation-states. 
The interaction between state law and confessional law generates conflicts precisely when the 
two systems refuse to give the same appreciation to a certain element. It is in those 
circumstances that the socio-legal arrangement model can be put to test. If a Muslim cleric 
registered as a celebrant under Scots law refuses to marry a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim 
man, it is dubious whether Scottish authorities would (and could) intervene. Could they 
revoke the authorization based on the application of a gender-discriminatory wedding 
practice? On what evidence? The broad wording of sect. 10(1)(d)(iii or iv) of the Marriage 
(Scotland) Act 1977 would seem to allow the removal of such a celebrant’s name from the 
register. Would (and could) the same Scottish authorities prevent the same celebrant from 
marrying a Muslim man to a non-Muslim woman in compliance with classical Islamic (Ḥanafī) 
law? The hypothesis seems quite remote since it would entail enforcement of a religious 
discrimination practice. Today even more than in the past, and on lesser and lesser grounds, 
the victim of the ‘modern’, single rule is the Muslim woman, who is forced to choose between 
her faith and her prospective or current partner. 
 
46  CHARLES TAYLOR, Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition”: An Essay, Princeton 1992; BHIKHU C. PAREKH, 
Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, Cambridge 2000; SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, Is 
multiculturalism bad for women?, Princeton 1999. 
47  WILL KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford 1995. 
48  AMARTYA SEN, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, New York 2007, at 157. 
49  OKIN, supra n. 46. 
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In reverse order, the same conflict between state law and confessional law can be observed in 
the current debate in Egypt over the second marriage of the Copt. The Coptic (Orthodox) 
Church allows for divorce in a very limited number of cases, but Egyptian state courts divorce 
Copts with much more liberality, considering divorce a constitutional right of the citizen 
according to the Islamic understanding of marriage and divorce. If state courts manage to force 
the termination of all legal consequences of the marriage, they cannot force the Church to 
acknowledge the termination of the marriage. The issue is further complicated by the absence 
of a non-confessional family law system by which the state-divorced Copt can actually lead a 
life without further, harsh legal consequences. The Supreme Administrative Court has tried to 
force the Church to remarry the court-divorced Copt, but to no avail so far. Here again the 
legal confrontation seems to have escalated to the point where the Coptic canon law rule has 
turned into a symbol of identity (and resistance). 
The strong claim to authenticity advanced in favor of the modern, single rule on interfaith 
marriages needs to be revisited in light of the latter’s super-hybrid nature. Considering the 
context in which the various considerations of classical law were articulated, the dynamics of 
selection and abstraction that unfolded with modernity, and the conditions of the new contexts 
in which these rules are to be applied challenges the simplistic claim to authenticity and opens 
new avenues for re-engagement with the issues – including discussions on interfaith marriage 
regulations, which are conventionally dismissed as barred by the overwhelming consensus 
reached on their final arrangement. 
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Abstract 
Recent revisionist academic legal historians have relocated the Israeli national story within a colonial and 
postcolonial narrative, and in a global context indigenous groups dispossessed from their communal and ancestral 
lands are increasingly re-asserting claims to that land through legal and human rights challenges, deploying 
international human rights law relating to rights to property and minority rights. Waqf property (held in charitable 
trust for religious purposes) is an important element in Muslim societies, and has been subject to large-scale 
transfer to Jewish control since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 (‘redeemed’ for the Jewish people). The role 
of successive Absentee Property Laws in this confiscation derives from Ottoman land tenure, as modified during the 
British League of Nations Mandate over Palestine, and subsequently. The Israeli legal system has, devised and 
utilised various modalities and mechanisms to systematically confiscate Palestinian land in general and more 
specifically the waqf, while also re-establishing shari’a courts and replacing the shari’a court of appeal in Jerusalem. 
Mutawallis (managers of waqf) have to undertake 'forum shopping’ for search for the most suitable court (between 
Israeli civil and shari’a courts and the Palestinian shari’a court) to get and enforce a favourable judgment, but the 
new structures leave Palestinians with no legal authority over the administration of the waqf system. Recent legal 
disputes over the status of certain mosques and cemeteries (as waqf properties), and the special situation of waqf 





* Haitam Suleiman is a Palestinian living in Israel and currently Assistant Professor in Law at al-Quds University, 
Jerusalem. This paper is based upon his PhD from Anglia Ruskin University (2009) on Reviving the Waqf in Palestine/Israel. 
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I. Introduction: legal pluralism & disputes over waqf 
property 
This article explores the conflict over land in Israel/Palestine, within a context of postcolonial 
legal pluralism, with particular reference to Islamic property held for religious charitable 
purposes (the waqf). Israel/Palestine inherits several legal traditions, offering often conflicting 
sources of legitimacy: Islamic, as applied by the Ottoman empire until 1918, and more recently 
by Jordan in the West Bank and Egypt in Gaza; British colonial, under the League of Nations 
Mandate (1923-48); and post-1948 Israeli, with borrowings from United States and European 
jurisdictions. British colonialism’s role in building the Israeli state has been re-asserted by 
Shamir: 
“Too little attention has also been given to the basic fact that the British, aided by all 
their colonial experience elsewhere, created and installed a functioning state in 
Palestine: a rather advanced web of administrative apparatuses and governmental 
departments, a sound infrastructure and, of course, a fully-developed, ready-to-use 
legal system”.1 
English-language literature on waqf in Israel/Palestine is limited, and relevant legislation and 
court rulings are often unpublished, or unavailable in English. This article is able to draw upon 
field research undertaken by a Palestinian Arab living in Israel, Haitam Suleiman, with Arabic, 
Hebrew and English language competence, and aware of nuances of language, even body 
language, and cultural background. Interviewees may have sought to mislead, where questions 
dealt with controversial and sensitive issues, and officials may withhold information, while the 
field-work was risky and interrupted by the current conflict. 
II. The Revival of waqf 
Waqf [pl. awqaf] in Arabic means hold, confinement or prohibition, and in Islamic shari’a law is 
a juridical institution for the reservation of property for religious purposes. A waqf is 
established by a living man or woman (the waqif = founder), who holds a certain revenue-
producing property and makes the (principal), inalienable in perpetuity, prohibited from sale, 
gift and inheritance. The property is placed under the stewardship of a fiduciary (wali or 
mutawalli) who assures that the revenues pass to the intended beneficiaries (mustahiqeen).2 
Under Shari’a law, while sadaqa (charity) should reach only the poor and needy, waqf can be 
directed to both poor and rich; Sadaqa may be owned, sold, or granted, but the waqf is 
perpetual, with no intervention in ownership, and is confined to fixed property, or things that 
have sustainable reserved revenues. There are three basic kinds of waqf. The first, the Khairy or 
charitable waqf, directs property revenues towards philanthropic goals. The second, the Ahli or 
family waqf, benefits family members, with the endower choosing what individuals and what 
lines of descent benefit; administrators are family members, and the revenue-bearing assets 
 
1  RONEN SHAMIR, The Colonies of Law: Colonialism, Zionism and Law in Early Mandate Palestine, Cambridge 2000, at 11. 
2  SIRAJ SAIT & HILARY LIM, Land, Law and Islam: Property and Human Rights in the Muslim World, London 2006. See also, 
MUSTAFA AHMAD ZARGA, Ahkam al-awqaf, [Awqaf Rulings], Dar ‘Ammar 1998. 
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circulated indefinitely.3 Finally, the Mushtarak or joint waqf, divided the revenues between 
philanthropy and family.  
Interestedly, given the contested state of waqf in Israel, the very first waqf was created by a 
Jewish convert to Islam who bequeathed his wealth to the Prophet for the benefit of the poor 
and needy. The juridical form of the waqf took shape in succeeding centuries and the jurist Abu 
Yusuf (d. 798) asserted that a waqf was valid only if irrevocable and made in perpetuity.4 Its 
perpetuity element distinguishes the waqf from the trusts and foundations found in Western 
legal systems, but it apparently influenced the early English trusts during the time of the 
crusades, when there was much population movement between Europe and the Holy Lands, 
including the Franciscan Friars. The University of Oxford in its early years may have been 
influenced by the waqf, with the 1264 Statutes of Merton College (significant in the founding of 
the college system) showing Islamic influences.5 
Awqaf flourished with the establishment of Muslim-ruled states, offering a means of diverting 
resources from consumption, and investing them in productive assets to provide either 
usufruct or revenues for future consumption by individuals or groups of individuals.6 Awqaf 
served many functions. They provided educational institutions with buildings, teaching 
materials, staff salaries, and scholarships for poor students, derived from the revenues of 
orchards and rental buildings, and independent of the state. They provided health services, 
public kitchens, orphanages, environmental protection and animal care. Awqaf stimulated 
economic activity, providing shops at low rent, public water fountains, and accommodation for 
commercial caravans. A range of public goods now provided by government agencies in the 
past came through private waqf, which have been called the most important and universal 
economic institution of Islamic society with reflective influance on the tax structure of the state, 
the redistribution of wealth in society and the urban fabric of Islamic cities.7 The waqf was an 
urban institution that shaped the civic space of Ottoman cities,8 while waqf property was 
estimated at over a third of the agricultural land in Turkey, Morocco, Egypt and Syria. In 
Recent times modern states in the Middle East however nationalized vast waqf properties, 
while new municipal government services increasingly supplanted the waqf. Legislation 
brought waqf under greater regulation or absolute prohibition, and contributed to the 
prevalence of secular law over shari’a principles, resulting in the stagnation of waqf. The family 
waqf was restricted, and some states forbade new creations, with the stipulations of waqf 
founders no longer treated as ‘sacred and inviolable’. The state claimed that the waqf was no 
longer serving its original purposes, and it could administer them better. The eclipse of waqf 
has left a vacuum in the arena of public services; students, the sick, homeless, travellers, the 
 
3  TIMUR KURAN, The Provision of Public Goods under Islamic Law: Origins, Contributions, and Limitation of the Waqf 
System, Law and Society Review, vol. 35, no. 4 (2001) 841-897, at 856. 
4  PETER C. HENNIGAN, The Birth of a Legal Institution: The Formation of the Waqf in Third-Century A.H. Hanafi Legal 
Discourse, London 2004. 
5  MONICA M. GAUDIOSI, The influence of the Islamic Law of Waqf on the Development of the Trust in England: the Case of 
Merton College, 136 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1988) 1231-1261. 
6  MONZER KAHF, Financing the Development of Awqaf Property, Seminar Paper, IRTI, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, March 2-4, 
1998.  
7  FRANCIS EDWARD PETERS, Jerusalem and Mecca: The Typology of the Holy City in the Near East, New York 1986. 
8  RICHARD VAN LEEUWEN, Waqfs and Urban Structures: The Case of Ottoman Damascus, Studies in Islamic Law and 
Society, vol. 11, Leiden 1999. 
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poor and prisoners are only some of the vulnerable who have lost the protection of the waqf. 
The waqf is, however, showing signs of reinvigoration, with Awqaf properties occupying a 
growing share of the societal wealth of Muslim countries and those with significant Muslim 
minorities. Since the oil crisis of the 1970s Islamic banking has developed new tools of finance, 
and waqf has emerged as a non-profit ‘third’ sector, distinct from the profit-based private sector 
and the official public sector. Its institutional protections are making it again a main actor in 
the social and economic life of Muslims.9 
III. Waqf in Palestine/Israel: special status 
As the waqf in main is a form of property or a land, therefore its legal influence should be 
attributed to the conflict over the land, ‘generally’, in the Middle East. The literature indicates 
that the waqf properties as the land in general were influenced by different and various means, 
mechanisms and law from those who ruled Palestine in the last two centuries. Before one 
proceeds to discuss the law of waqf in Palestine it is necessary to understand first the history of 
the legal system in Palestine followed by discussing the land laws in Palestine as this will help 
to comprehend the entire legal issues related to waqf law. Palestine is regarded a special case 
with a different status at all levels. The legal position in Palestine is simultaneously both one of 
the most complicated and most rare situations. The legal system in Palestine emerged in 
unsteady circumstances due to the several powers that ruled Palestine through history. The 
partition of Palestine led to the creation of complex and different law systems in the West 
Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem in addition to the parts of the country which were occupied in 
1948. The legal system in Palestine was based on the principles of the Islamic shari’a law until 
the end of the Ottoman rule in 1917. The British Mandate followed and remodelled the legal 
system, along with the Ottoman law-making the British introduced the principles of the Anglo-
Saxon system, which is based on Common Law. While the West Bank with eastern Jerusalem 
inclusive was under the rule of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1948, and the Jordanian 
legal system, which is influenced by many other systems prevailed. The Gaza Strip was under 
the Egyptian administration where the joint legal system of the former British Mandate 
prevailed. Later the Israeli occupation imposed its military law on the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip after the 1967 war and put eastern Jerusalem subject to the local law of the Israeli occupier 
after annexing it in 1980. After the Oslo Accord, the Palestinian Authority was found and the 
jurisdiction of the new authority was agreed upon. The Palestinian legislators then started to 
unifying and harmonizing the diverse legal systems prevailing in the Palestinian territories. 
Since 1994 unifying legislation has been enacted for both the West Bank and Gaza Strip.10  
Most waqf properties in Israel was expropriated under the Absentee property Law, and it is one 
of the most sensitive and complicated issues in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Israel claims 93 
per cent of its territory as public domain for the Jewish faith, and the process has isolated and 
contained the surviving Arab communities within Israel, while the rest of the Palestinian 
people have been displaced to peripheral locations (Gaza, the West Bank), which Israel has 
 
9  MONZER KAHF, Towards the Revival of Awqaf: A Few Fiqhi Issues to Reconsider, Presented at the Harvard Forum on 
Islamic Finance and Economics, October 1, 1999. See also, SAIT & LIM, supra n. 2. 
10  HAITAM SULEIMAN & ROBERT HOME, ‘God is an Absentee, too’: The Treatment of Waqf (Islamic Trust) Land in 
Israel/Palestine, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, (41:59; 2009), 49-65. 
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held under military occupation since 1967 and also has control of most of the land. During the 
period 1918-48 land dominated the efforts of the British Mandate. Among the first actions of 
the occupying British were to close the Ottoman land registers, prohibit all land transactions 
until a new registry was installed, and transfer much jurisdiction in land matters from Islamic 
shari’a courts to new secular land courts. The British colonial regime therefore had occupied the 
Palestinian legal systems.11 
The British established a Supreme Muslim Council in 1921, with a president and four members, 
to manage Shari’a affairs in Palestine. Its waqf activities from 1921 to 1936 were impressive:12 
 Twenty-one new mosques and three minarets built, and 313 mosques repaired (notably 
the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem).  
 224 new properties built, and 300 repaired, including shops, houses, and the waqf 
building (originally the Palace Hotel in Jerusalem, after 1948 used as Government 
offices).  
 draining swamps, planting trees on waqf lands, and enlarging waqf lands by the purchase 
of about 25,000 dunums.  
 maintaining schools and scholarships for Muslim students to universities in Egypt, Syria, 
and Europe.  
 establishing a Moslem orphanage, training midwives. 
In 1948 waqf land was estimated to comprise a sixth of the country, but estimates are unreliable, 
and the Israeli government does not disclose (and may not hold) data on the extent of waqf. In 
1980 the Custodian of Absentee Property estimated that about 70 percent of the land of the 
state of Israel might potentially have two claimants - an Arab and a Jew holding respectively a 
British Mandate and an Israeli deed to the same property.13 
The concept of absentee was recognised in Ottoman law, which distinguished different 
categories of absenteeism, and absentee property was theoretically held in suspense or trust.14 
After 1948 Israel applied the term to the Palestinians displaced from Israel (usually over 
relatively short distances, into Arab-controlled territory).15 The new Israeli state reformulated 
regulations devised in 1939 by the British for wartime conditions, as the 1949 Emergency 
Regulations on Property of Absentees. A Custodian of Absentee Property was instituted, 
similar to the preceding Mandate Custodian of Enemy Property. The first Emergency 
Regulation (Absentees’ Property) Law 1948 was contained in the Absentees Property Law 1950. 
Absentee land could be restored in only very restricted circumstances: if the absentee could 
prove that it was ‘for fear that the enemies of Israel might cause him or her harm’ or ‘otherwise 
 
11  JOHN STRAWSON, Reflections on Edward Said and the Legal Narratives of Palestine: Israeli Settlements and Palestinian 
Self-determination, Penn State International Law Review vol. 20 (2002) 363-384. 
12  MICHAEL DUMPER, Islam and Israel: Muslim Religious Endowments and the Jewish State, Washington DC 1994. 
13  DUMPER, supra n. 12. 
14  FREDERIC M. GOADBY & MOSES J. DOUKHAN, The Land Law of Palestine, Tel Aviv 1935. 
15  SULEIMAN & HOME, supra n. 10. 
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than by reason of fear of military operations’. The APL caused the confiscation of two million 
dunams and given to the custodian, who later transferred the land to the development 
authority. After the establishment of Israel in 1948, state-owned lands previously in the 
possession of British Mandatory Authorities, and the property abandoned by Arab refugees 
passed into the control of the new Israeli administration. Waqf ownership passed from Muslim 
hands to the Custodian, who on behalf of the state could convey the properties to Jewish 
hands, disregarding shari’a law. Israel did not distinguish between waqf property and any 
other land, and the Custodian of Absentee claimed waqf property on the ground that the 
Supreme Muslim Council became an ‘absentee’ because most of its members were refugees. 
Thus the Custodian was a conduit through which land passed to the Israeli Development 
Authority, and later the Land Authority, as a means of ‘laundering’ confiscated Palestinian 
land. The Absentee Law 1950 prohibited the shari’a court from their rights to supervise the 
awqaf properties. The Israeli high court held that the custodian was neither a trustee over the 
‘absent’ property or for the original owners of the properties, nor responsible for their 
management, and the absentee was not entitled to take legal action against the custodian.16 The 
five Ottoman tenure types, which were as follows: 
 Mulk land (fully-owned urban freehold property). The 7 per cent of the land of Israel still 
in private ownership is mostly former mulk land, mostly located within Arab villages. 
 Miri land. This had heritable use rights, and could revert to the state if not cultivated 
after three years (mahlul), and then be auctioned to anyone prepared to cultivate it. Miri 
land represented most of the cultivable land and, where not forfeited by the refugees of 
1948, was mostly acquired by the Israeli state through various means, particularly strict 
application of the three-year rule. Any land shown by aerial photography as not 
cultivated for a sufficient period was forfeited, not back to the village but to the state, by 
means of an official declaration in words: ‘I hereby declare that the area specified in the 
appendix is government property’, the appendix being a rough boundary line on the 
aerial photo. This declaration was sent to the village head and posted on the land 
(usually left under a stone), or made orally. The onus of proof for any counter-claim then 
fell to any prior owner, who had 45 days to commission a cadastral survey and lodge an 
appeal, but many owners would be unaware of the declaration, and few could afford to 
mount a defence, especially when they had little hope of success in court.17  
 State land required for public purposes (in Turkish matruka, meaning withdrawn) and 
registered with the state or local authority. This included military bases, roads, forest 
land and public open spaces within villages.  
 Dead land (mawat), i.e. uncultivated, unirrigated and vacant land, needing government 
consent to bring into cultivation. Islamic law defined ‘dead land’ as sufficiently far from 
an inhabited place (a distance regarded as in practice a mile and a half) that a human 
voice could not be heard. Mawat included the Negev desert and the 3000 sq.km. of 
 
16  Court Case of Civil Appeal 58/54 Mahmud Habab v. Custodian of Absentee Property, (1956) 10 PD 912. 
17  SANDY KEDAR, The Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geography: Israel Law and The Palestinian Landholder 1948-1967, 
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 33, no. 4 (2001) 945-949. 
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mountain and desert east of Hebron, Jerusalem & Nablus. Article 6 of the Mandate made 
it and matruka land available for Jewish settlement. 
 Waqf land, held in trust for Muslim religious and charitable purposes. This was 
confiscated by the state of Israel after 1948, when it comprised a sixth of the count. 
A significant law in the confiscation of Palestinian lands, including waqf land, was another 
modification of Mandate emergency regulations (a term carefully retained in its title: the 
Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Waste Lands) Law, amended in 1951. This law derived 
legitimacy not only from Mandate law but also the Ottoman land code, which had provided 
for special commissions to record abandoned villages and reclassify vacant land lying idle and 
‘exposed to the sun’ (shamsieh) as state domain. Much of the land abandoned by the 
Palestinians in 1948 was not recorded in the Ottoman or Mandate land registers, as many did 
not register their land for fear of tax collectors and military conscription. While much urban 
property was held freehold (mulk in the Ottoman system), agricultural land was classed as 
Miri, in which formal and ultimate ownership was held by the State, and which if uncultivated 
for three years could be reclaimed by the state. The Palestinians’ culture of the sacred waqf is 
reflected in their treatment of waqf plots, often olive groves, cultivated by community 
volunteers, who would afterwards meticulously clean from their clothes traces of the sacred 
waqf soil. The 1951 Law, however, empowered the Ministry of Agriculture to declare lands as 
‘waste’ lands (Article 2) and to take control of ‘uncultivated’ lands (Article 4). Such land could 
thus be confiscated without having to confirm the absentee status of owners.  
Another important law was the so-called 1965 amendment, described by Israeli scholars as a 
‘reform’ of the waqf in Israel: the Absentees’ Property (Amendment No. 3) (Release and Use of 
Endowment Property) Law 1965). In 1956 the Board of Trustees of the Muslim waqf, which by 
then was made up of collaborators appointed by the government, who would sell or exchange 
land with the ILA unaccountable to the Muslim community, leading to violence within the 
community, including assassinations. The 1965 amendment represented a further stage in the 
confiscation of any remaining Muslim awqaf. Authorising the transfer of waqf property to the 
Custodian, denying the conditions that were attached when the property was endowed, and 
ensuring that property confiscated from the waqf would not be returned, regardless of whether 
the mutawalli or the beneficiary is ‘absentee’. The law empowered the Custodian to pass the 
property to the Development Authority or to board of trustees, ostensibly to prevent its 
neglect, but in practice to sell it for development, contradicting the fundamental perpetual 
characteristic of waqf land. The Law freed the remaining waqf from restrictions under shari’a 
law, and restricted the political use of funds generated from those awqaf. The amendment 
granted the state a further tool to transfer the remaining waqf properties from Muslim hands to 
the Jewish community through the use of Muslim ‘state appointees’ to a board of trustees. The 
board fulfilled the wishes of the government that appointed them and they did not acquire 
either any independence from the government or gain any credibility from the Muslim 
community. Section 4 of the 1965 amended law puts all Muslim sacred places at risk, since the 
custodian was authorised to sell them, and has no obligation to protect them. The effect of a 
succession of Absentee Property Laws has precluded Muslims from protecting and 
maintaining their sacred places, many mosques and cemeteries were subsequently transferred 
by the custodian to the development authority, which sold on to Jewish investment companies, 
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and in the end many mosques and cemeteries were converted into museums, cafes, restaurants 
or even synagogues. The remaining mosques which have not been sold are deserted, and 
cannot be maintained and used by Muslims who are denied access to them. 
IV. Waqf land in Jerusalem: special status 
The situation with waqf property is particularly complicated in Jerusalem, because of its special 
status under international law. Waqf represents some 90 percent of property within the Old 
City (both Islamic and Christian).18 During the Mandate the Palestinians used waqf properties 
as a buffer against the sale of land to the Jews. Jordan continues to exercise its sovereignty and 
law over waqf institutions in Jerusalem through the Ministry of Waqf in Amman, and, while 
Jordanian law became obsolete with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the 
West Bank and Gaza, it still forms the legal basis for some institutions in Jerusalem where the 
PA is not allowed to function.19 Jordanian control allowed the decline of waqf until 1967: only 
16 new awqf were founded in Jerusalem during the 19 years of Jordanian rule, compared with 
90 under the first 23 years of Israeli occupation (1967-1990), giving the waqf a central position in 
Palestinian society.20 Many Jerusalem residents rent from waqf institutions. Since 1967 rents 
agreed under Jordanian rule are not recognised by Israeli law, and have not increased in line 
with inflation, resulting in dilapidation of much waqf property in the Old City. Israel 
maintained the sovereignty of Muslim institutions and the Waqf in East Jerusalem (including 
the Old City) remains under the relevant authorities in Jordan. Individual waqf property is 
recorded in the Shari’a Court in Jerusalem and in the Department of Islamic Awaqf, but the 
extent of waqf property in the Old City is not publicly available. Cases decided by the Shari’a 
Court in East Jerusalem on rent or tenancy issues could only be enforced by the civil courts, 
which are Israeli and so not recognised by the Shari’a Court. The mutawalli of family waqf 
cannot resolve waqf property disputes, because a Palestinian court decision cannot be enforced, 
while they refuse to take action in the Israeli shari’a court because this would be recognizing its 
jurisdiction over Jerusalem. As a result of this ‘void in legal authority’, the family waqf 
managers and the Administration have had to rely on moral and community pressure to 
enforce decisions. Investment in property and establishing new awqaf were neglected as a 
result of the uncertainty and the ambiguity, leading to property blight in Jerusalem particularly 
in the Old City.21 The Tenancy Protection Act of 1954 provides that a tenant cannot be evicted 
either for non-payment of rent, alterations, or sub-letting if resident for more than fifteen years. 
Additionally most leases allow a tenant to sub-let with mutawalli having no control over the 
sub-letting but still responsible for upkeep. Rent increases were linked to the cost of living 
index, but only for rents charged in Israeli shekels, while most properties in the Old City are 
charged in Jordanian dinars, tenants can avoid rent increases with support from Israeli courts. 
Therefore, some landlords had changed rents to Israeli shekels, seen as more stable than 
Jordanian, but deflation of the Israeli currency devalued these rents, while Israeli law prohibits 
 
18  SAMER BAGAEEN, Evaluating the Effects of Ownership and Use on the Condition of Property in the Old City of Jerusalem, 
Housing Studies, vol. 21, no. 1 (2006) 135-150. 
19  YITZHAK REITER, Islamic Institutions in Jerusalem: Palestinian Muslim Administration under Jordanian and Israeli Rule, 
The Hague/London/Boston 1997, at 27-28. 
20  YITZHAK REITER, Islamic Endowments in Jerusalem under British Mandate, London/Portland 1996. 
21  DUMPER, supra n. 12. 
Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law | Vol. 3 (2015)     
Conflict over Waqf property in Jerusalem | by Haitam Suleiman  
       105 
  
  
lease revisions or eviction of tenants.22 Commercial and cultural activities could flourish with 
Palestinians avoiding the full control of Israel, but investment and development were 
neglected because of legal uncertainties and ambiguities, as the field-work revealed. The Israeli 
district court issued an initial decision allowing itself the right to review cases related to 
Islamic Waqf property in Jerusalem but with the potential to be applied all over Palestine. 
1. The battle in courts 
In 1951 the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Custodian agreed that the ministry would be 
directly responsible for the management of sacred places, despite the fact that they are 
considered as ‘absentee’ properties, approved by the government in 1952.23 
The Protection of Holy Places Law 1967 (Article 1) states that: 
“The Holy Places shall be protected from destruction and any other violation 
and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of 
different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to 
those places”. 
This guarantee was inserted to neutralize international public opinion, but there was no clear 
definition of ‘sacred place’ in the Israeli legal system. Adjudication is still governed by a 1924 
Mandate law, upheld by the Israel Supreme Court, with matters relating to religious rights in 
the Holy Places (including disputes between denominations of the same religion, and between 
religions) decided by the government, and not adjudicated in the courts. About a third of 
Muslim waqf property, principally mosques and graveyards still in use, was not expropriated 
after 1948, but various approaches have been deployed to obtain the rest. More confiscations of 
mosques and cemeteries are occurring, contrary to Islamic law.  In the beginning of the 1990’s, 
the Islamic Movement in Israel started to survey the waqf properties, intending to protect and 
develop them, and to prevent attempts by Israeli authorities to change their status and sell 
them off through the state-appointed trustees. Among the disputes over waqf properties was 
that involving the Muslim cemetery of Haifa, (Jamia’ al-estiqlal) used since the Mandate. In 1993 
the shari’a court in Haifa confirmed an agreement between two mutawallis of the in Haifa and 
an Israeli company regarding a deal to develop the site, but some months later one of the 
signatory mutawallis applied to the shari’a court to cancel the agreement, since the same qadi 
Zaki Midlij who permitted the agreement disowned it.  The mutawalli then applied to the High 
Court, relying on an additional statement of qadi Midlij, in which he claimed he had been co-
erced under armed threat from the company’s lawyer. The police questioned the qadi, who was 
convicted and resigned as a qadi of the shari’a court of appeal. The two parties agreed to 
transfer the case to the civil court in Haifa, where it is still pending. The Adalah organisation 
petitioned the Supreme Court in the name of Muslim religious leaders to demand legal 
recognition for the Muslim Holy Places in Israel. A special committee was formed in 2000, to 
investigate the situation of Arab holy sites, with representation from the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, the Ministry of National Infrastructures, the Israel Lands Administration, and the 
 
22  Information from Field-work interviews undertaken by the present writer in 2008. 
23  SHMUEL BERKOVITS, “How dreadful is this Place!” Holiness, Politics, and Justice in Jerusalem and the Holy Places in Israel, 
Carta Jerusalem 2006. 
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Regional Committee for Arab Local Councils. The committee prepared a plan for abandoned 
non-Jewish holy sites, compiling a list of 53 Muslim holy sites and 58 abandoned Muslim 
cemeteries, but the Ministry of Religious Affairs did not implement the committee’s 
recommendations. 
In Bhmr 1931/97 the Israeli civil court held that a mosque should be considered as a sacred 
place only if the property itself is sacred (the use in itself being insufficient). In Islamic law, 
however, a shari’a court qadi can confirm the sacred element: mosques and graveyards 
remained sacred, even without a roof. The qadi of the shari’a Court of Appeal Ahmed Natur 
issued a marsoom qadai (legal decree) attempting a tougher line, legally binding on all shari’a 
qadis. With the Muslim waqf places, and the sacred specifically, gradually losing their status, 
with abuse of waqf properties increasingly common, has become a routine practice, with 
attempts to use the shari’a courts to release them. The qadi’s marsoom was for the ‘public benefit’ 
of Muslims in accordance with Islamic law, and he criticised the Israeli state for confiscating 
awqaf properties. He proposed procedural steps to protect the remaining awqaf from abolition, 
Qadi Natour states that the shari’a qadis are not allowed to deliver any fatwa which may permit 
the use of sacred waqf properties or any other awqaf, for other purposes than declared in the 
waqfiya. Even if the qadi tries to rely upon shari’a judgments, they may violate basic principles. 
Mosques are sacred even when closed or deserted, ‘as long as one prayer was performed 
there’. The qadi cannot issue or confirm agreements on waqf property where affecting sale, rent, 
or substitution. Shari’a courts appointing mutawallis should call them to account every six 
months, with reports kept in an official register available to the public (this procedure 
important as before many fatwas and approvals went inadequately documented). The shari’a 
courts should dismiss mutawalli who misappropriate their position and made no action to 
protect the waqf. The shari’a courts are not allowed to appoint mutawallis without permission of 
the shari’a court of appeal, choosing only those who have good character, history and no 
criminal record. The Israeli Minister of Religious Affairs, however, by letter of 3 June 1996 
rejected the marsoom, claiming that qadi Natour is not authorised to issue it. Qadi Natour 
challenged the minister as improperly intervening in the judicial system, arguing that the 
shari’a Court of Appeal had jurisdiction.  
The case of the Beer el-Sabe ‘big mosque’ first mosque in the Naqab (Negev), it was founded in 
1906, Arab Bedouin sheikhs contributing half of the funding. After 1948 the mosque was 
confiscated and used as a court and prison until 1953, then as a museum until 1991, but has 
since been neglected and unprotected, surrounded by restaurants and bars, a municipal 
building and a public garden. In 2005, the Supreme Court of Israel sat to adjudicate on a 
petition submitted by ADALAH.24 In 2002, a request was made for the re-opening of the Big 
Mosque in Beer el-Sabe (Beer Sheva) to allow Muslim residents and visitors of Beer el-Sabe to 
pray in it. At the time Beer el-Sabe had some 259 synagogues for 180,000 Jewish residents (one 
for every 700), while the 5,000 Muslims had no mosque, not to mention the 150,000 Muslims in 
the surrounding Naqab. The petition was submitted by ADALAH on behalf of the Association 
for Support and Defence of Bedouin Rights in Israel, the Islamic Committee in the Naqab, 23 
Palestinian citizens of Israel, against the Municipality of Beer el-Sabe the Development 
 
24  ADALAH, The Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, available at http://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/6677, 
last accessed 1 August 2015.  
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Authority, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the Minister of Science. ADALAH argued that 
free access to the mosque was protected by the right to freedom of religion. The Israeli police 
force claimed that reinstating the mosque would create inter-community conflict, and, the 
municipality argued, would bring the ownership of all Muslim religious sites into dispute, 
even the Temple Mount and Jerusalem. ADALAH argued that maintaining the status quo would 
continue discrimination against Muslims, violating the right of freedom of worship. ADALAH 
added that there was no presence or representation of any Muslims from Beer el-Sabe or 
elsewhere on the Committee, and that, as it was formed by and constituted of members of 
various governmental offices, who are essentially a party to the dispute with an interest in 
maintaining the status quo, the Committee’s recommendations were neither just nor objective 25. 
Justices Procaccia, Hayut and Jubran ordered that the parties review their positions and within 
sixty days reach an agreement to change the mosque to a cultural and social centre for use by 
the Muslim community of Beer el-Sabe, except for the purpose of praying. In 2009 the Supreme 
Court upholds the previous decisions to disallowing Muslims to use the building as a mosque. 
In the case of 2289/81 involving the waqf Alestiqlal cemetery in Haifa, the Muslim community in 
Haifa petitioned in the district court to prevent the mutawallis transferring the bones of the 
Muslim dead elsewhere, and to develop the site. The court claimed that it had no jurisdiction, 
but referred the case to the shari’a court, which allowed the transfer, asserting that the 
sacredness of a cemetery lapses after 36 years of abandonment, contrary to most Islamic 
scholarship. Similar approaches have been adopted in other cases. In 232/76 (Shukri v Sharia 
Court- Bagats), the court upheld and reiterated the Alistiqlal judgment. The qadi Tawfiq Asaliya 
in 1969 stated that after 36 years the status of the Salma cemetery in Jaffa changed to ‘outworn’, 
but he reversed that decision in 1991, now claiming that ‘the sacredness of grave-yards is 
eternal and this entitlement cannot be nullified as it belongs to Allah’, so no-one should 
destroy graves there. The Ijzim cemetery raised similar issues recently, with demonstrations on 
site. In 1949, a Jewish settlement was built on the lands of the Palestinian village Ijzim, whose 
inhabitants fled after the 1948 war. In 2002 Jewish developers bought land there which 
included a graveyard of Muslim and Christian Palestinians. In 2004, (the ‘Al-Aqsa institution 
for the development of waqf properties) applied to the Israeli Supreme Court to stop 
construction work because of the destruction of Muslim graves. The appeal relied upon the 
2004 fatwa of qadi Ahmed Natour, stating that: 
“the sacredness of grave-yards is eternal and no one is permitted to remove it... 
insulting graves and the cemetery for the purpose of building a residential area as in 
this case is forbidden.... the landscape of the grave-yard (even though it was not used 
for long time) is still considered as waqf and it cannot be confiscated, nor it can be used 
for other purposes” (translated from Arabic).26 
The developers disputed that the land was a cemetery, arguing that the grave-yard recognised 
by the authorities was at some distance, and that local Muslims did not regard it as such, but 
admitted that graves had been discovered on the site, which the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
barred from removal. In 2009 the Supreme Court rejected the petition and allowed construction 
to continue. The Maamano-Allah Graveyard in West Jerusalem has been another recent 
 
25  ADALAH, supra n. 24. 
26  Available at http://www.iaqsa.com/, last accessed 10 August 2015. 
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contested case. Dating from at least the 13th century, with Muslim tradition holding that 
companions of the Prophet Muhammad are buried there, the cemetery was declared absentee 
property in 1955 (with no publicity in Arabic as required under Israeli law), and over the next 
30 years, the municipality of Jerusalem gradually acquired ownership, with objections being 
filed but over-ruled. In 2004 the Simon Wiesenthal Centre began constructing a Museum of 
Tolerance on part of the cemetery, with a much-publicized ground-breaking ceremony 
attended by California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, the Israeli President and Vice Prime 
Minister, the Mayor of Jerusalem, and dignitaries and guests from around the world. The 
Centre aims to ‘fortify the value of tolerance between peoples and between man to man’. When 
work uncovered human graves, the Al-Aqsa institution petitioned the Supreme Court for a 
provisional injunction preventing construction, and the dispute was brought to the shari’a and 
civil courts, who issued conflicting judgments. In 2009 the Israeli Supreme Court confirmed 
that three Muslim cemeteries (MaamanoAllah, Ijzim & Alberwa) are confiscated to Jewish 
developers, against Palestinian objections. 
V. Conclusion 
Whilst investigating the reasons for the waqf’s decline, a great many participants have shared 
the view that there is a prevalent difficulty with regard to the enforcement of shari’a courts’ 
judgments and this has caused a very real problem; as one interviewee (mutawalli of durri waqf 
in Jerusalem) observed “if you have a rent problem with a tenant, and you take a legal action 
against him, the court decision hardly can be enforced.” Another example, a conflict of laws 
exists at least in Jerusalem district, where both the Israeli and Jordanian laws are applied. 
Moreover, one shari’a qadi pointed out “that there is a problem with court jurisdiction. He cited 
an example, where his shari’a court should have decided in disputes on waqf cases, however, 
his decision was not accepted and the case was raised to the civil courts.” As a result of the 
difficulty with regard to jurisdiction and enforcement, there is confusion for the mutawallis who 
want to take legal action to protect the waqf. As one mutawalli added “you have to search for the 
proper court, so that you will be able to enforce the court decision. Often you need to choose between 
shari’a court (either the Palestinian or the Israeli) or civil courts (Israeli).”27  
Furthermore, the results show that Israel through its land policy is still confiscating waqf 
properties, and preventing access to them. Some recent cases emphasises this point (i.e. 
Maamanollah & Ijzim cemeteries). The field-work revealed; contemporary techniques of 
management were commonly developed to improve the efficiency of collecting revenue, i.e. a 
family mutawalli of a huge waqf in Jerusalem is using a highly sophisticated computer program 
to divide the profits over the beneficiaries. By contrast one mutawalli observes “the corruption 
and maladministration led to conversion of some awqaf to privately owned property, this is of course due 
to the absence of enforcement by the legal system that brings into account waqf players who 
misappropriate their position.” The field-work indicates that there is absence of definite figures on 
the extent of awqaf in Israel. The Israeli government is still holding the records which show the 
extent and quantity of awqaf at least inside Israel. The results from previous studies are based 
on insufficient data. It is noted that there was contradictory results. Moreover, the literature 
reveals that the historic role of the waqf is considered by Israel as a threat to its physical 
 
27  The present writer interviewed Mutawalli (waqf manager) in 2008. 
Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law | Vol. 3 (2015)     
Conflict over Waqf property in Jerusalem | by Haitam Suleiman  
       109 
  
  
integrity. This assertion according to the field-work remains valid despite the physical 
occupation over the Palestinian community and the completion of its administrative and legal 
system. The results show that Israel still fully controls the waqf properties. There are different 
degrees of control; Israel controls waqf administration, in terms of payments of their salaries 
and appointment and the incumbents always have to demonstrate their loyalty to the Israeli 
state.  The State has also re-established shari’a courts and replaced the shari’a court of appeal in 
Jerusalem. Such a new structure has left the Muslim qadis and officials with no legal authority 
over the administration of the waqf system; they were given only an advisory insignificant role. 
The Ministry for Religious Affairs established a department to be responsible for the 
Palestinian religious community. Other communities in Israel were given a greater autonomy 
over the administration of their religious affairs, for instance the Absentee law exempted some 
of church properties from confiscation as for the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate was not 
considered an absentee as defined by the legislation, though in fact the patriarchate is located 
in Jordanian Jerusalem. The Druze were nevertheless given a relative independence over it 
waqf properties, the 1962 Druze Religious Courts Law had authority over personal status and 
endowment properties.  
The main piece of legislation that has influenced the awqaf is the Absentee Law 1950 which 
gave rise to the confiscation of almost all waqf properties in Israel. The Third Amendment of 
the Absentee Property Law in 1965 described as a ‘reform’ of the waqf in Israel, has in fact, 
effectively implemented the priorities of the Israeli policy and completed its objective, namely, 
controlling the entire waqf system in Israel. The Amendment has freed the remaining waqf from 
the restrictions of shari’a law, i.e. sale; also, it restricted the political use of funds generated 
from those awqaf. Furthermore, the amendment granted the state a further tool to transfer the 
remaining waqf properties from Muslim hands to the Jewish community through the use of 
Muslim ‘state’s appointees’ board of trustees. The results show that due to the 1965 ‘reform’ 
many mosques and cemeteries were sold contrary to principles of shari’a law.  
A modern, positivist ideology of law and the state supported the colonists/colonialists in 
dispossessing the colonised, and trapped the indigenous Palestinians in a world of 
manipulated bureaucracy. The state of Israel came into existence in 1948 as the inheritor of a 
body of non-Jewish law derived from Ottoman law, as ‘enriched’ by British Mandate law. The 
court may intervene and issue a decision, potentially making all waqf property vulnerable to 
confiscation. Having driven out most of the Palestinians, it then modified the Mandate 
institution of the Custodian of Enemy Property, designed to hold such property in trust 
pending the end of hostilities, into the Custodian of Absentee Property, drawing upon the legal 
concept of ‘absentee’ in the Ottoman Land Code. The new state already had state and waste 
land transferred to it by the outgoing Mandate administration, and used its powers against 
absentee property to confiscate large tracts of land, both miri (or cultivated) land, taking over 
uncultivated or abandoned land under Ottoman provisions. It treated waqf land as little 
different from other absentee property, disregarding the perpetuity element conferred under 
shari’a law, although ‘holy’ and ‘sacred’ places were placed under special protection, and there 
were particular arrangements for the Old City of Jerusalem. For the Palestinians waqf property 
during the Mandate period had been used as a buffer against Jewish land acquisition, but this 
protection was gradually eroded. Palestinian attempts since the 1990s to revive waqf status and 
protect mosques and cemeteries from confiscation and change of use have generally been 
Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law | Vol. 3 (2015)     
Conflict over Waqf property in Jerusalem | by Haitam Suleiman  
       110 
  
  
denied in Israeli courts, while shari’a court judgments over-ruled. As expressed by the director 
of Awqaf in Jerusalem, petitioning the Israeli court is ‘like walking into a dark tunnel. Nobody 
can tell what is waiting for him at the other end’. While the waqf has successfully functioned for 
long periods under different conditions; its modern decline seems predictable. The legal 
system in Israel is a fundamental component and its exceedingly overregulated rules alongside 
with obstacles of enforcement procedures, made any different outcome unfeasible to achieve 
without retaining waqf’s autonomy and independence. Beyond doubts, the decline is due to 
absence of shari’a law that can embrace success, development and reform of the waqf system. 
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„Kann es ein modernes Recht für die Familie in islamischen Ländern (...) überhaupt geben?“, 
fragt LENA MARIA MÖLLER eingangs ihrer Dissertation „Die Golfstaaten auf dem Weg zu einem 
modernen Recht für die Familie?“. Eine berechtigte Frage vor dem Hintergrund, dass der 
Rechtsbereich ‚Familie‘ infolge seiner Regelungsdichte in den Primärquellen des Islam der 
eigentliche Kernbereich des islamischen Rechts ist, was seine Fortentwicklung traditionell 
erschwert hat.1 Aus diesem Umstand fliesst die relativ kurze Geschichte der Kodifikation des 
Familienrechts in der muslimisch geprägten Welt, wofür Bahrain, Katar und die Vereinigte 
Arabische Emirate (VAE) fast schon exemplarisch stehen: Die drei Golfmonarchien, allesamt 
ehemalige britische Protektorate, haben ihre Personalstatute erst nach der Jahrtausendwende 
kodifiziert. 
MÖLLERS Arbeit will eine regionale Lücke im Forschungsstand der Familienrechte islamischer 
Länder schliessen und aufzeigen, inwieweit die neuen Kodifikationen aktuellen 
Regelungserfordernissen genügen. Kern der Arbeit sind laut der Autorin die kodifizierten 
Personalstatute der drei ausgewählten Golfstaaten und deren gerichtliche Anwendung – unter 
Berücksichtigung etwaiger Rechtsfortbildung – rechtsvergleichend zu untersuchen. 
Verschiedene Aspekte machen das Studienobjekt besonders attraktiv: So etwa die zeitliche 
Nähe der Kodifikationen (VAE 2005; Katar 2006; Bahrain 2009), die Tatsache, dass der Islam 
den Charakter einer ‚Staatsreligion‘ geniesst, die Dualität von säkularem und religiösem Recht, 
aber auch die Unterschiede hinsichtlich Konfession und dominierenden Rechtsschulen. So ist 
im sunnitischen Katar die hanbalitische Schule vorherrschend, während in den beiden 
einflussreichsten Emiraten der VAE – Abu Dhabi und Dubai – die Malikiten die Mehrheit 
stellen. In Bahrain leben demgegenüber hauptsächlich Zwölferschiiten. 
 
* Dr. iur. Eveline Schneider Kayasseh, Geschäftsleitung Center for Islamic and Middle Eastern Legal Studies (CIMELS), 
Universität Zürich, Schweiz. 
1  Statt vieler zur Thematik des Familienrechts als Kernbereich des islamischen Rechts: BÜCHLER ANDREA, Das Islamische 
Familienrecht: Eine Annäherung, Bern 2003, 15; ROHE MATHIAS, Islamic Law in Past and Present, Leiden 2015, 100ff., 263ff.  
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Nach einem kondensierten Einführungsteil zum klassischen Islamischen Recht und dem 
Stellenwert bzw. Verständnis des islamischen Familienrechts innerhalb desselben wendet 
MÖLLER sich der Historie und Aktualität von Kodifikationsidee und Kodifikation in Europa 
und im arabisch islamischen Raum zu, wobei sie prägnant und konzise die beiden 
Kodifikationswellen2 auf dem Gebiet des islamischen Familienrechts nachzeichnet. Die Autorin 
äussert sich zum einen zu Übernahme und Grenzen des Kodifikationsideentransfers. Zum 
andern streicht sie im Lichte der hohen Regelungsdichte in den islamischen Primärquellen und 
identitätsschaffenden Charakters des Familien- und Erbrechts die Bedeutung des 
innerarabischen Rechtstransfers in diesen Rechtsgebieten heraus. MÖLLER konstatiert, dass die 
europäische Rechtssystematik im arabisch-islamischen Rechtsbereich hauptsächlich im Bereich 
der Formalie (Stichwort ‚Gesetzbuch‘) rezipiert worden sei, während das islamische Recht im 
Bereich familienrechtlicher Normen „vorrangiger Bezugspunkt“ blieb.3 
Im zweiten Kapitel setzt MÖLLER die Familienrechtskodifikationen Bahrains, Katars und der 
VAE in den rechtshistorischen und rechtspolitischen Kontext. Die Autorin zeichnet die 
Entwicklung vom Perlenfischerei- ins Petrolzeitalter nach, zeigt auf, wie die Golfstaaten 
sukzessive unter britisches Protektorat kamen und tribale Scheiche zu dynastischen 
Herrschern aufstiegen, und verfolgt den Weg in die Unabhängigkeit nach dem Ende der 
britischen Schutzherrschaft anno 1971 sowie die Rentierpolitik im Spannungsfeld von 
Persistenz und Wandel. Ein weiterer Kapitelschwerpunkt liegt auf der politischen und 
gesellschaftlichen Stellung der Frauen. Die Autorin zeigt vor dem Hintergrund des 
grundlegenden ökonomischen Wandels im 20. Jahrhundert auf, wie sich die Situation der 
weiblichen Bevölkerung in den drei untersuchten Golfmonarchien entwickelt hat. Sie kommt 
unter anderem zum Ergebnis, dass die Bildungschancen junger Golfaraberinnen mit denen von 
jungen Männern vergleichbar sind, derweil strukturelle, religio-kulturelle und sozio-
ökonomische Randbedingungen – Stichwort ‚Re-Islamisierung‘ – einer vollständigen 
Integration der weiblichen Arbeitskraft jedoch nach wie vor entgegenstehen. 
Darauffolgend befasst sich MÖLLER mit der Entwicklung der Rechtssysteme in den Golfstaaten. 
Den Ausgangspunkt bildet ein wenig systematisiertes, praxisorientiertes, auf tribalem 
Gewohnheitsrecht und unkodifiziertem klassischem islamischem Recht beruhendes 
Rechtswesen, das in schriftlichen Quellen kaum dokumentiert ist. Das vornehmlich als ‚hybrid‘ 
beschriebene Rechts- und Gerichtssystem erfuhr durch den Zuzug von Arbeitsmigranten in die 
Handelszentren am Golf eine grundlegende Änderung, indem durch die Pluralisierung der 
Bevölkerung ein Bedarf an objektivierten Rechtsregeln für die Streitschlichtung zwischen 
Personen ohne tribale Bindungen offenbar wurde. Dies führte zur Vorherrschaft des 
islamischen Rechts und der Schaffung von Scharia-Gerichten. 
Parallel dazu übte die britische Protektoratsmacht bis zur Unabhängigkeit der Golfmonarchien 
1971 (Kuwait 1961) extraterritoriale Jurisdiktion aus. Nach der Unabhängigkeit erwies sich die 
Schaffung einer nichtreligiösen Gerichtsbarkeit, die die Zuständigkeit der Scharia-Gerichte 
beschränkte, sowie die nationalstaatliche Kodifikation des Rechts als vordringlich. Da eigene 
Juristen fehlten, zogen die Herrscher ausländische Rechtsanwender bei. Dies führte nicht nur 
 
2  Siehe MÖLLER LENA MARIA, Die Golfstaaten auf dem Weg zu einem modernen Recht für die Familie?, Diss., Tübingen 
2015, 40. 
3  MÖLLER, supra n. 2, 42f. 
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zu einem verzögerten Kodifikationsprozess, sondern auch zu einer gewissen ‚Arabisierung‘ 
von Gesetz und Rechtsprechung. Zum einen blieb auch nach den umfangreichen 
Reformbestrebungen ein gewisser Grad an Dualität innerhalb der Rechtssysteme, indem nebst 
den zivilen Gerichten auch Scharia-Kammern, beziehungsweise im Fall von Bahrain: Scharia-
Gerichte, weiterbestanden. Zum anderen gründete die Rechtsprechung aufgrund des Fehlens 
von Kodifikationen im Bereich des Familien- und Erbrechts weiterhin auf die einschlägigen 
Rechtswerke der jeweils vorherrschenden Rechtsschulen.  
MÖLLER nimmt dies im dritten Kapitel zum Ausgangspunkt, die Kodifikationsbestrebungen 
und -debatten in den drei Golfmonarchien nachzuzeichnen. Die Autorin setzt einen 
Schwerpunkt in Bahrain, wo sich die Zivilgesellschaft bereits in den 1980er Jahren aktiv um die 
Kodifikation des Personalstatuts bemühte. Sodann bespricht sie die Auswirkungen der 
Ratifikation supranationaler Verträge – namentlich die UN-Kinder- und 
Frauenrechtskonventionen – für die Kodifikationsprozesse in den drei Golfstaaten und den 
Verlauf der Gesetzgebungsprozesse. 
In Kapitel Vier untersucht MÖLLER den Regelungsumfang der in den Jahren 2005 (VAE), 2006 
(Katar) und 2009 (Bahrain) erlassenen Kodifikationen auf dem Gebiet des Ehe-, Scheidungs- 
und Kindschaftsrechts. Der Hauptfokus liegt auf der Frage, ob die jüngst erlassenen 
Familiengesetzbücher den gesellschaftlichen Regelungserfordernissen Rechnung tragen. Unter 
dem wichtigen Hinweis auf die eingeschränkte Unabhängigkeit der Justiz4 geht die Autorin 
auf die gerichtliche Anwendung der Gesetzbücher und richterliche Rechtsfortbildung ein, 
wobei sich die Untersuchung der Rechtspraxis im Familienrecht hauptsächlich auf 
höchstrichterliche Urteile der Familiengerichte Katars und der VAE stützt.5 Die Auswertung 
fokussiert auf die Anwendung von Bestimmungen, die den Gerichten Ermessensspielraum 
gewähren sowie auf Lückenfüllung, die unter Rückgriff auf das klassische islamische Recht zu 
erfolgen hat. Überdies untersucht MÖLLER das Zusammenspiel der Gesetzesnovellen und setzt 
sie ins Verhältnis zueinander und wertet die andauernden öffentlichen Debatten über die 
Kodifikationen im Hinblick auf Erreichtes und weiteren Reformbedarf aus.  
Hinsichtlich Inhalt, Aufbau und Struktur weisen die drei Gesetzbücher, die sich am Maskat 
Dokument orientieren konnten, signifikante Ähnlichkeiten auf. Unterschiede ergeben sich zum 
einen im sachlichen Anwendungsbereich, indem das Familiengesetzbuch Bahrains einzig das 
Ehe- und Scheidungsrecht sowie die Personensorge regelt, während die Kodifikationen Katars 
und der VAE als umfassende Regelungen des Familien- und Erbrechts zu betrachten sind. 
Bezüglich dem persönlichen Anwendungsbereich ist zum anderen die konfessionelle Spaltung 
der Gesetzbücher Bahrains und Katars hervorzuheben: Die bahrainische Kodifikation findet 
ausschliesslich auf den sunnitisch-malikitischen Bevölkerungsteil, das Personalstatut Katars 
auf die Anhänger der hanbalitisch-sunnitischen Rechtsschule Anwendung. Das Personalstatut 
der VAE gilt demgegenüber prinzipiell für alle emiratischen Staatsbürger. 
 
4  Details bei MÖLLER, supra n. 2, 123. Ein Aspekt ist die – vornehmlich in Katar und den VAE – überwiegend ausländisch-
arabische Richterschaft, deren Aufenthaltsrecht im Land in direktem Zusammenhang mit der beruflichen Tätigkeit steht. 
5  Die Quellenlage hinsichtlich gerichtlicher Entscheidungen ist in den drei Golfstaaten nach wie vor relativ dünn. So 
veröffentlicht etwa das Oberste Berufungsgericht der Scharia-Gerichte Bahrains seine Gerichtsentscheidungen nicht. Siehe 
MÖLLER, supra n. 2, 122; siehe ferner: SCHNEIDER KAYASSEH EVELINE/BROZZO PATRICK, Chapter 7: Legal Systems Influenced 
by Religion, in: MÜLLER-CHEN MARKUS/WIDMER CORINNE/MÜLLER CHRISTOPH, Comparative Private Law, Zürich/St. Gallen 
2015, 351-426, 391. 
Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law | Vol. 3 (2015)     
Book Review: Lena Maria Möller, Die Golfstaaten auf dem Weg zu einem modernen Recht für die Familie? | von Eveline 
Schneider Kayasseh  
       114 
  
  
Inhaltlich sind, so führt MÖLLER aus, drei Tendenzen erkennbar: die Übernahme islamischer 
Rechtsfiguren ohne nennenswerte Veränderungen; Regelungen, die als Ergebnis 
innerisamischen und/oder –arabischen Rechtstransfers zu bewerten sind sowie innovative 
Regelungen. In einem ersten Schritt zeigt MÖLLER anhand von diversen Rechtsinstituten auf, 
dass zahlreiche Aspekte des Ehe- und Ehescheidungsrechts aller drei Golfstaaten nur zaghaft 
reformiert wurden und nach wie vor vornehmlich auf klassisch-islamischen Rechtsfiguren 
beruhen; ähnliches gilt für das Kindschaftsrecht. 
Im Folgenden sollen einige Beispiele veranschaulicht werden: Das Eherecht beruht weiterhin 
auf dem traditionellen Verständnis der Geschlechterrollen. Ähnliches gilt für das 
Scheidungsrecht. Allerdings wurde dort der Zugang der Ehefrau zur Scheidung infolge einer 
‚Schädigung‘ von der Rechtsprechung insofern erleichtert, als die obersten Gerichte Katars und 
der VAE den Begriff der Schädigung weit auslegen. Die Scheidung aufgrund von Schädigung 
kann übrigens, wie MÖLLER aufzeigt, in Bahrain und Katar lediglich von der Ehefrau, in den 
VAE indes auch vom Ehemann beantragt werden. Dieser hat im Übrigen weiterhin ein nahezu 
uneingeschränktes Recht auf Verstossung. Gleichwohl haben die zögerlichen Reformen – von 
MÖLLER anhand von Beispielen illustriert – bereits Auswirkungen auf die Rechtspraxis des 
Eherechts gezeitigt. 
Im darauffolgenden Abschnitt wendet sich MÖLLER den Regelungen rechtsvergleichender 
Prägung zu. Diese sind vornehmlich im Bereich der Formalisierung familienrechtlicher 
Vorgänge und der damit verbundenen staatlichen Kontrolle des Personenstandes zu finden. 
Hervorzuheben aus diesem Abschnitt sind: Die Einführung der grundsätzlichen 
Eheregistrierungspflicht, die Kodifikation der khul‘-Scheidung nach ägyptischem Vorbild, die 
Einführung einer Entschädigung für die verstossene Ehefrau wie auch die Möglichkeit beider 
Ehegatten, die Ehe ohne Angabe von Gründen und unter finanzieller Entschädigung an den 
schuldlosen Ehegatten aufzulösen.  
Auf diese Themen folgen die innovativen Regelungen in den drei neuen Kodifikationen. Im 
Scheidungsrecht ist dies die ‚angemessene Abfindung‘, welche die scheidungswillige 
emiratische Ehefrau ihrem Gatten im Rahmen einer khul‘-Scheidung schuldet. Die Autorin 
zeigt anhand der emiratischen Rechtsprechung auf, wie die Gerichte diesen unbestimmten 
Rechtsbegriff auslegen. Im Kindschaftsrecht eruiert MÖLLER Innovationen in drei Bereichen: 
Erstens, eine Stärkung väterlicher Rechte hinsichtlich der Personensorge in Katar und den 
VAE; zweitens die Tendenz, das Kindeswohl als Maxime des Kindesrechts anzuerkennen, 
indem es im Bereich des Sorgerechts Vorrangstellung geniesst und vor allem in Katar und den 
VAE eine Entscheidung ermöglicht, die dem Umständen des jeweiligen Falles Rechnung trägt; 
sowie drittens, eine Diskriminierung geschiedener nichtmuslimischer Mütter beim Sorgerecht, 
was als Rückschritt gegenüber den Regelungen des klassisch-islamischen Kindschaftsrechts zu 
werten ist. 
Abschliessend fasst MÖLLER die Ergebnisse ihrer Studie zusammen und bewertet die 
Rezeption der familienrechtlichen Reformen innerhalb der Bevölkerung anhand der 
öffentlichen Debatten. Diese lassen, so etwa hinsichtlich der andauernd langwierigen 
Gerichtsverfahren, Reformbedarf erkennen. Konsequenterweise werden weitere 
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Reformschritte vonnöten sein. Doch der „erste, schwerste Schritt“6 in Richtung eines modernen 
Rechts für die Familie ist getan. 
Resümierend lässt sich festhalten, dass MÖLLER ihr Forschungsziel auf hohem 
wissenschaftlichem Niveau erreicht hat, indem ihre Dissertation die jüngsten 
familienrechtlichen Kodifikationen in der islamischen Welt fundiert analysiert und kritisch 
bespricht. 
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Abstract 
A brief examination of various criminal jurisprudences in the world reveals that nationality is taken as one of the 
main bases for extending the judicial jurisdiction of states. In such cases, the jurisdictional bases for prosecution are 
in turn the personal and the passive personality principles. Yet, despite their widespread acceptance, regulating 
these two jurisdictional bases has not proven to be an easy task, if only for the encroachments that a wholesale resort 
to the jurisdictional bases in question may make into the sovereignty of other states. In this regard, the Iranian 
experience marks out many of the difficulties that law-makers around the world may face, when purporting to 
legislate on the bases for exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction. Another reason for viewing the Iranian encounter 
with the personal and the passive personality principles as a case of special interest is the mode in which the Iranian 
legislature has sought to adjust the application of the jurisdictional bases in question against the requirements of 
sharia law. By taking these factors into consideration, this essay will map out the successes and failures of the 
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A brief examination of various criminal jurisprudences in the world reveals that nationality is 
taken as one of the main bases for extending the judicial jurisdiction of states. In principle, the 
criminal laws of states cannot be applied to a criminal act committed outside their territory. 
However, a state can reserve for itself the right to assert jurisdiction over a criminal case if its 
nationals happen to be either the perpetrator of an offence committed abroad or its victims.1 In 
such cases, the jurisdictional bases for prosecution are in turn the personal and the passive 
personality principles. Yet, despite their widespread acceptance, regulating these two 
jurisdictional bases has not proven to be an easy task. Two issues are at stake here. On one 
hand, states have sought to recognize the personal and the passive personality principles in 
their penal codes so as to not tighten their freedom, when they are required to exercise 
jurisdiction either for keeping their public order or protecting their nationals. On the other 
hand, it remains true that exercising jurisdiction on the basis of either the personal or the 
passive personal principle is an exception to the main base of jurisdiction, that is, the territorial 
principle.2 Therefore, drawing precise boundaries for the jurisdictional bases in question 
becomes a paramount task for law-makers and judges around the world. 
The experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter Iran) in regulating the personal and 
the passive personality principles is very intriguing. Of these two jurisdictional bases, the 
personal principle used to be considered as the only acceptable ground for prosecuting crimes 
committed outside Iran. However, the exercise of the personal principle in Iran has undergone 
some radical transformations in recent years. For example, in the Amended General Penal 
Code of 1973 (hereinafter the 1973 Code), some primary preconditions had been set out for the 
application of the personal principle. Yet, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, except for the 
presence of the accused in Iran, the preconditions for the exercise of the personal principle 
were entirely lifted in the course of the three penal bills of 1982, and the Islamic Penal Code of 
1991 (hereinafter the 1991 Code).3 In the most recent penal legislation passed by the Iranian 
Parliament in 2013, another precondition that had been removed in the previous criminal 
legislations was redeemed to govern the exercise of the personal principle. This was the 
prohibition of double jeopardy (infra).   
Another development in the Islamic Penal Code of 2013 (hereinafter the 2013 Code)4 is that the 
passive personality principle has for the first time found a place in the Iranian criminal laws. 
As will be seen later in this essay, there is a broad spectrum of opinions as to the utility of this 
 
1  As will be seen later, however, the Anglo-American legal systems have taken a much more nuanced position towards 
these jurisdictional bases, and do not tend to employ them save for the cases of exceptional nature. HALLEVY GABRIEL, A 
Modern Treatise on the Principle of Legality in Criminal Law, London 2010, at 124.  
2  See generally STRAUSS ANDREW L., Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, Harvard International Law Journal 1995, Vol. 36, at 373.  
3  An unofficial English translation of the 1991 Code is available at http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/human-rights-
documents/iranian-codes/3200-islamic-penal-code-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-book-one-and-book-two.htm, last accessed 
28 December 2015. 
4  An unofficial English translation of the 2013 Code is available at http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/human-rights-
documents/iranian-codes/1000000455-english-translation-of-books-1-and-2-of-the-new-islamic-penal-code.htm, last accessed 
28 December 2015. 
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jurisdictional base.5 However, it is important that the exercise of the passive personality 
principle shall not be done in an unbridled manner, if only for the encroachments that it may 
make into the sovereignty of other states. Rather, the application of the passive personality 
principle must be accompanied by some important constraints. It is this dimension of the 
passive personality principle that renders its regulation particularly difficult.  
In this regard, the Iranian experience marks out many of the difficulties that law-makers 
around the world may face, when purporting to legislate on the bases for exercising extra-
territorial jurisdiction. Another reason for viewing the Iranian encounter with the personal and 
the passive personality principles as a case of special interest is the mode in which the Iranian 
legislature has sought to adjust the application of the jurisdictional bases in question against 
the requirements of sharia law. By taking these factors into consideration and by invoking the 
conception of the personal and the passive personality principles in the criminal codes of some 
other states, this essay will map out the successes and failures of the Iranian legislature in 
conceiving these two jurisdictional bases in the 2013 Code. At the end, it will be concluded that 
notwithstanding following some progressive milestones, the Iranian legislature is yet to draw 
precise boundaries for the application of the personal and the passive personality principles, 
and thus, the conception of these two jurisdictional bases in the 2013 Code is yet to meet the 
modern standards of penal legislation. 
II. Definition and Classification of Crimes in the Iranian 
Penal System 
Before we take on the issues of jurisdiction in the Iranian penal system, it is necessary for us to 
provide a brief introduction to the definitions and classification of offences in the Iranian legal 
system. The importance of this introduction can better be grasped when one considers that the 
classification of offences in the Iranian penal system on some occasions runs hand-in-hand 
with the application of the personal and the passive personality principles. This is a by-product 
of the important role that sharia plays in conceptualizing different types of offences in the 
Iranian penal system. In the Islamic law tradition, crimes are generally classified on the basis of 
the punishments prescribed for them.6 In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, 
legislations on criminal law in Iran have consistently followed this pattern for the classification 
of offences.7 Therefore, the offences enumerated in the 2013 Code have been classified in the 
following order: 
1. Crimes punishable by hadd (hodood) 
Article 15 of the 2013 Code has provided a definition for the concept of hadd: “[h]add is a 
punishment for which the grounds for, type, amount and conditions of execution are specified 
in holy Sharia”. The hadd crimes are usually considered the most serious religious offences in 
 
5  For an international law view of the passive personality principle, see RYNGAERT CEDRIC, Jurisdiction in International Law, 
Oxford 2015, at 110.   
6  TELLENBACH SILVIA, Iran, in: HELLER KEVIN/DUBBER MARKUS D. (Eds.), The Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law, 
Stanford 2011, 320-351, at 321.   
7  RAHAMI MOHSEN, Development of Criminal Punishment in the Iranian Post-Revolutionary Penal Code’, European Journal 
of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2005, Vol. 13, 585-602, at 588–589. 
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the Islamic criminal justice doctrine.8 As is evident from the text of Article 15, hadd crimes are 
enumerated in the Islamic sacred texts (regarding which and whose authority, there are some 
differences between schools of thought in Islam).  
Hadd crimes are largely specified in Book II of the Islamic Penal Code. Such crimes as unlawful 
sexual intercourse (Article 221), sodomy (Article 233), false accusation of unlawful sexual 
intercourse against someone else (Article 245), pandering (Article 242), swearing at the prophet 
(Article 262), consumption of intoxicants (Article 264), theft (Article 267) and corruption on 
earth (Article 286) are among the most severe hadd crimes. Apart from the crimes specified in 
the 2013 Code, the Iranian legislature in Article 220 has left the door open for judges to refer to 
the Islamic books on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) to identify other hadd crimes that may have 
escaped criminalization in the 2013 Code. Needless to say, given the vital importance of the 
principle of legality in the sphere of criminal law, this is not an acceptable mode of criminal 
legislation. However, this must be blamed on Article 167 of the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, which states:  
“The judge is bound to endeavor to judge each case on the basis of the codified 
law. In case of the absence of any such law, he has to deliver his judgment on 
the basis of authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatawa. He, on the 
pretext of the silence of or deficiency of law in the matter, or its brevity or 
contradictory nature, cannot refrain from admitting and examining cases and 
delivering his judgment.”9  
Many different interpretations of this Article have been produced by the legal scholarship in 
Iran, whose consideration goes beyond the limited space of this essay.10 However, in short, it 
must be said that such provisions as Article 220 cannot but be viewed as incompatible with the 
principle of legality, and as such, signify an area in which the Iranian legislature has fallen 
short of creating a balance between sharia instructions and the modern imperatives of criminal 
law. 
2. Crimes punishable by qisas 
The definition of qisas as provided in Article 16 of the 2013 Code is as follows: “[q]isas is the 
main punishment for intentional bodily crimes against life, limbs, and abilities which shall be 
applied in accordance with Book One of this law”. Therefore, the punishment of qisas is 
rendered when at issue is the infliction of an intentional bodily injury. When it comes to crimes 
punishable by qisas, two types of crime must be distinguished: crimes punishable by qisas of 
limb, and those punishable by qisas of life. As regards the latter, the only crime punishable by 
qisas of life is murder; this literally means the death penalty, whilst ‘qisas of limb’ refers to the 
retributive infliction of bodily harm on the body of a convict who has committed a crime 
punishable by qisas of limb. 
 
8  PETERS RUDOLPH, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-First 
Century, Cambridge 2005, at 53.  
9  An official English translation of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is available at 
http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution.html, last accessed 28 December 2015.   
10  For a summary of these debates, see TELLENBACH SILVIA, Islamic Criminal Law, in: DUBBER MARKUS D./HÖRNLE TATJANA, 
The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law, Oxford 2014, 248-268, at 264.  
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3. Crimes punishable by diya (diyat) 
The same crimes susceptible to punishment by qisas can become liable to diyat if done in an 
unintentional manner. In Article 17, diyat is defined as follows: “[d]iya, whether fixed or 
unfixed, is monetary amount under holy Sharia which is determined by law and shall be paid 
for unintentional bodily crimes against life, limbs and abilities or for intentional crimes when 
for whatever reason qisas is not applicable”. 
4. Crimes punishable by ta’zir (ta’zirat) 
Generally, any crime not subsumed within the rubric of one of the categories mentioned above 
must be categorized as a ta’zirat crime (or a crime punishable by ta’zirat). As discerned above, 
crimes that come under the ambit of hadd, qisas and diyat are very limited in number, and 
normally signify wrongdoings specified in the sacred religious texts. Article 18 of the 2013 
Code defines ta’zirat as: 
“a punishment which does not fall under the categories of hadd, qisas, or diyat 
and is determined by law for commission of prohibited acts under Sharia or 
violation of state rules. The type, amount, conditions of execution as well as 
mitigation, suspension, cancellation and other relevant rules of ta’zir crimes 
shall be determined by law.” 
Therefore, criminalization of acts punishable by ta’zirat has less to do with the instructions of 
the holy sources than with the requirements of public order. As a result, this group of crimes 
can be said to have been created at the discretion of authorities. That said, to raise the 
satisfaction of the Assembly of Guardians tasked with approving legislations passed by the 
Iranian legislature on the basis of their compatibility with sharia law, the authors of the Islamic 
Penal Code made a distinction between two types of ta’zirat: ta’zirat prescribed by sharia law, 
and ta’zirat not prescribed by sharia law. The former consists of a very limited number of acts 
admonished and stigmatized in sharia law, such as sexual intercourse with one’s spouse 
during the fasting hours of Ramadan, for which there is no fixed punishment in sharia law.11 
Due to their insignificance and impractical nature, we shall not elaborate on ta’zirat prescribed 
by sharia law. Having provided a brief introduction to the categorization of offences in the 
2013 Code, it is time to embark on the main focus of this essay, and analyse the way in which 
the personal and the passive personality principles are conceived in the Iranian penal system. 
III. The Personal Principle: Definition and Limitations 
In the context of criminal law, the personal principle can be defined as extending the judicial 
jurisdiction of states vis-à-vis crimes committed outside their sovereign territory by nationals 
(active nationality principle).12 Articles 6 and 7 of the 2013 Code have accepted this basic 
definition, and have specified that subject to some limitations, discussed later in this essay, an 
Iranian national charged with committing a crime abroad can be prosecuted and punished in 
 
11  The Advisory Opinion of the General Legal Bureau of the Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 45, 28/05/92 available only in 
Persian.   
12  RYNGAERT, supra n. 5, at 102.  
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Iran. Not all states take nationality as the only basis for proceeding with the personal principle. 
Some states such as Finland, Denmark, Island, Liberia, Norway and Sweden go as far as 
subjecting their residents to the personal principle, too.13  
According to Iranian laws, in order for the personal principle to apply, an offender must hold 
Iranian nationality at the time of committing a crime. Therefore, acquiring or abandoning 
Iranian nationality in the aftermath of committing a crime would not influence the application 
of the personal principle.14 This is while the penal laws of some states have seen no problem in 
establishing jurisdiction over their nationals for crimes committed by them before their 
naturalization or even after removal of their nationality.15 Article 113-6 of the French Penal 
Code takes a rather similar approach and stipulates that the personal principle applies “even if 
the offender has acquired French nationality after the commission of the offence of which he is 
accused”.16 Section 2 of Article 7 of the German Criminal Code is also very similar to its French 
counterpart.17  
The personal principle is meant to fill the gaps that might otherwise have emerged from an 
exclusive reliance on the territorial principle. As a result, the application of the personal 
principle must be adjusted against the backdrop of the territorial principle, and the way this is 
achieved, is left to the subjective discretion of each state. Accordingly, some states have 
reserved a broader periphery of preconditions for applying the personal principle, and some 
have given more freedom to prosecutors and judges to prosecute and try an accused on the 
basis of the personal principle. All in all, it must be borne in mind that when it comes to the 
exercise of the personal principle in different jurisdictions, there is no uniform rule engraved in 
stone. Nonetheless, we briefly mention some of the general rules that, especially in states 
following the civil law tradition, are more often than not taken to govern the exercise of the 
personal principle. 
1. Seriousness of Crimes 
There has been a continuous debate among legal scholars as to whether or not the application 
of the personal principle must be confined to serious crimes. It has been said that applying the 
personal principle to non-serious crimes will only lead to the time and resources of the 
prosecuting state being wasted.18 This is particularly true when one takes note of the fact that 
such necessities as the collection of evidence are much more costly in cases concerning the 
personal principle. It is thus that in some states such as the UK, the application of the personal 
 
13  MALANCZUK PETER, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, London 1997, at 111.  
14  KHALEGHI ALI, Tahavolāt Qanūn Jadid Jazāy Islāmi Dar Mvured Qalamrū Makāni Qavānin Jazāyi (in Persian), [English: 
The Developments of the New Penal Code vis-à-vis the Territorial Scope of Criminal Laws], Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology Studies 2012, Vol. 1, 8-38, at 12. For the Romanization of Persian and Arabic words the authors used the Library 
of Congress transcription scheme. 
15  FAZEL MUHAMMAD, Almabādi Al'āmeh fi Tashri' Aljazāyi (in Arabic), [English: General Principles of Penal Legislation], 
Damascus 1976, at 136.    
16  An official English translation of the French Penal Code is available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Traductions/en-
English/Legifrance-translations, last accessed 28 December 2015. 
17  An official English translation of the German Criminal Code is available at http://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=752, 
last accessed 28 December 2015. 
18  WATSON GEOFFREY R., Offenders Abroad: the Case for Nationality-Based Criminal Jurisdiction, Yale Journal of 
International Law 1992, Vol. 17, 41-84, at 70. 
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principle is confined to a limited number of crimes such as treason, murder and bigamy.19 In 
the United States too, there has been a strong reluctance to exercise the personal principle save 
for crimes of such serious nature as treason.20 Article 113-6 of the French Penal Code implicitly 
excludes the personal principle from governing the cases of petty offences. Nonetheless, the 
French Penal Code has expanded the scope of the personal principle to govern 
misdemeanours. This extensive reading of the personal principle may seem liable to criticism. 
However, the prosecutorial discretion (infra) in France to determine whether to proceed with 
cases concerning the personal principle may compensate for this loose configuration of the 
personal principle. 
2. Double Criminality 
The act for prosecuting for which the personal principle is invoked must have been 
criminalized both in the lex loci delicti (the law of the place of commission of the crime) and in 
the place of its prosecution and trial. Absent this requirement, the personal principle cannot be 
relied upon in that, in such cases, neither the public order of where the crime is committed nor 
that of the perpetrator’s state of origin will be affected. In fact, if we accept that the rationale 
behind exercising the personal principle is to prevent criminals from escaping punishment, it 
would then be absurd to prosecute and try a person for an act not criminalized in the place it is 
committed.21 As a result, the principle of double criminality has found widespread acceptance 
as a precondition for applying the personal principle.22  
The principle of double criminality also figures in the penal codes of many states. For example, 
Article 7 of the Swiss Criminal Code,23 Section 12 of Norway’s General Penal Code24 and 
Section 7 of the German Criminal Code point to the application of the personal principle only 
when the act committed outside their territory is criminalized therein. The French Penal Code 
accepts this precondition only with regard to misdemeanours. Accordingly, when it comes to 
felonies, the French Penal Code applies in an “exclusive and unconditional”25 manner. On the 
first encounter, this formulation of Article 113-6 may seem rather strange in its partial 
deviation from the principle of double criminality. Yet, this provision reveals an important fact, 
that double criminality cannot be considered an absolute principle.26 On some occasions, states 
would rather give priority to their own penal laws, not least because they may consider their 
own formulations as regards the questions of criminalization and penalization better 
positioned to meet the requirements of their own public morals. That said, however, it cannot 
 
19  MALANCZUK, supra n. 13, at 111.   
20  WATSON, supra n. 18, at 40.   
21  FAZEL, supra n. 15, at 138.      
22  MULLAN GRAINNE, The Concept of Double Criminality in the Context of Extra Territorial Crimes, Criminal Law Review 
1997, 17-29.  
23  An unofficial English translation of the Swiss Criminal Code is available at https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-
compilation/19370083/201501010000/311.0.pdf, last accessed 28 December 2015. 
24  An official English translation of Norway’s Penal Code is available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/NOR_penal_code.pdf, last accessed 28 December 
2015. 
25  TRIPONEL ANNA, Comparative Corporate Responsibility in the United States and France for Human Rights Violations 
Abroad, in: MORRIS ANDREW P./ESTREICHER SAMUEL (Eds.), Global Labor and Employment Law for the Practicing Lawyer, 
The Hague 2010, 59-158, at 102. 
26  For a detailed discussion of the French law in this regard, see STEFANI GASTON/LEVASSEUR GEORGES/BOULOC BERNARD, 
Droit pénal général, Paris 2000, at 154.  
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be denied that the French conception of the personal principle is excessively broad, and 
therefore, open to criticism. 
3. The Prohibition of Double Jeopardy (ne bis in idem) 
For the purposes of applying the personal principle, observing the prohibition of double 
jeopardy is of utmost importance. It is fair to say that today the prohibition of double jeopardy 
has become more of a human rights principle than a principle of criminal law. So much so, that 
many human rights instruments have echoed this principle in one way or another.27 For 
example, Article 14(7) of the ICCPR states that “[n]o one shall be liable to be tried or punished 
again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance 
with the law and procedure of each country”.28 Of course, it must be noted that the principle of 
double jeopardy does not prohibit the resumption of a trial or a retrial ordered by a court of 
higher hierarchy.29 
4. The Return of the Accused to his Country of Origin 
Some states such as Iran view the presence of the accused in their territory as a precondition 
for exercising jurisdiction on the basis of the personal principle. This does not hold true for the 
French Penal Code, which permits trials in absentia in cases concerning the personal principle. 
Proceeding with prosecutions and trials without the presence of the accused definitely flies 
against the human rights requirement of fair trial. Notably, the use of trials in absentia is 
mostly allowed in countries that follow the civil law tradition.30 
5. Victim’s Complaint 
Article 113-8 of the French Penal Code stipulates that the prosecution of misdemeanours under 
Article 113-7 can only be initiated “at the behest of the public prosecutor [which] must be 
preceded by a complaint made by the victim, or his successor, or by an official accusation made 
by the authority where the offence was committed”. This precondition can significantly 
prevent an overload of prosecutions. This is notwithstanding the fact that in some penal 
systems such as Iran, most offences are considered public crimes, whose prosecution is not 
necessarily triggered by a private complaint.  
As was seen above, according to Article 113-8, “the behest of the public prosecutor” is a must 
for the prosecution of misdemeanours on the basis of the personal principle. To the extent that 
the authors of this essay have examined the penal codes of other states, it seems that the French 
Penal Code is rather unique in employing the element of prosecutorial discretion as a 
precondition for proceeding with the prosecution of misdemeanours.  
 
27  For a discussion of different dimensions to the prohibition of double jeopardy, see CRYER ROBERT ET AL., An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure, New York 2010, at 80–82. 
28  UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, Vol. 999, at 171. 
29  Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 32, Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair 
trial, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007).  
30  Prisoners Abroad (Factsheet), Trials in Absentia (2007) at 9.  
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The prosecutorial discretion in proceeding with the cases of misdemeanours committed abroad 
can preclude the unnecessary cases from being raised in the French penal system, and at the 
same time, this precondition can compensate for the lack of the condition of the presence of the 
accused in the French territory. For in such cases, the prosecutor can decide not to initiate 
prosecution following its discretionary determination that the presence of the accused is 
necessary in order for prosecution to take place. 
IV. Examining the Development of the Personal Principle in 
the Penal System of Iran 
Prior to the Islamic Revolution, Article 3(H) of the 1973 Code had set out five preconditions for 
the application of the personal principle in criminal courts: 1) the personal principle applies to 
offences for which the maximum punishment exceeds one year; 2) the act must be punishable 
under the laws of the country where it is committed; 3) the accused must not have been tried 
and exonerated in the country where he committed his crime, or in the case of his conviction, 
he has not either in part or in total served his sentence; 4) according to the laws of Iran, or the 
country in which the offence has been committed, there must be no cause for waiving the 
prosecution or abolishing the punishment for the accused. To these preconditions must be 
added the presence of the accused within the sovereign borders of Iran mentioned at the 
beginning of Article 3(H). It goes without saying that the content of Article 3(H) signified a 
restrictive formulation for the application of the personal principle, which was extremely 
compatible with the general principles of criminal law, such as the prohibition of double 
jeopardy and double criminality. However, in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, 
this standard configuration was replaced by a very expansive version of the personal principle. 
Accordingly, Article 7 of the 1991 Code stated that “[i]n addition to the cases mentioned in 
articles 5 and 6, any Iranian who commits a crime outside Iran and is found in Iran shall be 
punished in accordance with the criminal laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran”. As can be seen, 
of all the preconditions stipulated in the 1973 Code, the only one that found a place in the 1991 
Code was the presence of the accused. This loose formulation of the application of the personal 
principle was criticized by some Iranian scholars.31 The result was that in 2013, the Iranian 
legislature revised the standards governing the personal principle, and imposed other 
prerequisites upon its application. According to Article 7 of the 2013 Code:  
“any Iranian national who commits a crime outside Iran and is found in, or 
extradited to, Iran shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the 
laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran, provided that:  
a)  The committed conduct is deemed an offense under the law of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.  
 
31  POORBAFRANI HASSAN, Barresi Tatbiqi Onsor Tab'iat Dar Tos'h Qalamrū Makāni Hoqūq Jazā (in Persian) [English: A 
Comparative Study of the Role of Nationality in Expanding the Territorial Scope of Criminal Codes], in: SAFAEI SEYED 
HUSSAIN (Ed.), Tā'molāti Dar Hoqūq Tatbiqi (in Persian) [English: General Thoughts on Comparative Law], Tehran 2007, 345-
360, at 350.  
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b)  If the committed crime is punishable by ta’zir, the accused person is not 
tried and acquitted in the place of the commission of the crime, or in the 
case of conviction the punishment is not, wholly or partly, carried out 
against him. 
c) According to Iranian laws there is no basis for removal or discontinuation of 
prosecution or discontinuation or cancellation of execution of the 
punishment.” 
At first blush, when compared to the 1991 Code, it seems that three other prerequisites have 
been added to that of the presence of the accused in the 2013 Code, namely, the prohibition of 
double jeopardy, double criminality and the existence of a legal basis for initiating a 
prosecution according to Iranian laws. Nevertheless, a closer examination of Article 7 reveals 
that it is only the precondition of double jeopardy that comes to govern the application of the 
personal principle in the criminal jurisprudence of Iran. This calls for an illustration of these 
three preconditions as they appear in the 2013 Code. 
1. The Precondition of Double Criminality 
As a general rule, when penal codes of different states mention the term ‘offence’, they mean 
the particular mode in which it is defined, characterized and criminalized by their own 
national laws. This is because the domestic penal codes mean to protect the functioning values 
of the country in which they operate. The Iranian Penal Codes are no exception in this regard. 
Thus, the concept of ‘crime’ in the clause ‘any Iranian national who commits a crime outside 
Iran’ as manifested at the beginning of Article 7 generally refers to an act recognized as such in 
the context of the Iranian national laws. The problem is that this standard reading of Article 7 
renders redundant the precondition imposed by Article 7(a): “the committed conduct is 
deemed an offense under the law of the Islamic Republic of Iran”. Obviously, it is neither 
reasonable nor acceptable to prosecute and try a person for an act not deemed an offence 
within the jurisdiction of Iran. Reasonably, the criminal laws of many states support the 
principle of double criminality, which implies that prosecuting an act requires its 
criminalization where it is committed as well as where it stands trial. Therefore, Article 7(a) 
states the obvious, and as such, no weight can be assigned to its content.  
However, one may say that it is possible to interpret Article 7 in a different way, and it can be 
argued that its opening phrase epitomizes the criminality of an act in the place where it is 
committed. If read in this light, Article 7(a) can no longer be considered redundant and 
becomes an implicit articulation of the principle of double criminality. In other words, if an 
Iranian national commits a criminal act in a foreign jurisdiction, the Iranian courts can have 
jurisdiction over trying the accused, provided that his act is deemed to be criminal in Iran. 
However, it seems that this interpretation is also ridden with serious problems. Firstly, if one 
pays attention to Article 8(b) of the 2013 Code, the natural conclusion is that the Iranian law-
makers had not committed Article 7(a) to hint at the principle of double criminality. According 
to Article 8(b), “[i]n the case of crimes punishable by ta’zir, the committed conduct is deemed 
an offense under the law of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the law of the place of the 
commission”. 
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The Assembly of Guardians, whose task is to monitor the compatibility of the parliamentary 
enactments with sharia law and to provide interpretative guidelines for the state’s laws, has 
discerned that the general application of Article 8(b) contradicts the Islamic prescriptions on 
punishments,32 although it has not identified such contradiction for Article 7(a). Secondly, it 
would be generally very bizarre if one were to interpret the phrase ‘the committed conduct’ in 
Article 7(a) to mean an act criminalized in the penal laws of foreign states. As mentioned 
above, this is not an acceptable form of authoring or interpreting penal codes.   
In any case, it seems that selecting each of the interpretations discussed above can create 
unresolvable problems. If choosing the first interpretation, one cannot fail to arrive at the 
conclusion that Article 7(a) is redundant in its entirety. At the same time, the second 
interpretation signifies a deviation from the standard way in which the penal codes of different 
states are authored. Yet, it must be noted that the second interpretation accommodates the 
standards of international criminal law in a better fashion. Therefore, it seems necessary to 
amend Article 7(a), and rewrite it in a way that resembles Article 8(b), and this will be 
discussed below. 
2. The Principle of Double Jeopardy 
The inclusion of double jeopardy is the only uncontroversial development built into the 2013 
Code as regards the personal principle.33 Double jeopardy has become an important safeguard 
for protecting the rights of individuals in the field of international human rights.34 According to 
this principle, respecting fairness and justice requires that an accused be held judicially 
responsible for an illegal action only once. Article 7(b) posits that “[i]f the committed crime is 
punishable by ta’zir, the accused person is not tried and acquitted in the place of the 
commission of the crime, or in the case of conviction the punishment is not, wholly or partly, 
carried out against him”. As a result, if an Iranian national commits a crime outside Iran, and is 
subjected to trial and punishment there, he cannot be tried and punished in Iran again. 
However, if he has not served punishment either in part or in total, it is possible to bring him 
before an Iranian court on another occasion. Obviously, in a scenario where the sentence of a 
convict is only partly carried out, it will not be the Iranian judiciary’s responsibility to carry out 
the unexecuted part of the sentence. Rather, in these cases, the Iranian judiciary must establish 
a new trial for the accused to be tried in accordance with Iranian criminal laws. This is because, 
save for some exceptional cases such as the international agreements on the transfer of persons 
sentenced to terms of imprisonment in foreign countries, states do not execute the sentences of 
those convicted in foreign jurisdictions.35 However, an Iranian judge can reduce the 
punishment of those who have served part of their sentence abroad by invoking the 
diminutive factors of punishment articulated in Article 22 of the Islamic Penal Code of 2013.  
 
32  The interpretive guidelines of the Assembly of Guardians is available at http://www.shora-gc.ir/Portal/Home/, last 
accessed 28 December 2015. 
33  RAHMDEL MANSOUR, The "ne bis in idem" rule in Iranian Criminal Law, Journal of Financial Crimes 2004, Vol. 11, 277-281, 
at 277.  
34  KIRBY MICHAEL, Carroll, Double Jeopardy and International Human Rights Law, Criminal Law Journal 2003, Vol. 27, 231-
276, at 269.  
35  CRYER, supra n. 27, at 105.  
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However, the principle of double jeopardy in the Iranian courts is respected only insofar as its 
application relates to ta’zirat, whose specific cases and punishments are not prescribed in 
sharia law. Hence, when at issue are offences of the kind susceptible to such types of 
punishments as hodood, qisas and diyat, and ta’zirat prescribed by sharia law, Article 7(2) 
cannot generally be applied. This means, for example, if an Iranian national accused of murder 
is tried and punished in England, he can be subjected to another trial and punishment in Iran 
for the same crime upon his return to Iran, since his crime is punishable by qisas. Needless to 
say, this cannot be deemed acceptable either from the vantage point of penal law standards or 
those of international human rights law. However, this unacceptable delimitation of the 
prohibition of double jeopardy signifies a more serious problem within the genus of criminal 
laws in Iran. That is to say, in the wake of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, a constant 
preoccupation of the legislature in Iran has been to strike a balance between the modern 
standards of penal law codification and the imperatives of Islamic criminal law. Yet on many 
occasions, this balance has easily been lost, and as a result, shallow rules have emerged.36 The 
blame cannot here be solely put on the Iranian legislature, because the Parliament is compelled 
to pass laws that meet the Islamic standards as identified by the Guardian Council. More often 
than not, the Guardian Council applies a strict scrutiny test to the parliamentary drafts, and in 
the case of detecting an area of incompatibility, returns the said drafts to the Parliament for 
reconsideration. The Guardian Council exercised a controversially harsh standard of review to 
the 2013 Code.37 
3. The Existence of a Legal Basis for Prosecution 
As was mentioned above, Article 7(c) stated that “[a]ccording to Iranian laws there is no basis 
for removal or discontinuation of prosecution or discontinuation or cancellation of execution of 
the punishment”. Much in the same way as Article 7(a), this section also states the obvious, and 
its inclusion in the 2013 Code seems to have served no purpose. Obviously, the criminal courts 
in Iran are bound to follow the Iranian penal laws, and there is no need to emphasize this 
simple fact of prosecution and criminal adjudication any further. Interestingly, unlike 
Article 7(a), it is impossible to devise a reading of Article 7(c) that would give meaning and 
utility to its content.  
This unusual way of legislating the issue of personal jurisdiction is very telling in that it shows 
that the question of prerequisites for the application of personal jurisdiction in Iran has long 
been neglected, and now that the Iranian law-makers have come to address this issue, they 
have created conceptual chaos in formulating the contours of the personal principle. 
Furthermore, the 2013 Code has clearly not established sufficient preconditions for the 
application of the personal principle. For example, the Code in question has not made any 
distinction between different types of offences for the purposes of applying the personal 
 
36  In the larger context of the Iranian criminal justice system, some Iranian scholars have argued that reaching a balanced 
position with regard to both sharia law and modern standards of criminal justice is an impossible project, since these two 
regimes are incompatible in nature. In this regard, SANEI writes: “we have a constructed image of sharia law, and have not 
but entrapped ourselves within the walls of this image, which we have mistaken for the sharia proper”, SANE'I P., Hoqūq 
Jazāye Omūmi (in Persian) [English: General Criminal Law], Tehran 2003, at 22.   
37  TAVANA MOHAMMAD H., Three Decades of Islamic Criminal Law Legislation in Iran: Legislative History Analysis with 
Emphasis on the Amendments of the 2013 Islamic Penal Code, Electronic Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 2014, 
Vol. 2, 24-38, at 29.  
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principle. The principle of double criminality is totally neglected, and the prohibition of double 
jeopardy has only been partly accepted. Unfortunately, the authors of the 2013 Code did not 
avail themselves to other states’ experience of criminal legislation, and chose not to include the 
two preconditions of victim’s complaint and the behest of the public prosecutor as they appear 
in the French Penal Code. Importantly, these two preconditions do not seem to have been at 
odds with the dictates of sharia law. 
V. The Passive Personality Principle: Definition and 
Limitations 
The application of the passive personality principle also results in an extension of the 
legislative and jurisdiction of states vis-à-vis crimes committed outside their sovereign 
territory. The judicial invocation of this principle has not been devoid of criticism.38 However, 
notwithstanding these criticisms, the passive personality principle has secured a place in the 
criminal laws of many states such as France, Germany, Brazil, Greece, Turkey and Mexico.39 
Notably, most of the preconditions and limitations governing the exercise of the personal 
principle also usually come to regulate the application of the passive personality principle. 
As was said above, the application of the passive personality principle cannot be done in an 
unfettered manner. For example, Section 5 of the Criminal Code of Finland has limited the 
application of the passive personality principle to offences “punishable by imprisonment for 
more than six months”.40 Section 7 of the German Criminal Code puts an emphasis on the 
prerequisite of the double criminality for applying the passive personality principle, and the 
French Penal Code has excluded petty offences from the application of the passive personality 
principle, and confines the exercise of this jurisdictional base to felonies and misdemeanours 
punishable by imprisonment. Apart from the exclusion of petty offences, Articles 113-8 and 
113-9 have added other preconditions for the exercise of the passive personality principle in 
France. Article 113-8 holds that 
“[i]n the cases set out under articles 113-6 and 113-7, the prosecution of 
misdemeanors may only be instigated at the behest of the public prosecutor. It 
must be preceded by a complaint made by the victim or his successor, or by an 
official accusation made by the authority of the country where the offence was 
committed.” 
As was remarked earlier in this essay, this procedural precondition bestows a prosecutorial 
discretion upon the public prosecutor by which to block the entry of unnecessary and 
insignificant cases into the French criminal justice system on the basis of either the personal or 
the passive personality principle.  
 
38  The Lotus Case (1927), PCIJ, Ser A, No.10.  
39  SØRENSEN MAX, Manual of Public International Law, New York 1968, at 368.  
40  An unofficial English translation of the Penal Code of Finland is available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5614.html, last accessed 28 December 2015. 
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Also, Article 113-9 refers to the principle of double jeopardy and prohibits the prosecution and 
punishment of those already tried and sentenced in foreign jurisdictions, and finally, in a 
similar manner to the practice of personal jurisdiction, the French Penal Code has not viewed 
the presence of an accused person in the French territory as a must for exercising the passive 
personality principle. However, as was discussed earlier, this deficiency can be compensated 
by the prosecutorial discretion in initiating a prosecution. Notwithstanding the prosecutorial 
discretion, the French conception of the passive personality principle has been criticized for 
providing “jurisdiction to the broadest extent possible under the passive personality 
principle”.41 Of course, this criticism seems justified when one considers that the requirement 
of double criminality is also absent in Article 113-9. In the United States, one sees a much 
narrower construction of the passive personality principle. Before the 1970s, the passive 
personality principle had been granted no place in the criminal laws of the United States.42 
However, subsequent to joining treaties on terrorism, some new laws were enacted to 
incorporate the passive personality principle into the criminal jurisprudence of the United 
States.43 Undoubtedly, the formulation of the passive personality principle in the United States 
signifies the narrow end of the spectrum when compared to the manner conceived in the 
French Penal Code. 
1. The Passive Personality Principle in the 2013 Code 
The 2013 Code must be considered the first textual base in the context of the Iranian criminal 
laws to give effect to the passive personality principle. According to Article 8 of this code:  
“When a non-Iranian person outside Iran commits a crime other than those 
mentioned in previous articles against an Iranian person or the Iranian State 
and is found in, or extradited to, Iran, his crime shall be dealt with in 
accordance with the criminal laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran, provided 
that: 
a) in the case of crimes punishable by ta’zir, the accused person is not tried 
and acquitted in the place of commission of the crime, or in the case of 
conviction, the punishment is not, wholly or partly, carried out against 
him; 
b) in the case of crimes punishable by ta’zir, the committed conduct is 
deemed an offence under the law of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
law of the place of the commission.” 
The following will scrutinize the strengths and flaws of the conception of the passive 
personality in the Islamic Penal Code of 2013.  
 
41  MCCARTHY JOHN G., The Passive Personality Principle and Its Use in Combating Terrorism, Fordham International Law 
Journal 1989, Vol. 13, 298-327, at 314.  
42  LOWENFELD ANDREAS F., U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, American Journal of 
International Law 1989, Vol. 83, 880-893, at 887.  
43  WATSON GEOFFREY R., The Passive Personality Principle, Texas International Law Journal 1993, Vol. 28, 1-46, at 3.   
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Unlike the chaotic formulation of the personality principle, the passive personality principle in 
Article 8 of the 2013 Code takes a more coherent shape. As a result, the limitations reserved for 
the application of the passive personality principle make a much clearer appearance in 
Article 8. As is clear from the text of Article 8, these limitations are: 1) the prohibition of trials 
in absentia; 2) the prohibition of double jeopardy; and 3) the requirement of double criminality. 
Especially with regard to the requirement of double criminality in Article 8, the drafters of the 
2013 Code have employed a precise language pre-empting any misunderstanding of this 
requirement, which, as was examined above, is missing in Article 7(a). 
Another strength of Article 8 lies in its use of the opening phrase “a non-Iranian person”. Two 
important points immediately come to mind as regards this choice of language. Firstly, the 
invocation of the term ‘person’ instead of ‘individual’ reveals that other types of legal entities 
(such as corporations) can also be deemed to be responsible for committing offences, thereby 
being brought before a trial on the basis of the passive personality principle. The second point 
is that the reach of the passive personality principle cannot be stretched to include Iranian 
offenders committing offences outside the Iranian borders, as this must come under the ambit 
of the personality principle. Excluding the Iranian nationals from the scope of Article 8 must be 
commended, since if an Iranian national falls victim to the crimes of another Iranian outside 
the sovereign borders of Iran, the personal principle can better protect the rights of the Iranian 
victim, not least because there are fewer constraints put on the exercise of the personal 
principle. Of course, this is not a general formula, and based on their particular conception of 
jurisdictional bases, states can choose to apply the passive personality principle when both the 
offender and the victim hold their nationality. 
Of particular relevance in this regard is the way the French Penal Code has conceived the 
passive personality principle. According to the French Penal Code, the passive personality 
principle applies to the cases where both victims and offenders in extra-territorial scenarios are 
French. However, it has rightly been argued that the French Penal Code takes too generous an 
approach towards the passive personality principle.44 Also, Article 8 employs the term “an 
Iranian person” to describe the victims of crimes committed abroad subject to the passive 
personality principle, which moves one to conclude that the application of this jurisdictional 
base is not confined to natural persons. Rather, the application of the passive personality 
principle must cover other legal entities as well. This is a more precise description of the 
victims of crimes committed abroad in comparison to the penal codes of other states. For 
example, Article 7(1) of the German Penal Code states that “German criminal law shall apply 
to offences committed abroad against a German, if the act is a criminal offence at the locality of 
its commission or if that locality is not subject to any criminal jurisdiction”. Here, one can 
rightly ask if the term ‘a German’ encompasses legal entities as well as natural persons. 
A similar issue has come to the surface with regard to Article 7 of the Swiss Criminal Code, 
where the application of the passive personality principle is conditioned upon the victims 
being ‘Swiss’. In both Switzerland and Germany, a lengthy debate has ensued over whether 
corporate entities must be considered as being within the meaning of ‘German’ or ‘Swiss’ for 
 
44  For a more detailed analysis of the French law in this regard, see CAFRITZ ERIC/TENE OMER, Article 113-7 of the French 
Penal Code: The Passive Personality Principle, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 2003, Vol. 41, 285-599, at 587–588.  
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the purposes of exercising the passive personality principle.45 This is while the drafters of the 
2013 Code have avoided the hassle of this question by coining a clear terminology. 
2. Flaws of Article 8 
On close scrutiny, one can also detect some flaws in the text of Article 8, for example, where it 
speaks of committing a crime “against the Iranian state”, since one wonders to what end this 
phrase has found an expression in Article 8. The unfortunate appearance of this phrase is both 
redundant and harmful, since if it means to allude to the protective principle, Article 5 of the 
code in question had already done that job, and there was no need to repeat this principle in a 
place dedicated to another jurisdictional base. This misplacement of the phrase “against the 
Iranian state” is also harmful, because it may confuse one as to the application of the protective 
principle. The exercise of the protective principle is not normally governed by as many 
constraints as the personal and the passive personality principles. Indeed, states prefer to save 
a free reign for themselves when it comes to prosecuting crimes giving rise to the protective 
principle. This is due to the fact that the protective principle targets crimes endangering the 
vital interests of states, which in turn, moves these entities to make no compromise on the 
exercise of this principle.46 As a result, the sudden use of the phrase “against the Iranian state” 
may mislead one to conclude that the exercise of the protective principle is limited by the same 
preconditions as those governing the passive personality principle.  
Another weakness of Article 8 is its peculiar invocation of the prohibition of double jeopardy. 
While stating the prohibition of double jeopardy, Article 8(a) puts the condition of the accused 
not having been tried and acquitted in the place of commission of the crime. Here, one may 
legitimately ask: what if an accused is tried and acquitted in a forum other than the place of 
commission of the crime? Of course, the scope of the prohibition of double jeopardy cannot be 
considered as limited such as to only govern situations where an accused is tried in the place 
where his alleged crimes are committed. Suppose a French citizen commits a crime against an 
Iranian national in France and he is tried for that same crime in Lebanon, and serves his 
punishment wholly or partly therein. Given this, would it be reasonable for an Iranian court to 
proceed with his trial and conviction by invoking Article 8(a) and on the basis that he is not 
tried, convicted or acquitted in France. This would vigorously slap common sense, and fly 
against any known principle of fairness and justice in the sphere of penal law. Yet, an 
overzealous textual reading of Article 8(a) leaves the door open for prosecuting those already 
convicted or acquitted in the judicial forums of countries other than the place of commission of 
crimes.  
Another defect of the conception of the passive personality principle in Article 8 lies in 
reserving such limitations as the prohibition of double jeopardy and the principle of double 
criminality only “for crimes punishable by ta’zir”. Therefore, these preconditions cannot 
regulate the exercise of the passive personality principle for crimes punishable by hodood, 
qisas and diyat. Of course, this unfortunate jurisdictional expansion has far-reaching 
implications, being not only confined to the passive personality principle in Iran, but also 
 
45  ECHLE REGULA, The Passive Personality Principle and the General Principle of Ne Bis In Idem, Utrecht Law Review 2013, 
Vol. 9, 56-67, at 61.    
46  CASSESE ANTONIO (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, Oxford 2009, at 274.   
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governing the application of the personal principle as well. From the perspective of the general 
principles of penal law, such an approach is utterly unacceptable, and violates the most 
elementary principles of fair trial as recognized in the domains of penal law and international 
human rights law. What is more, the drafters of the 2013 Code have excluded ta’zir offences 
prescribed by sharia law from the limitations set out in Article 8. As was explained above, such 
deviations from the international standards of criminal justice take their cue from law-makers’ 
failure to strike a balance between the modern imperatives of criminal justice and those of 
sharia law. 
VI. Conclusion 
It is not uncommon for states (especially those belonging to the civil law tradition) to resort to 
the personal and the passive personality principles to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction over 
crimes committed outside their sovereign borders. However, an unhinged practice of these two 
jurisdictional bases can clash with the principle of sovereignty, and at the same time, 
undermine the highly respected maxims of criminal law. Therefore, any nationality-based 
claim to jurisdiction must be predicated upon meeting some pre-determined requirements. For 
better or worse, due to the diverse approach of states to these requirements, it is not always 
easy to stipulate a uniform list for them. Yet, such prohibitive principles such as double 
criminality and double jeopardy can be taken as a minimum yardstick for constraining the 
exercise of the personal and the passive personality principles. Against this background, the 
Iranian encounter with the personal and the passive personality principles as manifested in the 
2013 Code is neither a success nor a complete failure. It is not a failure because compared to its 
predecessors, the 2013 Code at least on the surface acknowledges the existence of some 
preconditions governing the personal principle, and for the first time in the aftermath of the 
1979 Revolution, purports to regulate the passive personality principle. Nonetheless, the 
formulation these two jurisdictional bases are configured in the 2013 Code is punctuated by 
some conspicuous fallacies.  
It was seen above that as regards to the personal principle, Article 7 had been formulated in so 
strange a form as to render all preconditions other than the prohibition of double jeopardy 
totally meaningless. This is while the appearance of Article 7 moves one to think that the 
Iranian law-makers had actually intended to set out some other preconditions for the exercise 
of the personal principle. However, the chaotic conceptual architecture of Article 7 fails to 
drive its intended result home. 
Furthermore, the preconditions governing the personal and the passive personality principles 
are entirely lifted when it comes to the crimes punishable by hodood, qisas and diyat. It is true 
that when compared to the crimes punishable by ta’zirat, these categories of crimes signify a 
much smaller group. Still, it is not acceptable for the 2013 Code to ignore some of the most 
primary rules of criminal justice, such as the precondition of double jeopardy. As was argued 
above, extra-territorial jurisdiction represents an area in which the legislature is yet to render 
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Abstract 
The foundation of an Islamic country and the implementation of Islamic laws were the primary goals of the Iranian 
Islamic Revolution of 1979. Many laws and regulations were changed and revised in order to conform to Shari’ah 
law. Therefore, one of the most critical laws adopted after the Revolution and rooted in Shari’ah law, which strictly 
forbids riba (interest), is the Riba-Free Banking Act of 1983. After three decades, a case can be made that it is has 
not been entirely successful in eliminating riba from Iran’s banking system. While all Iranian banks allegedly follow 
the prohibition of riba, in practice they cannot afford to fully adopt the Islamic doctrine in this manner. With 
practical work experience in a financial institution in Iran, I thoroughly understand the distance between theory 
and the reality of the riba-free banking system in Iran. Specifically, with study and review of term investment 
deposit accounts, we argue that post-revolutionary changes in the banking system of Iran did not result in the so-
called elimination of riba from Iran’s financial structure. Iranian banks continue to pay a fixed and predetermined 
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Foundation of an entirely functional Islamic country and the implementation of Islamic laws 
were the primary goals of the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979. Precipitant process of 
Islamization of Iran started right after the fall of the Shah of Persia. Necessary measures were 
taken to build an Islamic country. Many laws and regulations were changed and revised in 
order to conform and harmonize with Shari’ah law. Shari’ah law provides directions for all 
spheres of Muslim life including daily affairs, matrimony, rituals, politics, and family 
obligations and, of course, provides instructions for financial activities as well. Therefore, 
Shari’ah plays an indispensable role in the governance of banking activities in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. One of the most important and critical laws adopted after the Revolution that 
was rooted in Shari’ah law, forbidding riba (interest) is the Riba-Free Banking Act of 1983. The 
Act is drawn up so as to ensure that the banking system of Iran complies with Shari’ah rules. 
After three decades of its adoption, a case can be made that it is not entirely successful in 
eliminating riba from the Iran’s banking system. While all of the banks and financial 
institutions in Iran allegedly follow the prohibition of riba, in practice they cannot afford to 
fully adopt the Islamic doctrine in this manner. With actual work experience in a financial 
institution in Iran, I thoroughly understand the distance between theory and practice of the 
riba-free banking system in Iran. Specifically, with the study and review of the term investment 
deposit accounts, we argue that post-revolutionary changes in the banking system of Iran did 
not result in the so-called elimination of riba from the country’s financial structure. Iranian 
banks continue to pay a fixed and predetermined interest known by a new phrase: ‘provisional 
profit’. 
In the first part of this paper, we briefly define riba and its prohibition in Islam and expound on 
the Riba-Free Banking Act of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Muslim and non-Muslim scholars 
have written ad nauseam in this regard, and different aspects of riba and Islamic banking have 
been described in detail.1 However, the fact that Iran’s banking system continues to follow 
interest-based banking and how it found a way to circumvent the Act has never been studied. 
Accordingly in the second part of this paper, we exclusively study term investment deposit 
accounts. 
II. Riba 
The word riba means ‘increase’ as interpreted by Imam Razi. It corresponds to the word 
‘interest’ as defined by Webster's New World Dictionary.2 In both cases, increase refers to the 
amount beyond what is owed.3 In Arabic language, riba, is also known as ‘usury’, which means 
excess or addition, an effortless profit, the ‘premium’ that must be paid by the borrower to the 
 
1  For further study, see: THOMAS ABDULKADER, Interest in Islamic Economics: Understanding Riba, London/New York 
2006; RAHMAN FAZLUR, Riba and Interest, Islamic Studies 1964, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1-43; AHMAD ZIAUDDIN, The Theory of 
Riba, Islamic Studies 1978, Vol. 17, No. 4, 171-185. 
2  As defined by Webster’s New World Dictionary, interest means: “a charge for borrowed money generally a percentage 
of the amount borrowed”. 
3  SIDDIEQ NOORZOY M., Islamic Laws on Riba (Interest) and Their Economic Implications, International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 1982, Vol. 14, No. 1, 3-17, at 3. 
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lender along with the principal amount as a condition for the loan or for an extension of its 
maturity, a tool of oppression, and a means to unjustly take the money of others by exploiting 
their needs and circumstances.4 Prohibition of riba is one of the core subjects and distinctive 
features of Islamic beliefs and is widely reflected in the Holy Qurʾan and Hadiths.5 The 
prohibition of riba is mentioned in four different chapters (Sura) in the Holy Qurʾan. These are 
Sura Al-Baqara (Chapter 2: verses 275 – 280), Sura Al-Imran (Chapter 2: verses 130 – 132), Al- 
Nisa (Chapter 4: verse 161), and Al- Rum (Chapter 30: verse 39). To avoid rehash, we mention 
just two important verses in this context:6 
“And if you do not [abandon what remains of usury], then be informed of a 
war from Allah and His apostle. And if you repent, then you will have your 
principal, neither harming others, nor suffering harm.”7 
“And for their taking usury though they had been forbidden from it and for 
eating up the wealth of the people wrongfully. And We have prepared for the 
faithless among them a painful punishment.”8 
There are also many Hadiths on the prohibition of riba. 
“The Prophet said: riba has seventy segments, the least serious being 
equivalent to a man committing adultery with his own mother.”9 
“The Prophet said: the receiver and the payer of riba, the one who records it 
and the witness to the transaction, they are all alike in guilt of this sin.”10 
By studying the Holy Qurʾan and Hadiths, we note that the attitude of Islam toward riba is far 
harsher than for other sins such as adultery, alcohol consumption, gambling, cruelty, and 
murder11 in so far as it is considered blasphemy and receivers of riba have been declared to be 
at war against Allah and Mohammad (His Messenger). The Holy Qurʾan provides no 
explanation as to why riba is prohibited, and different reasons have been purported by Islamic 
scholars and jurisprudence throughout history. In this paper, the reason behind the prohibition 
of riba is not discussed. 
 
 
4  BOTIS SORINA, Shari’ah Concepts in Islamic Banking, Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Braşov, Series V: 
Economic Sciences 2013, Vol. 6 (55) No. 2, 139-146. 
5  A collection of traditions containing sayings of the prophet Muhammad, which constitute a major source of guidance for 
Muslims apart from the Qurʾan. 
6  The verses are from The Holy Qurʾan: Translation and Commentary (1934) by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. 
7  Sura Al-Baqara, Chapter 2: Verse 278. 
8  Sura Al-Nisa, Chapter 4: Verse 161. 
9  AL-AAMILI SHAIKH AL-HUR, الشریعهُمسائلَُتحصیلُالیُالشیعهُوسائلُتفصیلُ   (Wasā'il al-Shīʿa), Qom 
1993, Vol. 18, at 122. 
10  AL-AAMILI, supra n. 9, at 126. 
11  HUSSAYN TABATABAEI MUHAMMAD (Allameh Tabatabaei), المیزانُتفسیر  (Tafsir al-Mizan), Qom 1417 AH, 
Vol. 2, at 628. 
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III. Riba-Free Banking Act of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Gradually, after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the nationalization of Iranian banks,12 
reception of any kind of interest faded away from Iran’s financial system. With the adoption of 
Iran’s Riba-Free Banking Act in 1983, for the first time in modem history, the Islamization of 
the banking system was implemented in the financial sector of the economy as a whole.13 As 
Ayatollah H. Rafsanjani expressed, “this Act was adopted to found a system of riba-free 
banking in the Muslim world.”14 However, after three decades, the major question still looms 
large as to whether this Act has been able to go beyond the idea of Islamic banking and 
implement Islamic principles in Iran’s banking system. In this paper, we argue that the Riba-
Free Banking Act has failed to fulfill its duty in practice and riba emerged in Iran’s banking 
system, with a new face called provisional profit. Later, using empirical examples of term 
investment deposits and the provisions currently being used by the banks and financial 
institutions in Iran, we argue that this so-called provisional profit is riba in the context of 
Islamic finance. 
The first chapter of the Riba-Free Banking Act expresses the goals and duties of the banking 
system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Sections 8 and 9 of Art. 2 of this chapter relate directly to 
our discussion. They state that: 
“[…] 
8. [Banks have the duties of] Opening of various Gharz-al-hasaneh (current 
and savings) accounts and accepting Term Investment Deposits and issuance 
of relevant certificates, as required by the Act and the regulations.  
9. [Banks have the duties of] Granting of loans and credits free of riba charges 
in accordance with the Act and the regulations.” 
These two sections of Art. 2 perfectly describe and define the core functions of banks as 
financial intermediaries in Iran’s financial system. Religious philosophy aside, from a 
functionalist perspective, there is no difference between Iranian banking and conventional 
banking. In both systems, banks raise funds by opening different types of accounts and taking 
deposits and grant these funds to those who need them. The difference lies within the 
implementation of these functions. In contrast to conventional banking, when performing their 
roles, Iranian banks must follow the Islamic principle on the prohibition of interest and 
Qurʾanic injunctions against riba. Obviously, prohibition of riba has a major effect on both 
classic functions of banks. In the next section, we closely study the concept of term investment 
deposits as a common tool for the mobilization of monetary resources and examine how 
Iranian banks cope with the Islamic principle in practice. 
 
12  Nationalization of Banks Act approval by Revolutionary Council dated June 1979. 
13  VALIBEIGI MEHRDAD, Banking and Credit Rationing Under the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian Studies 1992, Vol. 25, 
No. 3/4 , 51-65, at 56. 
14  KASHANI MAHMOOD, ایرانُبانکداریُقانونُهایچالش  (Problems in the Iran’s Banking Law), Legal Research 
Journal 2005, Vol. 42, 11-68, at 23. 
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IV. Term Investment Deposits 
Art. 3 of the Riba-Free Banking Act authorizes Iranian banks to accept deposits under each of 
the following titles: (A) Gharz-al-hasaneh Deposits: 1-current and 2-savings and (B) term 
investment deposits. According to this article, term investment deposits, for which the bank 
enjoys the power of attorney for their utilization, shall be used in Mosharka, Mozarebeh, hire-
purchase, installment transactions, Mozara-ah, Mosaqat, direct investment, forward dealings, 
and Joaalah transactions. Art. 5 states that the profit from said transactions (the ennealogy 
Islamic contracts), proportional to the duration and amount of the investment deposit, should 
be divided among the owners after deduction of the bank’s expenses and fees.  
Thus, on the basis of the above provisions of this Act, Iranian banks, under the terms of the 
agency contract, act as agents of the depositors to invest the deposited funds in said 
transactions (the ennealogy Islamic contracts). Upon completion of the contract period and 
final calculation, the profits (losses) are shared between the agent (the bank) and the 
entrepreneur. Therefore, the bank’s profits and consequently the profits of their client (the 
depositor) are not at all assured or secured. For example, when opening a long-term 
investment deposit with Saman Bank (a famous privately owned Iranian bank), under the 
conditions of the long-term investment deposit account: 
“Saman Bank as the agent of the long-term investment depositor, with full 
power of substitution, in accordance with the Riba-Free Banking Act can invest 
the depositor’s funds. The profit of said investment after the deduction of the 
bank’s fees, conforming to the relevant regulations and rules and proportional 
to the duration and amount of the investment deposit, shall be paid to the 
depositor or his substitute.”  
Further, according to the conditions for long-term investment deposit account stipulated by 
Bank Maskan (an Iranian government-owned bank): 
“Bank Maskan, on behalf of and as an agent of the depositor, use the deposited 
funds in accordance with the Riba-Free Banking Act and the profit, conforming 
to the relevant regulations and rules, will be paid, with the right of 
compromise, proportional to the duration and amount of the deposited fund.” 
All Iranian banks and financial institutions have the same clause in their agency contracts with 
more or less similar wording. 
Most Islamic contracts are based on profit-and-loss-sharing (PLS) and not on a lender-borrower 
relationship, and Islamic law demands that the provider of funds should share the risk with 
the entrepreneur if he wishes to earn a profit.15 There are no guarantees that there will always 
be a profit in most of the said contracts. The PLS scheme is inherently risky while bank 
investment depositors are generally ordinary, risk-averse people who desire a fixed, decent, 
and risk-free income from their investment deposits. However, in Islamic banking, investment 
 
15  ROY DELWIN A., Islamic Banking, Middle Eastern Studies 1991, Vol. 27, No. 3, 427-456, at 431. 
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depositors are treated as if they are shareholders and are thus entitled to a share of the profits 
or losses made by the bank16 as their agent. In addition to the high-risk nature of these 
transactions, this method of banking demands that profit (or loss) should be divided at the end 
of the Islamic contract period between the bank and the entrepreneur. In other words, Iranian 
investment depositors face two risks; first of all, there is no guarantee that any profit will be 
made. Second, let us assume for the sake of argument that the bank makes a profit. In such 
case, there is still no immediate profit payment to the investment depositors. The assumed 
profit is paid at the end of the contract period. These two high-risk features of Islamic banking, 
without a doubt, increase uncertainty and change the savings behavior of the Iranian people. 
Lack of motivation to invest money in term investment deposits would result in liquidity crisis, 
which would place banks in a poorer position. 
Islamic law forbids fixed or predetermined returns on financial transactions, not an uncertain 
rate of return represented by profit.17 Therefore, Iranian banks needed to design an investment 
deposit model in which the existence of predetermined interest is ruled out but still attractive 
and secure enough for Iranian citizens to invest. To solve the motivation problem and create 
sufficient assurance among investors, Iran’s banking system adopted the strategy of 
provisional profit payments.  Provisional profit is a predetermined and fixed amount of money 
paid prior to the expiration of the ennealogy Islamic contract period and calculation of final 
profit (or loss).18 Paying this predetermined and fixed profit (i.e., provisional profit), with the 
current terms and conditions, makes the Iranian banking system equivalent to an interest-
based banking system. 
1. Provisional Profit in Iran’s Banking System 
According to Art. 4 of the Riba-Free Banking Act, banks may undertake and/or insure the 
principals of term investment deposits. However, no single article in the said Act or its 
regulations points to provisional profit payments. Art. 10 of the Implementing Regulations of 
the Act passed on December 18, 1983 by the Cabinet prohibits the payment of any kind of 
predetermined profit to Term Investment Depositors. To highlight the importance of this rule, 
even the Implementing Guideline of the Act, passed by the Money and Credit Council on 
February 27, 1983, expresses this dictum. Art. 14 states: 
“The banks cannot declare and/or pay any predetermined profit to Term 
Investment Deposit accounts.”19 
Despite this explicit stipulation in Art. 14, Art. 21 of the same Implementing Guideline 
surprisingly uses the phrase provisional profit for the first time in the history of banking in 
Iran. This article authorizes banks to pay provisional profit in specified circumstances. As 
discussed above, after the expiration of the agency contract period, the final and actual profits 
 
16  KHAN MOHSIN S./MIRAKHOR ABBAS, Islamic Banking: Experiences in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 1998, Vol. 38, No. 2, 353-375, at 355. 
17  KHAN/MIRAKHOR, supra n. 16, at 354. 
18  JALILI HOSSEIN MIR,  ایرانُتجربهُدرُبهرهُبدونُبانکداریُمسائل (Interest-free Banking Experience in 
Iran), Research and Economic Policy 2002, Vol. 22, 127-152, at 128. 
19 Emphasis added by the author. 
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(losses) are shared between the bank and the entrepreneur. According to this article, however, 
if the client, prior to the expiration of the contract period, decides to dissolve the agency 
contract, “the profit will be calculated on a provisional basis, and the final and actual profit will 
be paid at the end of the fiscal year.” Therefore, payment of any kind of provisional profit is 
evidently supposed to be a simple solution in cases of dissolution. This exceptional solution 
should not be generalized and extended whatsoever.  
It has been proven many times throughout human history that Necessitas non habet legem, and 
certainly Iran’s banking system cannot change this hard-set rule. On January 15, 1992, Iran’s 
banking system took a giant leap toward interest-based banking. The Money and Credit 
Council, at its 758th session, in order to create a safe and secure investment environment, 
decreed that: “[T]he granting of any kind of benefits and profits such as guaranteed profit, 
provisional profit, […] are clear examples of banking, monetary and credit activities that banks 
and credit institutions who are authorized by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
are permitted to do.”20 Although the Money and Credit Council, as one of the pillars of the 
Central Bank, is “in a position to consider and decide on the general policy of the Central Bank 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to supervise the monetary and banking affairs of the 
country”21 it unquestionably cannot enact a regulation that violates the letter or the spirit of the 
Riba-Free Banking Act. Enactment of such regulation is a blatant violation of Islamic banking, 
which is formed on the basis of necessity. In consonance with the said regulation, Iranian 
banks explicitly and impudently undertake to pay a monthly provisional profit to depositors. 
For example, Saman Bank’s agreement states: “The share of long-term investment profits, 
according to relevant regulations, is calculated provisionally and will be paid on a monthly 
basis to the depositor's account. The final settlement in respect of the actual profit shall be 
made at the end of each fiscal year.”  
In past years, the Money and Credit Council has determined various rates for provisional 
profit. The provisional profit rate is always a function of the inflation rate. Currently, under a 
directive of the Money and Credit Council dated June 24, 2014,22 the provisional profit rate is as 
follows: 
Maximum Provisional Profit Rate of Investment 
Deposit Accounts in Iran’s Banking System 
Type of Deposit Accounts Percentage of Annual Provisional Profit 
Short-Term Deposit Investment Account 10.0 
Short-Term Deposit Investment Account 
(Three Months to Less than Six Months) 
14.0 
 
20  Emphasis added by the author. 
21  Article 18 of the Monetary and Banking Act of Iran, adopted on July 9th 1971 and revised on January 11, 2014. 
22  Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Press Release, available at http://www.cbi.ir/showitem/11923.aspx, last 
accessed on 28 December 2015. 
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Short-Term Deposit Investment Account 
(Six Months to less than Nine Months) 
16.0 
Short-Term Deposit Investment Account 
(Nine Months to Less than One Year) 
18.0 
Long-Term Deposit Investment Account 
(One Year) 
22.0 
2. Legal Nature of Provisional Profit under Shari’ah Principles 
As discussed above, until the expiration or dissolution of the agency contract, depositors are 
not entitled to receive any kind of profits (losses). So the main question is how to justify the 
legal nature of provisional profit under Shari’ah’s financial principles. 
Basically, the concept of provisional profit is that a bank pays a fixed and predetermined profit 
to a depositor provided that after the final calculation and determination of each party’s share 
(the bank as the agent and the entrepreneur), if the amount paid as provisional profit is less 
than the actual and final profit, the bank will pay the differential amount to the depositor. 
However, if the actual and final profit is less than the provisional profit, the depositor must 
return the differential amount to the bank. Contrary to interest-based banking, where the 
interest immediately becomes the lender’s property without any element of consideration or 
conditions, the ownership of provisional profit does not unconditionally pass to the depositor 
and the depositor is obliged to return the differential amount to the bank. This conditional 
transfer of ownership means provisional profit is more like a loan.  By way of explanation, 
when opening a term investment deposit account, two contractual relationships are formed 
between the bank and the customer. Based on the first explicit relationship, under the agency 
contract, the customer appoints the bank as his representative for investment. Under the 
second relationship, the bank loans a monthly fixed and predetermined amount of money to 
the depositor. This regular payment in the form of an implicit loan contract creates sufficient 
incentive among depositors to keep their fund in deposit accounts. After determining the 
agent’s (the bank’s) share of the final profit on the investment, the bank—after deducting of 
expenses and fees—gives the final profit to the principal (the depositor).  
On the other hand, the depositor must also pay off his loan to the bank. Consequently, when 
two parties are indebted to one another at the same time, their debts are annulled by a set-off to 
the extent of the amount owed by both parties. To that extent, the parties are released from 
their mutual debts.23 Finally, if, after the set-off, one party still owes money to the other, the 
debtor must settle his account. 
As long as the Iranian banks are committed to the theoretical principals of this approach (as 
described above), the elements of insecurity and instability will be the main hallmarks that 
 
23  The Civil Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1935), Art. 295. 
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distinguish provisional profit in Islamic banking from interest in conventional banking. 
Insecurity and instability mean that depositors have no assurance that any profit will be made 
and the rate of profit remains unknown. Theoretically, it is possible that after the final 
calculations, depositors who participate in investment may lose all their funds and hence must 
restore the total amount of provisional profit to the bank. As a result, “the cost of being a 
Muslim”24 can be extraordinary high for ordinary Iranian citizens. 
3. Provisional Profit in Practice 
The current and actual practice of Iranian banks in light of the provisional profit payment 
scheme is paradoxical to the Islamic injunction against riba. The difference between 
‘provisional profit’ and ‘interest’ is not supposed to be a mere technicality or choice of 
vocabulary. There is a profound conceptual difference between these two approaches. The 
elements of insecurity and instability mentioned above are the key fundamental distinction. If 
these indispensable elements are detached from the scheme, we will only have a rhetorical 
dichotomy or, in the words of Mr. DELWIN A. ROY, “[a] cosmetic operation that may show an 
Islamic bank's inability to perform in a truly Islamic manner.”25 
Practical procedures of Iranian banks in the years following the adoption of the provisional 
profit scheme absolutely eliminated the elements of insecurity and instability. Performance of 
the banking system in Iran over the last 23 years, especially the method of calculating final and 
actual profit, has created and shaped a surety and certainty in society that provisional profit is 
indeed actual profit. During these years, there has not been a single case of withdrawal of extra 
profit from depositors. Oddly enough, not a single case in which actual profit is less than 
provisional profit is on record. It has been consistently proven that the most skilled financial 
and investment experts make mistakes in predicting the investment environment but 
surprisingly, Iranian banks have always been profitable and paid provisional profit as the 
minimum final and actual profit. Undoubtedly, the reason for this is to keep customers 
satisfied and avoid losing funds. However, this practice of Iranian banks has caused depositors 
not to consider provisional profit as a temporary loan.  
The result is that the crucial elements of insecurity and instability are separated and detached 
from the scheme. Provisional profit is calculated based on the simple above-mentioned rate 
formula and is paid on a monthly basis to depositors. Depositors have no obligations or 
responsibilities to banks. They regularly receive their provisional profit, and Iranian banks set 
provisional profit rates and treat them as the final profit rates at the end of the fiscal year. 
Many people are not even aware of the provisional profit structure. As far as they are 
concerned, they like to receive a monthly fixed and risk-free income from their investment. In 
the current banking system of Iran, provisional profit has the same meaning and function as 
interest in conventional banking. As one of Iran’s current Parliament members said: 
“Provisional profit is just an estimated figure so the depositors know the ballpark figure of the 
profit they are going to make. Of course, after auditing, the actual profit should be announced 
 
24  ABDUL-RAHMAN YAHIA, The Art of Islamic Banking and Finance: Tools and Techniques for Community-Based 
Banking, New Jersey 2010, at 199. 
25  ROY, supra n. 15, at 431. 
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and the final profit rate will necessarily vary from the provisional profit rate.”26 The current 
scheme, regardless of the name chosen for it, contains a fixed predetermined risk-free rate of 
return on investment and definitely does not differ in essence and nature from the interest-
based system. 
V. Solution 
In accordance with the Act and regulations, funds obtained by banks from investment deposits 
can be used through ennealogy Islamic contracts. These ennealogy contracts can be simply 
divided into two categories: The first category is based on the PLS scheme and includes 
Mosharka, Mozarebeh, Mozara-ah, Mosaqat, Joaalah, direct investment, and forward dealings. 
In this category, entrepreneurs are not guarantee a predetermined and fixed profit, and 
financing operations are based on an unknown rate of return derived from the PLS. The second 
category consists of hire-purchase contracts and Installment Transactions. As defined in Art. 47 
of the Implementing Regulations, a hire-purchase contract is a lease contract in which the bank 
purchases goods for their clients and under the conditions stipulated in the contract, 
ownership gradually passes to the tenant with the payment of installments. The same scenario 
is true in the case of installment transactions. The rent in hire-purchase contracts and sales 
prices in installment transactions are determined by taking the bank’s cost and profit into 
account. Thus, contrary to the first category, the rate of return is clear and defined at the initial 
stage. 
The difference between the bank’s profits in the first category and profits in the latter category 
is quite obvious. In the first category, banks are expected to make a profit. There is no guarantee 
that such profit will be made, as profits may be much greater than the expected sum. This is the 
nature of the PLS scheme. However, in the second category, the bank’s profits are guaranteed 
and the entrepreneur must pay the guaranteed profit, which means there is no risk. 
To fully adapt to Shari’ah principles and solve the riba dilemma, the Iranian banking system 
should design two types of accounts. The first type should be based on the PLS scheme (the 
first category of contracts as mentioned above). There is no predetermined and fixed profit for 
this type of account so it is suitable for those who wish to take more risk to make more profit. 
On the other hand, the second type is a risk-free account. This type of account is based on the 
second category of contracts. These contracts have a fixed rate of return and are fully be 
functional in the framework of Shari’ah principles and the Act as they are not based on the PLS 
scheme. For this type of account, banks are not participating in a risky business with an 
unknown rate of return. However, determination of a fixed profit rate is not prohibited in these 
accounts. Thus, Iranian Banks can pay a fixed and definite profit at specified intervals to 
depositors. This is precisely why the problem of provisional profit payments is avoided in 
these accounts. Without a doubt, the amount of profit in this type of account is reduced 
compared to the amount in the first type of account. However, to build a fully Islamic financial 
system, Muslims must pay the price and cannot have the best of both worlds. 
 
26  Islamic Consultative Assembly News Agency, available at http://www.icana.ir/Fa/News/255195, last accessed 28 
December 2015. 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
Islamic banking has always tried to provide an alternative to conventional banking systems. 
They both have the same function in societies. In other words, all roads lead to Rome. 
However, the Islamic banking road has its own characteristics and requirements. The Islamic 
injunction against riba has major effects and outcomes on the deposit side of Islamic banking 
activities. The post-revolutionary financial system of Iran, as a front runner of Islamic banking, 
has tried to design a risk-free Islamic investment deposit account based on the PLS scheme in 
which depositors can receive profits on a monthly basis, which is quite similar to interest-based 
banking. Thereupon, Iranian banks came up with the provisional profit payment scheme. The 
current scheme totally changes the structure of PLS and makes it a risk-free and safe business. 
The contemporary practice of provisional profit is contrary to the principles of Shari’ah. It is 
easy to infer that Iranian banks have tried to prevent a cash-flow problem.  
The Act should be amended. To honor Islamic values, the financial system of Iran needs to 
incorporate two types of accounts: one based on the PLS scheme, where depositors share 
profits and losses in proportion to their fund contributions, and the other one based on the 
hire-purchase contract and installment transactions with a fixed rate of return, where 
depositors receive risk-free, fixed, and definite monthly profits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
